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ABSTRACT 
MOIRA NELSON: Education Policy and the Consequences for  
Labor Market Integration in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands 
(Under the direction of John D. Stephens) 
The increased risk of skill obsolescence calls for new types of education policy that facilitate learning 
throughout the life course. I build two indices in order to express the types of education policy 
required to ameliorate this increased risk as well as explore variation in the degree to which different 
countries succeed at developing education policy to address this risk. Analyzing the origins behind the 
country rankings on these two indices, the results from the fuzzy set and regression analysis 
underscore a Scandinavian path to high rankings on both indices buttressed by the key presence of 
high left party incumbency and a powerful state. With respect to the skill transparency index, an 
additional path appears plausible consisting of strong right party incumbency combined with 
relatively well-organized social partners and left parties. Also, Christian democratic incumbency 
appears particularly hazardous for the development of policies that secure the transparent certification 
of skills. Examining the cases of Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands in greater detail provides 
evidence first for the role of the various political factors described above in influencing the 
development of education policy. Three thematic groups of education policies are considered, the 
comprehensive school movement, continuing education, and active labor market policies.Second, firm 
interviews regarding firms’ involvement in active labor market policies help to delve deeper into the 
mechanisms by which mutually beneficial policy outcomes are facilitated or made more difficult. 
Although Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands have all used active labor market policies to 
reintegrate workers into the labor market, the types of policies each country has pursued as well as the 
degree of investment that these policies have both demanded and received from firms varied.     
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Skill-biased technological change, trade, and financial liberalization change the skills demanded 
by firms across advanced industrialized economies. Trade and financial liberalization shift 
production in goods requiring low skill levels to low-wage countries, increasing the premium on 
higher skills as well as the demand for skills complementary to service section production such as 
social skills. Technological change increases the skill intensity of production across industries, 
which includes the particular increase in the intensity of cognitive skills; due to the high rate of 
technological change and the changed role of knowledge in the production process, the types of 
skills demanded is in a constant state of flux.  
 
These developments induce skill obsolescence to the degree that workers no longer hold all of the 
skills necessary to function in their current or a comparable employment position. The structure of 
national education systems, moreover, holds consequences for the capacity of workers to prevent 
and respond to skill obsolescence by structuring opportunities to enter into formal education and 
overseeing the transparent certification of skills. In these ways, the education system not only 
delivers skills, but also governs the distribution of labor market opportunities. The impact of skill-
biased technological change, trade, and financial liberalization on skill obsolescence opens up a 
role of education policy to address skill obsolescence and thereby reduce the risk of labor market 
marginalization. 
 
Education policy as an appropriate tool to reduce skill obsolescence and thus labor market 
marginalization, however, does not receive sufficient attention in the social policy or comparative 
political economy literatures. Scholarly work has generally focused on the mix between changed 
economic conditions, labor market regulation, and social policy to explain the causes of and 
solutions to the heightened risk of labor market marginalization. The analysis here speaks to this 
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debate by illuminating the central role of national education systems in influencing the degree to 
which workers’ skill sets reflect current skill demands. 
 
This study aims at making four central contributions. The first contribution of this study includes a 
comprehensive conceptualization of education systems. The welfare state and comparative 
political economy literatures have generally not included education policy within the conventional 
set of redistributive policies despite the significant ramifications of education policy for labor 
market opportunity structures. Conceptualizing the role of education policy within a political 
science framework motivates the delineation of two dimensions of education policy in this study. 
The first dimension of education policy captures the degree to which education policy expands 
opportunities to acquire skills. Analysis of the consequences of education policy for opportunities 
to acquire skills has a long history within the sociology literature and naturally the education 
policy literature. Within the political science literature, however, the link between education 
policy on the one hand and political contestation and redistributive outcomes is less studied. There 
are exceptions to this generalization (e.g. Castles 1989), and indeed in the past few years there has 
been increased attention paid to the political determinants of educational investment by national 
governments and private firms (e.g. Busemeyer 2007; Hall & Soskice 2001b; Iversen & Stephens 
2008). By addressing the issue of opportunities to acquire skills and cataloging the host of 
education policies that expand educational opportunities, the theoretical and empirical 
construction of this first dimension contributes to this growing debate on the redistributive politics 
of education. 
 
The second dimension of education systems developed in this study builds off the argument that 
the manner in which skills are certified influences their actual and perceived market value. The 
concept of skill certification was given central attention in Thelen’s (2004) study of skill regimes 
in Japan, the UK, the US and Germany, which recognized not only the distributive aspects of skill 
certification but also linked the control over certification measures to the quality of firm-based 
training. Outside of this study, however, the topic of skill certification and related issues of skill 
transparency have been all but absent from research on the political contestation of skills.  
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Attempts at harmonization of educational standards across the European Union has placed 
educational reform on the policy agendas of Member States and helped to instigate a data-
gathering process on the subject of certification structures that has had the consequence of 
facilitating comparison within Europe and beyond. The urgency to harmonize qualification 
systems across Europe underscores the recognition among policy-makers of the obstructive effects 
of the non-transparency of skills on labor mobility.  
 
Analogous attention in scholarly work to issues of skill certification is also needed. The 
consequences of skill certification and, by extension, skill transparency are not insignificant, yet 
most studies implicitly assume that economic actors have complete information with regards to 
workers’ skill sets. Also, virtually no study except the Thelen book endogenizes firms’ preferences 
over the certification of skills. The theoretical and empirical construction of a skill transparency 
dimension, which captures education policies that promote the clear certification of skills and the 
recognition of complementary skills between occupational and educational units, aims to address 
this lacuna in the literature. 
 
The second main contribution involves a systematic analysis of the determinants of the skill 
acquisition and skill transparency dimensions. Using fuzzy set and regression analysis, the 
explanatory value is tested of factors frequently related to the passage of generous social policy. 
The results allow for comparison of the origins of education policies that promote both 
opportunities to acquire skills as well as skill transparency with the existing body of knowledge 
about the determinants of the development and change of the welfare state.  
 
The third main contribution of this study lies in examining political contestation over education 
policy in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. Given the dearth of political science studies on 
education policy, the historical case studies of these three generous welfare states provides above 
all information about the distributive politics of education policy in these three countries. The 
analysis divides the policies from the skill acquisition and skill transparency dimensions into five 
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groups in order to facilitate the discussion of education policy from a historical perspective. These 
groups include the comprehensive schooling, state planning, firm-based training, active labor 
market policies, and qualification systems.  
 
Beyond intrinsic informational value, these comparative historical analyses also speak to broader 
debates within the welfare state and comparative political economy literatures on the causes of and 
solutions to the problem of marginalized employment. In particular, the comparative studies on 
education policy draw out the stark differences between social democratic and Christian 
democratic incumbency in supporting education policies that facilitate skill transparency. By 
linking the effect of such policies to the occurrence and intensity of labor market marginalization, 
this study introduces an explanatory variable that holds the promise of offering considerable 
leverage in explaining recurrent difficulties in Christian democratic countries to reduce long-term 
unemployment.  
 
The fourth main contribution of this study is the dataset composed of firm-based interviews in 
Germany and the Netherlands. By replicating the interviews conducted by C. J. Martin (Martin 
2004b; Martin & Swank 2004; Martin 2004c) in Denmark and the UK in the German and Dutch 
context, the study facilitates cross-national comparisons of firm behavior.  
 
To make these contributions, the study consists of ten additional chapters. Chapter 2 lays out the 
theoretical framework of the study, explaining the growing need to gain skills throughout the 
career and the role of education policy in addressing this need. The theoretical discussion is 
followed up by an empirical section that develops two indices that aim to capture the two 
theoretical dimensions: the ‘skill acquisition’ index measures the extent to which education policy 
expands opportunities to acquire skills and the ‘skill transparency’ dimension measures the 
strength of policies supporting the clear certification of skills and the recognition of shared skill 
sets between different occupational and educational units. 
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Chapter 3 endogenizes the skill acquisition and skill transparency indices. Using fuzzy set and 
regression analysis appropriate to small N samples, the analysis assesses the explanatory power of 
variables highly relevant to the clarification of social policy outcomes in the welfare state and 
comparative political economy literatures. The results indicate the positive relation between left 
party incumbency, public sector employment, and trade union density to the passage of policies 
promoting skill acquisition and skill transparency, and the detrimental effects of right party 
incumbency to skill acquisition policies and Christian Democratic Party incumbency to skill 
transparency policies.  
 
Chapters 4 through 7 involve comparative historical case studies of education policy in Denmark, 
Germany, and the Netherlands. Chapter 4 sets up the analysis by justifying the case selection 
method and providing background information on the three cases. Chapter 5 analyzes political 
contestation around comprehensive schooling. Chapter 6 examines the degree of coordination over 
firm-based training. Chapter 7 assesses developments in the field of active labor market policies.  
 
Chapter 8 presents results from 150 firm-based interviews in Denmark, Germany, and the 
Netherlands. The theoretical section develops expectations about the role of business organization 
and the state on private firms’ willingness to hire marginalized workers. The interview data is used 
to substantiate these claims. Chapter 9 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ECONOMIC CHANGE AND SKILL OBSOLESCENCE 
  
Education systems hold the potential to address the heightened risk of skill obsolescence today by 
facilitating skill acquisition and skill transparency. The realization of this potential, however, 
remains contingent on political reforms, because contemporary education systems largely 
developed in a period of lower skill obsolescence when initial education proved sufficient to 
secure employment throughout the career. By facilitating skill acquisition and transparency, 
education systems stand to play a central role in bolstering labor market chances among 
marginalized workers as well as supporting government programs to reintegrate the unemployed.  
 
The potential for education systems to alleviate skill obsolescence abides by the following logic. 
When faced with skill obsolescence, workers lose the capacity to fulfil the tasks required by their 
employment position. Depending on the source and degree of skill obsolescence, workers can 
reduce the ensuing labor market risk by bolstering their competitiveness in their current 
employment position or moving to a new employment position. All of these responses, however, 
require either learning new skills or providing evidence of existing skills to education institutions 
or potential new employers; these actions, in turn, depend largely on the structure of the education 
system.  
 
Two aspects of education systems stand as particularly relevant to the mitigation of skill 
obsolescence, skill acquisition and skill transparency. Education systems influence skill 
acquisition by investing in individuals’ cognitive capacity and creating opportunities to enter into 
formal education. The capacity and opportunity to learn skills reduce the risk of skill obsolescence 
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by facilitating the replacement of obsolete skills with marketable skills. The second dimension, 
skill transparency, refers to the structure of the skill certification system, which governs the formal 
recognition of skills and the acknowledgement of shared skill sets between different academic 
degrees and professional occupations. Due to information problems that employers face in 
assessing job candidates and the extent to which previous coursework acts as a prerequisite for 
further study, the structure of the certification system influences hiring decisions and the range of 
training opportunities that workers’ previous education qualifies them to pursue, respectively. 
Together these dimensions of skill acquisition and skill transparency express how education 
systems influence the ability of workers to prevent and respond to skill obsolescence. To test the 
theoretical claim that education systems mitigate the risk of skill obsolescence, I create two 
indices for these aspects of educational systems. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section defines skill obsolescence and outlines the 
causes of its recent upward trend. The following section builds a model of how education systems 
mitigate skill obsolescence by first reviewing the existing literature on how education policy 
relates to economic and social outcomes and then developing an argument on the particular ways 
in which education systems can address the current risk of skill obsolescence. The analysis section 
outlines the measurement of the indices on skill acquisition and skill transparency, presents the 
results, and then validates the indices by correlating them with measures of observable 
implications of the theoretical argument. The discussion section then explains potential 
implications of the index for the integration of the unemployed and analyzes potential political 
explanations for the country rankings on both dimensions. 
Defining Skill Obsolescence  
While the intensity of skill obsolescence fluctuates over the course of history, recent trends prompt 
a new period of heightened skill obsolescence. To support this claim, it is first necessary to define 
skill obsolescence. In general, skill obsolescence means the loss of the value of skills that workers 
possess, though definitions of obsolescence vary according to how loss is calculated. Viewing 
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obsolescence as a relational concept between workers suggests the following definition: “A person 
is obsolescent to the degree that, relative to other members of his profession, he is not familiar 
with, or is otherwise unfitted to apply, the knowledge, methods, and technologies that generally 
are considered to be important by members of his profession” (Shearer & Steger 1975, p. 265). 
From another perspective, obsolescence does not define the distance from the skills of the average 
worker, but rather the distance from the ideal skill set necessary to complete the task associated 
with a given job. With this understanding, one might consider the following definition: 
“Obsolescence is the degree to which organizational professionals lack up-to-date knowledge or 
skills necessary to maintain effective performance in either their current or future work roles” 
(Kaufman 1974, p. 23). For the purposes of the argument here, I rely on a broad understanding of 
skill obsolescence, where obsolescence refers to the deficiency of skills necessary to fulfill the 
tasks associated with one’s employment position or comparable employment positions. 
 
Different general varieties of skill obsolescence can be identified: skill atrophy due to illness or 
nonuse; job-specific skill obsolescence through technological change; sector-specific skill 
obsolescence due to shifts in employment; and firm-specific skill obsolescence through 
displacement (de Grip 2004). These categories of skill obsolescence cluster into roughly two 
groups: technical obsolescence refers to changes that originate within the individual (e.g. nonuse) 
whereas economic obsolescence refers to decreases in the value of an individual’s human capital 
due to external changes (e.g. technological change) (de Grip et al 2002; Rosen 1975). I focus here 
on economic obsolescence, which occurs through technological developments, trade, sectoral 
employment shifts, company restructuring, and shorter average job tenure.  
 
The literature generally relies on three different ways of measuring skill obsolescence. The most 
direct way to assess obsolescence is through personal assessments (e.g. Allen & van der Velden 
2002; Blechinger & Pfeiffer 2000; Karasek et al 1998; Kaufman 1989; van Loo et al 2001). 
Economic studies tend to focus most on wages (e.g. Jacobson et al 1993; Mincer & Ofek 1982; 
Neuman & Weiss 1995), which should decrease in response to high skill obsolescence. Other 
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studies either look at flow from employment into unemployment (e.g. van Loo et al 2001) or non-
participation (e.g. Allen & De Grip 2005; van Loo et al 2001) as an indicator of human capital 
obsolescence. 
 
Quanitifying skill obsolescence is an illusive task. Measurement issues remain for three main 
reasons. First, both workers and employers’ self-evident incentives to avoid obsolescence will lead 
them to update periodically existing skill sets to adapt to technological innovations or changes in 
the market. These practices will mask obsolescence by reducing skill-obsolescence-induced 
unemployment or non-participation. Declining investments in certain skill sets or increasing 
training efforts could provide additional measures of skill obsolescence, although cross-sectional 
time series data on college majors or in-firm training courses are not available.  
 
Second, labor market regulations frustrate the reflection of skill obsolescence in labor market 
statistics. Sticky wages conceal skill obsolescence by failing to register reductions in productivity. 
In addition, employment protection potentially reduces the likelihood of unemployment of 
workers with obsolete skills, thereby underestimating true levels of skill obsolescence. On the 
other hand, unemployment rates may also overestimate skill obsolescence, because factors besides 
skill obsolescence lead to unemployment (see de Grip 2004).  
 
Finally, personal assessments face the dilemma that obsolescence measures are subject to 
individual biases. For instance, managers may face problems in assessing the skills of their 
subordinates (Borghans et al 2000; de Grip 2004). At the same time, personal assessments hold the 
advantage that they capture potential skill obsolescence not yet reflected in wage levels due to 
wage rigidity.  
 
Having defined skill obsolescence and the main methods of measuring of skill obsolescence, I 
now turn to the main causes of the heightened risk of skill obsolescence in the recent period. 
Doing so clarifies the ways in which skill obsolescence manifests itself by drawing out the ways in 
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which demands for various skilled changed over time. The discussion calls on economic changes 
that alter the level and types of skills needed in advanced industrialized economies as well as the 
changed role of human capital in the production process.  
Recent Causes of Skill Obsolescence 
Over the last three decades or so, a number of economic changes generated a sustained period of 
high skill obsolescence. These changes include trade, financial liberalization, skill-based 
technological change, and the growth of the knowledge economy. Together, these changes alter 
firms’ skill needs. In terms of skill level, trade, capital market liberalization, and skill-based 
technological change lead to a shift towards demand for higher skills. The types of skills that firms 
demand also changed. Firm displacement to foreign countries as well as shorter job tenure 
increases the obsolescence of firm-specific skills. The growth of the service sector and skill-based 
technological change also increase the salience of various social skills, computer related skills, and 
cognitive skills. Below I elaborate on the logic behind and the evidence for these trends. I first 
review the support for the claim that the levels of skills has changed. Then I discuss ways in which 
the types of skills demanded by firms have changed. Finally, I discuss the growth of the 
knowledge economy and how technological innovation shortens the ‘half-life’ of workers’ human 
capital investments and prompts the need to invest more often in training. 
 
Demand for high-skilled workers arises predominantly from trade, financial liberalization and 
skill-based technological change. For the trade argument, the logic of factor price equalization 
suggests that prices for low-skilled labor in developed countries cannot remain above those in 
developing countries. Following Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson assumptions, trade with developing 
countries with abundant low-skilled workers should force down wages of less abundant low-
skilled workers in developed countries; if labor market policy prevent adjustment, unemployment 
among low-skilled workers will rise in low wage countries. International specialization therefore 
drives up skill premia in economically developed nations (Wood 1994; Wood 1995). Increased 
levels of trade between advanced industrialized countries and less developed countries thereby 
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either reduce the return to low-skill work or increase the risk of redundancy. Both lower wages 
and redundancy imply skill obsolescence, either because a worker’s skills no longer suffice to earn 
the previously established wage or because high wage costs led firms of a certain skill-level to 
relocate in low-wage countries, thereby reducing labor demand for these skills in high-wage 
countries. 
 
Financial liberalization allows for massive foreign direct investment (hereafter FDI) flows that, 
according to ‘knowledge capital theory,’ provide firms with incentives to reorganize production in 
ways that are sometimes anagolous to trade. According to Markusen and Maskus (2002; 2002), 
firms in traded industries face three options: they can either remain domestic, internationalize 
‘horizontally’ by dividing similar production processes between different countries, or 
internationalize ‘vertically’ by dividing different production processes across countries. Firms 
follow these strategies depending on firm-level economies of scale and the costs of trade and FDI. 
Horizontal FDI aims to facilitate access to foreign markets, and trade and horizontal FDI are 
therefore substitutes. Vertical FDI aims to take advantage of lower labor costs in countries with 
relatively abundant labor, and trade and vertical FDI are complements because component parts 
return to the home country for completion of the production process. Empirical evidence provides 
evidence for the link between firms incentives to pursue vertical FDI with the relative abudance of 
low-skilled labor in host countries (Hanson et al 2001). The pursuit of vertical FDI therefore 
increases the risk of skill obsolescence among low-skilled workers by shifting their low-skilled 
jobs to low-wage countries, similar to the trade argument.  
 
Skill based technological change involves transformations in production technology that favor 
skilled labor over unskilled labor by increasing its relative productivity. Initial studies assumed 
that technological change was factor neutral and therefore influenced all workers equally (e.g. 
Solow 1957), but recent work finds evidence that technological change produces factor- and 
sector-specific effects (Chusseau et al 2008; Haskel & Slaughter 2002). On the basis of the 
different logics outlined above, scholars explain the clear trend towards increased demand for 
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higher skills and waning demand for low skills (Autor et al 2006; Bresnahan et al 2002; 
Geishecker ; Nickell & Bell 1995). Skill based technological change therefore increases skill 
obsolescence by reducing the returns to low-level skills. 
 
Beyond the increased obsolescence of low-level skills, broad types of skills also face obsolescence 
either because they have become redundant to the production process or because new skills 
become relatively more imporant. To begin, firm-specific skills face higher obsolescence in recent 
times. Firm displacement due to trade and financial liberalization as well as shorter terms of tenure 
increases the obsolescence of various firm-specific skills since workers who lose their position in 
a firm can no longer apply these skills to new jobs.  
 
Sectoral employment shifts and skill based technological change also create new skill needs. An 
oft-cited skill requirement includes cognitive skills, which are mental skills used in gaining 
knowledge such as reasoning, perception and intuition. Furthermore, in contrast to product-
specific skills dominant in the industrial period, the focus today is on problem solving, 
entrepreneurship, communication, and social skills (Bengtsson 1993; Green et al 2000). Since 
service sector jobs typically involve face-to-face interaction, an ability to communicate and 
interact with a broad range of individuals greatly facilitates business. High rates of service sector 
growth thereby generate high demand for social skills. 
 
Skill based technological change also calls for cognitive skills due to the need to work with and 
create new technologies. Frequently cited in the literature is the development of information and 
communication technologies, the impact of which is most often captured by the expansion of 
computer-based technologies. Demonstrating the salience of this technology for changing skill 
needs, studies indeed show that skill-upgrading occurs at highest rates in computer-intensive 
sectors (Autor et al 1998). Computers represent what Rosen (1975, pp. 199-200) labels a vintage 
effect, which occurs when “stocks of knowledge available to society change from time to time 
[and] capital losses are imposed on those embodying the earlier knowledge and skills.” The 
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capacity to function within a computer-based environment demands new competencies: “Effective 
use of computer systems calls for new cognitive skills, having a deep understanding of one’s own 
organization and one’s customers’ needs. Even those managerial and professional workers who 
never touch computers are having their work transformed in this way, calling for more and more 
complex bodies of skill and knowledge” (Bresnahan et al 2002). The development of new 
technologies therefore calls for a new type of worker with the capacity to operate these 
technologies and apply them to existing work practices. 
 
Additionally, business in a service-based technologically advanced society is more customer-
orientated than was production in the industrial period. This tendency acquired the label mass 
customization, which stems from computer-based advancements that make the unification of low 
unit costs with mass production processes with the flexibility of custom-design possible (Pine 
1999). Although the occurrence of long supply chains inhibits the development of mass 
customization, facilitating greater individualization on a mass scale defines a current shift in 
production strategies and management techniques.  
 
In sum, the need to operate both with new technologies and more closely with customer needs 
increases demands for cognitive skills. In constrast to the skills required during the period of 
industrialization, the new period places more value on the ability to analyze and incorporate 
information quickly into the production process. Individuals who fail to adapt to these new skill 
needs face obsolescence, because their existing skill set does not suffice to compete effectively on 
the labor market. 
 
The higher emphasis on cognitive skills in a postindustrial period belies a larger transformation in 
the nature of production. According to scholars of the ‘knowledge economy,’ the continued 
obsolescence of skills is a characteristic feature of the current era. The roots of the knowledge 
economy can be traced to innovations in scientific and information technology and can be defined 
as “production and services based on knowledge-intensive activities that contribute to an 
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accelerated pace of technological and scientific advance as well as equally rapid obsolescence” 
(Powell & Snellman 2004, p.201). David and Foray continue this line of thought and, 
acknowledging the critical role of knowledge in economic growth, explain that “the crux of the 
issue lies in the accelerating (and unprecedented) speed at which knowledge is created, 
accumulated, and, most probably, depreciates in terms of economic relevance and value” (David 
& Foray 2003, p. 21). Though defining knowledge frustrates analysis, some describe the salience 
of knowledge as the heightened need of ‘articulating and integrating’ information into activities 
(Winch 2003) or the importance of ‘know-why’ (more theoretical knowledge), ‘know-how’ 
(skills), and ‘know-who’ (networks) as compared to ‘know-what’ (facts) (OECD 1996). 
 
The breadth and depth of the knowledge economy remain controversial. Whereas some research 
views these changes as structural, influencing the whole economy (Bell 1973; Romer 1990), other 
research focuses more narrowly on productivity growth in certain industries (Brynjolfsson & Hitt 
2003). Another strand of this literature looks at the capacity for knowledge transfer within the firm 
(Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995; Prusak 1997), which implicitly upholds a widespread view that the 
diffusion of new technologies depends on the development of complementary institutions and 
policies (Bengtsson 1993; David 1990). Beyond a handful of fields such as biotechnology where 
high levels of R&D and patents clearly demonstrate innovation, the extent to which the knowledge 
economy affects all workers is difficult to quantify.  
 
Attemtps to gauge the development of the knowledge economy tend to focus either on stocks of 
knowledge including human, organizational, and intellectual capital or on activities including 
investment in training and information technology, R&D expenditure, and organizational reform 
(Powell & Snellman 2004). By far, however, the most commonly used measure of knowledge 
intensive production is patent data. High quality US patent data is publicly available (Hall et al), 
and demonstrate an upward trend since 1983 that takes off in the late 1990s, particularly in 
biotechnology and semiconductors. Finland provides a European example. Based predominantly 
on paper and forestry production in 1960, the growth in telecommunications and multiplex 
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communications overtook these traditional industries in terms of patent size in 1994 (Powell & 
Snellman 2004). Additional support for the growth of knowledge intensive production shows an 
increase in the share of high tech patents in Finland, from 8.9 percent in 1990, to 30.3 percent in 
1995, and 51.6 percent in 2000 (Powell & Snellman 2004; Zoppè 2002). The more salient role of 
knowledge in the production process increases the risk of skill obsolescence, because new 
‘vintages’ are constantly developed, thereby reducing the relative value of existing skills. Since 
skills become obsolete quickly, individuals who fail to learn new technologies stand the risk of 
becoming obsolete as well. 
 
To summarize, economic changes in the last few decades of the twentieth century altered the level 
and types of skills necessary to find stable employment. In some cases, jobs may simply no longer 
exist that use the workers’ existing skills. This is the case where firms become insolvent or move 
abroad as well as in cases where workers’ firm-specific skills lose value because they become 
redundant. Skill obsolescence also occurs when new skill needs reduce the relative value of 
workers’ existing skills. This occurs due to new skill needs generated by both technological 
change and sectoral shifts in production. 
 
These changing skill demands influence the capacity of individuals to retain their productivity in 
their current job or find similar employment positions. The degree of skill obsolescence inflicted 
by these economic changes varies by position, firm, sector and country. To minimize the effects of 
skill obsolescence, namely unemployment or job instability, it is necessary to anticipate 
obsolescence and adjust accordingly in terms of either gaining skills or changing employment. 
Participating in training holds the potential to reduce the negative consequences of skill 
obsolescence. Assessing the influence of lifelong learning on skill obsolescence, de Grip and van 
Loo find that training decreased the chance of unemployment or early labor market exit among 
workers (Allen & De Grip 2005). The study also showed proof that training occurs more often in 
jobs with high rates of obsolescence and that a decrease in training activity increases the 
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probability of future job loss. Drawing on these insights, the next section explores how education 
can mitigate the negative consequences of skill obsolescence. 
Education and Social Risks 
Education policy represents an obvious policy area for addressing declining value in workers’ 
human capital investment. For clarity, education systems include the rules, regulations and 
institutions that govern entry into new forms of education (prerequisites and costs), the content of 
education courses (curriculum), and the way in which skills are formally certified (categorization 
of skills, formal acknowledgement). Due to difficulties in collecting data and validating 
comparability, the issue of curricula is not addressed in detail here. The role of curricula 
differences in explaining responses to skill obsolescence is therefore only handled cursorily as part 
of the discussion on skill forecasting and state planning.  
 
Highly relevant international organizations recognized the potential of education policy to address 
heightened labor market risk. In response to the increased incidence of labor market 
marginalization and the development of the knowledge economy, both the OECD and the World 
Bank developed agendas for education reform. The OECD’s Schooling for Tomorrow Programme 
and the World Bank’s report, Lifelong Learning for the Global Knowledge Economy, encapsulate 
the views of these organizations. Both institutions call for governments to address the salient role 
of knowledge in today’s economy by expanding opportunities to learn throughout the career as 
well as preparing young children to cope in a technologically advanced economy. However, while 
both agendas forward the idea of ‘learning to learn,’ the World Bank policy promotes a policy of 
competitive individualism whereas the OECD focuses more on institutional configurations that 
support the sharing of knowledge (Robertson 2005). The difference between these responses 
suggests the diversity of possible responses to economic change. 
 
Despite the variety of potential policy responses, all education reforms infer a move away from 
passive social policies towards an active welfare state. Passive social policies exist on the 
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assumption that income replacement during an absence from work upholds the value of workers’ 
skills by providing adequate search time (DiPrete 2002; Gangl 2004) or induces investment in 
specific skills (Hall & Soskice 2001b). While short term income support does indeed help to 
maintain high employment levels (Bradley & Stephens 2007), insuring the future value of skills 
becomes a risky business in a period of heightened skill obsolescence. Since the best safeguard of 
human capital is participation in the labor market (Huber & Stephens 2001; Scharpf 2001), 
sustaining prolonged labor market exit on the logic of the insurance principle becomes 
contradictory, particularly if skill obsolescence triggered unemployment. Under these conditions, 
social policy focused on upholding employment levels should emphasize investment skills to 
improve workers’ employment opportunities, rather than insuring obsolete skills. 
 
Despite the attention to education reform by international organizations, the political science 
literature has not given the education reforms much consideration for their potential role in an 
active welfare state agenda. The political science literature addresses the increased risk of skill 
obsolescence under the rubric of new social risks as well as part of the discussion about shifting 
the focus of welfare state policy towards labor market participation rather than labor market exit, 
i.e. activation. New social risks refer to “situations in which individuals experience welfare losses 
and that have arisen as a result of the socioeconomic transformations that have taken place during 
the past three to four decades and that are generally subsumed under the heading of 
postindustrialization” (Bonoli 2007, p.498). Industrial unemployment, low-value-added service 
sector jobs, single parenthood, and temporary or part time work represent the most prevalent new 
social risks.  
 
The potential of education policy to address these new risks, however, does not receive much 
attention in the academic literature. As case in point, scholars note that education has always held 
a precarious position in the comparative political economy literature (Arnesen & Lundahl 2006; 
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Iversen & Stephens 2008).1 An EU-funded project at Uppsala University found that research on 
education reform rarely addressed aspects of social exclusion and inclusion (Popkewitz et al 
1999). Perhaps also complicating the analysis of the effects of education policy, Arnesen and 
Lundahl (2006) also recognize that: “[i]n contrast to other parts of the welfare apparatus, e.g. 
health care and social services, education is supposed to serve several masters simultaneously. Not 
only should it provide the individual citizen with a certain safety and social connection, it must 
also contribute to economic growth by producing human capital” (286). In short, education policy 
does not assume a central role in the welfare state literature and vice versa.  
 
Recent work has begun to explore the distributive politics of education (e.g. Ansell 2006; 
Busemeyer 2007; Iversen & Stephens 2008) drawing particularly on the power resources approach 
(Stephens 1979; Wilensky 1975). Social democrats tend to spend more than other parties on all 
levels of education (Busemeyer 2008; Iversen & Stephens 2008), which some interpret as an 
alternative ‘left’ growth strategy (Adsera & Boix 2000; Boix 1998). Right parties spend less than 
other parties (Busemeyer 2007), and Christian democrats spend relatively less on primary and 
tertiary education than their Scandinavian neighbors (Iversen & Stephens 2008). Moreover, due to 
a trade-off between education and social insurance policies, Christian democratic parties’ 
preference for social insurance may cause them to forego opportunities to expand education 
funding. Other factors that increase public education spending include a relatively young 
population, a decentralized fiscal system, high numbers of veto points, and high levels of public 
spending (Busemeyer 2007).  
 
Beyond a redistributive role, the varieties of capitalism approach (Hall & Soskice 2001b) 
illuminates a second goal of education policy. Focusing on firms’ needs, the varieties of capitalism 
approach dichotomizes countries according to the degree to which production relies on specific 
                                                 
1 A brief look through major journals demonstrates that most political science work on education 
examines its role in state-building and democracy. See Baum MA, Lake DA. 2003. The Political 
Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital. American Journal of Political Science 47:333-
47, Brown DS, Hunter W. 2004. Democracy and Human Capital Formation: Education Spending in 
Latin America, 1980 to 1997. Comparative Political Studies 37:842, Stasavage D. 2005. Democracy 
and Education Spending in Africa. American Journal of Political Science 49:343-58. 
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skills. Where specific skill production dominates, firms develop an incentive to invest more highly 
in firm-based vocational education, or apprenticeships. Firms prefer apprenticeships because they 
want to control the content of training. In order to ensure the sustained production of specific 
skills, firms rely on additional labor market institutions and social policies. For instance, social 
pressure on firms to invest in apprentices reduces free-riding, unemployment insurance induces 
workers’ investment in such skills by supporting long job search time, and industry-wide training 
standards guarantee increase external demand for apprentices (see Hall & Soskice 2001b).  
 
Despite these recent studies in political science, other fields such as economics, sociology and 
comparative education demonstrate a long history of assessing the diversity in educational 
institutions and their consequences for various micro and macro outcomes. Economists recognize 
the role of education in economic growth (e.g. Barro 1997; Romer 1994). Working predominantly 
on the micro level, sociologists consider the stratifying effects of education policy (e.g. Kerckhoff 
2001; Müller & Shavit 1998; Shavit 2007; Shavit et al 1998). Comparative education scholars 
explore education policy in different nations and investigate the social, economic, and political 
factors that explain the variation (e.g. Boli et al 1985; de Bruijn & Howieson 1995; Finlay & 
Niven 1996; Grollmann & Ruth 2006). The theory that I delineate below shares the sociological 
perspective on stratification, particularly among the low skilled, though the independent variable 
of interest remains the macro structure of educational institutions, and the analysis tries to 
understand how these structures influence the labor market integration of marginalized workers. 
The richness of the economics, sociological and comparative education research helps to develop 
a model of how education systems influence reintegration efforts. Analyzing the politics of 
education reform, moreover, helps to address the question of why countries fail to invest highly in 
human capital and why some social groups face relatively higher labor market risk than others. 
Drawing on these various explanations of factors influencing educational spending, the structural 
of education institutions, and the social and economic ramifications of education policy, the 
following section builds upon this discussion to develop a model of how education institutions can 
mitigate the heightened risk of skill obsolescence.  
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Building a Theoretical Model for the Relationship between Education Policy and Labor Market 
Integration 
 
In order to flesh out how education institutions can reduce the risk of skill obsolescence, I draw 
out two theoretical dimensions along which education policy varies. The unit of analysis is for 
both dimensions is the skill set of an individual. I am interested in ways in which education 
institutions facilitate the adjustment mechanism of a (partially) obsolete skill set to a non-obsolete 
skill set. In my conceptualization, this can occur in two ways: either by acquiring new skills or by 
making existing skills more transparent to economic actors. First, education institutions can create 
the capacity or opportunity for individuals to acquire new skills. For example, in terms of 
cognitive ability, education systems can endow individuals with a strong initial education that 
makes it easier for them to acquire skills later in life. In terms of opportunities, education 
institutions can provide financial relief or mandate firms to provide training. Therefore, education 
policy can be understood as reducing the risk of skill obsolescence by investing in cognitive 
capacity and providing opportunities to gain new skills. For conceptual clarity, I will call this 
dimension the skill acquisition dimension.  
 
Second, education institutions influence the transparency of individuals’ skill sets, where 
transparency refers to the formal recognition of skills and the acknowledgement of shared skill 
sets between different academic degrees and professional occupations. Skills are typically learned 
as part of a broader group of similar or related skills. To the extent that educational degrees and 
job descriptions only acknowledge a skill as belonging to a specific academic degree or 
occupational profession, overlap between the skill sets of different educational degrees or 
professions does not receive acknowledgement. If authorities begin to recognize individually the 
various skills included as part of educational degrees or job descriptions, it becomes possible to 
measure the degree of overlap between of different degrees or professions. By extension, the 
coursework necessary to change professions can be developed. In education systems that facilitate 
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skill acquisition and skill transparency, skills at the lower end of the distribution should be 
relatively higher and the incidence of employment precariousness should be relatively lower. I call 
this dimension the skill transparency dimension. 
 
The two concepts underlying these two dimensions, skill acquisition and skill transparency, align 
closely with the concepts of vertical and horizontal organizational differentiation developed by 
Aage Sorensen (1970). Vertical differential refers to division of student cohorts into different 
ability groups, whereas horizontal differentiation implies division according to different types of 
curricula. This comparison is useful because it provides an example of a study that links education 
structures to the distribution of skills within a given social group. However, whereas Sorensen was 
interested in the effect of school organization on student achievement, I am interested in the 
national structure of education policy more generally and the consequences for the skills, defined 
by level and transparency, of workers trained within that national structure. 
 
To recapitulate, the theoretical argument developed above contends that education policy holds the 
potential to reduce the risk of skill obsolescence and does so by expanding opportunities either for 
individuals to acquire skills or by increasing the transparency of existing skills. Policies that 
expand opportunities to acquire skills constitute the skill acquisition dimension, and policies that 
improve skill transparency make up the skill transparency dimension. The observable implications 
of these two theoretical dimensions include expectations about skill levels and training behavior. 
In particular, high rankings on the skill acquisition and skill transparency dimension should be 
linked to higher average skill levels and training rates. Policies promoting skill acquisition will 
endow workers with strong cognitive skills that enable them to learn relatively efficiently and 
increase incentives to take up post-compulsory education due to higher expectations of success. 
These policies will also make opportunities to acquire skills relatively more affordable and 
abundant. The logic behind these observable implications in terms of skill transparency is a bit 
different. Where education policies increase skill transparency, workers will find it easier to enter 
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new forms of training because their educational background, particularly initial and informal 
education, will qualify them for a relatively broader array of education opportunities. 
Index Composition 
Following from the theoretical discussion, I now develop empirical measures for the dimensions 
of skill acquisition and skill transparency. For each dimension, available measures of educational 
institutions, regulations or policies capture an aspect of skill acquisition or skill transparency, 
respectively.  
 
For the analysis, the direction of the hypotheses is presumably consistent across all labor market 
groups, although the effect may be stronger for some than for others. The selection of these 
variables suffered from considerable data restrictions, because finding cross-nationally valid 
measures that are at once reliable across countries and simultaneously express much of the 
variation in countries’ opportunities to enter new forms of education remains difficult. 
 
To build the skill acquisition dimension, I measure nine variables that cluster into three groups. 
All nine variables express ways in which educational institutions facilitate or frustrate entry into 
further education. Making the link between education policies and training behavior follows two 
logics. Addressing how education policy influences the capacity to learn, the first four variables 
speak primary to the investment in future workers’ cognitive capacity. The second set of variable 
speaks to the way in which education institutions restrict access to education before the end of 
compulsory education. The final set of variables focuses on post-compulsory education and 
captures the barriers to entering tertiary, continuing education, and active labor market policies. I 
will briefly elaborate on these variables below. 
 
The first group captures the degree of public investment in education. Whereas pre-primary and 
primary education provides workers with cognitive abilities to learn more efficiently (Esping-
Andersen 2005), investment in secondary and tertiary education provides a base of reading, 
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writing and reasoning skills that improve learning capacity. Following previous work measuring 
quality of education (Barro & Lee 1996; Dustmann et al 2003), I use education spending .  
 
The second group captures the degree to which the structure of educational institutions, on the 
secondary level, shapes the probability of entering further forms of education. Key differences 
between education systems lie in whether students follow different tracks and face an option of 
entering vocational education. These two institutional structures relate to each other, although they 
are not synonymous with each other. On the one hand, vocational education historically receives 
positive acclaim for increasing students’ employment chances. Vocational education facilitates 
both matching of skills to employers’ needs (Scherer 2005), fulfils a safety net function (Arum & 
Shavit 1995; Shavit & Müller 2000), and has been shown to increase participation in continuing 
vocational training (Blog 2007). Although vocational systems appear to face challenges in recent 
periods, particularly with respect to firms’ willingness to invest in apprenticeships, the merits of 
vocational training in providing students with useful occupational skills continues to be strong.  
 
At the same time, such systems often carry with them reputational costs when students who follow 
vocational tracks are separated institutionally from the higher performing students. This separation 
signals to students and teachers alike the expected lower potential of this group, which may 
influence how these students perceive their future goals and, by extension, their ambitions in the 
labor market (see review by Arum & Shavit 1995). Therefore, I construct a variable for vocational 
training that codes countries that divide students according to ability before the end of compulsory 
education as ‘0’ and all other countries according to the percentage of each student cohort that 
enters apprenticeship training. As such, this variable aims at capturing the labor market benefits of 
apprenticeship training while controlling for the disadvantages of such a system it terms of 
limiting students’ perspective too early. 
 
The third group of variables that I consider include measures of the ways in which the state 
reduces barriers to post-compulsory education. I consider the total commitment of countries to 
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providing financial aid and, in light of the growing relevance of tertiary education for job security, 
I consider the cost barriers to entry into tertiary education. Low costs and available financial 
support improve chances for access to tertiary education (OECD 2000, 2002). With respect to 
continuing training, I include a variable for the regulation of continuing training. The regulation of 
continuing training will increase worker participation in training (Billett & Smith 2005; Hall et al 
2002; Smith & Billett 2006), and countries are coded according to the level at which training is 
mandated. Finally, I include a variable for the level of expenditure on active labor market policies 
divided by unemployment levels with the expectation that spending effort on active labor market 
policies improves the employment prospects of program participants (Bradley & Stephens 2007; 
Kenworthy 2003).  
 
Having discussed the variables that comprise the skill acquisition dimension, I turn now to skill 
transparency. Six variables that fall into three groups express how education policy can facilitate 
skill transparency. Skill transparency plays a large role in reducing the risk of skill obsolescence, 
but in order to clarify how it is necessary to explain what is being made transparent and to whom. 
First, skill forecasting plays a key role in illuminating general trends in skill demands, which, if 
taken seriously by policy-makers, can lead to updated curricula and modernized occupations 
(Neugart & Schömann 2002b). In this case, skill forecasts make new skill needs more transparent, 
which should help educational institutions adjust their curriculum and students match firms’ needs 
with greater accuracy.  
 
The next set of variables speaks to the degree to which qualifications are made transparent. First, 
the centralization of the qualification system increases transparency of earned qualifications across 
federal units (Blog 2007). Recognition of prior learning increases transparency by linking informal 
learning to formal educational classifications (Colardyn & Bjornavold 2005). Firms’ use of 
external training institutions is first important because firm training is seen as central to a nation’s 
skill profile (Lloyd & Payne 2002) and because the information about training from external 
institutions servicing many firms will be relatively more available.  
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The final set of variables goes one step further than the previously discussed by highlighting 
complementarities between different qualifications.  A framework for linking different 
occupations illuminates shared skill sets between occupations and thereby facilitates occupational 
mobility (Blog 2007), and unitized qualifications, or modules, increase the pathways between 
vocational education and training and higher education. 
 
To construct each index, I conducted factor analysis. The results provided evidence for a single 
latent factor for each dimension based on the scree plot of the eigenvalues created with unrotated 
factor loadings. The first factor is therefore scored and used as the country values in the rest of the 
analysis.
Results 
The tables below display the two indices of skill acquisition and skill transparency.2 A brief glance 
over the two dimensions reveals the differences between the rankings and perhaps a surprising 
lack of clustering around groupings such as welfare state regimes or varieties of capitalism. One 
exception seems to be the Social Democratic countries, which receive high scores for both skill 
acquisition and skill transparency. The diversity in the Christian Democratic countries is evident 
on the skill acquisition dimension with Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Austria ranking quite 
high and Germany and Switzerland low. In terms of skill transparency, the Netherlands remains 
highly ranked, but Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Italy receive low scores. Despite these 
shifts, however, Christian Democratic welfare states can be described as scoring about average on 
both dimensions.  
 
The ranking of the Liberal welfare states demonstrate changes the most between the two 
dimensions. On the skill acquisition dimension, almost all Liberal states receive below average 
scores. On the skill transparency dimension, however, only the United States remains low on the 
                                                 
2 Appendix A and B explains the measurement and sources for the indices. 
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ranking. All the other countries receive substantially higher scores, and New Zealand and 
Australia even receive the rank of 1 and 2, respectively. 
 
Eastern European countries generally remain lower on the rankings of both dimensions with the 
exception of Slovenia, which scores high in terms of skill acquisition. 
 
Table 2.1. Acquisition Dimension 
Country Access
Denmark 3.47
Norway 1.77
Sweden 1.52
Finland 0.55
  
Netherlands 0.47
Slovenia 0.44
Canada 0.39
Belgium 0.27
Austria 0.27
New Zealand 0.26
France 0.16
Italy 0.03
Switzerland -0.03
Hungary -0.04
Latvia -0.13
Germany -0.13
Portugal -0.21
United Kingdom -0.29
Bulgaria -0.37
United States -0.42
Czech Republic -0.45
  
Lithuania -0.51
Spain -0.55
Estonia -0.61
Ireland -0.61
Australia -0.86
Japan -0.92
Romania -1.12
Poland -1.19
Greece -1.19
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Table 2.2. Transparency Dimension 
Country Transparency
Norway 1.32
Denmark 1.27
New Zealand 1.27
Finland 1.25
United Kingdom 1.20
France 1.19
Australia 1.15
Sweden 0.91
Netherlands 0.89
  
Spain 0.17
Belgium 0.08
Canada 0.07
Ireland 0.02
Portugal -0.02
Germany -0.04
Estonia -0.06
Austria -0.13
Slovenia -0.23
Japan -0.26
Switzerland -0.29
  
Czech Republic -0.51
United States -0.58
Hungary -0.60
Poland -0.69
Lithuania -0.72
Romania -1.13
Latvia -1.19
Italy -1.29
Bulgaria -1.50
Greece -1.54
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Validation 
Having created an index that captures how educational institutions portend to reduce the risk of 
skill obsolescence, I now provide some evidence of the observable implications for the theory in 
order to validate the construction of the index. First, I will provide evidence that the skill 
acquisition dimension captures to a high degree the extent to which the education system develops 
cognitive capacity and provides opportunities to enter into new forms of education. Then, I will 
turn to the skill transparency dimension and provide some evidence that the index expresses how 
eduction systems provide formal recognition of individuals’ skill as well as the degree of overlap 
between different professional skill requirements.3  
 
                                                 
3 Due to missing data, the countries that are included in the different correlations vary. Refer to the appendix for 
more information.  
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The theory explained that different elements of the education system facilitate skill acquisition by 
developing cognitive skills and reducing barriers to pursuing further education. If the index for the 
skill acquisition indeed promotes the attainment of new skills, the index should correlate highly 
with data for cognitive abilities and participation in various forms of education. As such, I 
correlate the index with measures of both low and information age literacy.4 Cognitive ability, 
along with reduced barriers to education, should also increase training and overall labor market 
success after compulsory education. For these reasons, I also correlate the skill acquisition index 
with measures of training incidence, including percent of early school-leavers, tertiary education 
enrolment, participation in continuing education and recent participation in lifelong learning, as 
well as measures of unemployment among school-leavers with only a secondary degree. 
 
All of the correlations receive the correct sign. As predicted, the index varies negatively with the 
measure of low literacy and positively with the measure for information age literacy, which 
suggests that investments in cognitive capacity improve skills on the low end of the distribution 
and at the high end. The following four variables provide evidence that the index capture the 
facility with which individuals enter education. The index correlates negatively with the 
percentage of individuals between 18 and 24 with only a secondary school degree and not 
currently in training; the index correlates positively with measures for tertiary education 
enrolment, continuing training among workers, and recent participation in lifelong learning among 
the working age population. Finally, looking at labor market outcomes among low-skilled 
workers, the results demonstrate that higher rankings lead to better employment prospects. I focus 
here on low-skilled workers, because the structure of the education system portends to have the 
largest effect on these workers. As case in point, unemployment among primary and secondary 
                                                 
4 The data for these variables comes from the Adult International Literacy Survey. “The IALS employed a 
sophisticated methodology developed and applied by the Educational Testing Service to measure literacy 
proficiency for each domain on a scale ranging from 0 to 500 points. Literacy ability in each domain is expressed 
by a score, defined as the point at which a person has an 80 per cent chance of successful performance from 
among the set of tasks of varying difficulty included in the assessment” Kahn LM. 2000. Wage Inequality, 
Collective Bargaining, and Relative Employment from 1985 to 1994: Evidence from Fifteen OECD Countries. 
The Review of Economics and Statistics 82:564-79.  
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school leavers is lower for higher rankings. The gap in employment levels between those with a 
tertiary degree and those with a secondary degree narrows at higher rankings. 
 
Table 2.3. Validity Check: Skill Acquisition       
 Coefficient  P-Value
Low Literacya -0.611 * 0.007
Information Age Literacya 0.588 * 0.010
Percent Early School Leaversb -0.275  0.183
Gross Tertiary Enrolmentc 0.349  0.059
Participation in Continuing Educationa, b, c, d  0.494 * 0.006
Percent in Recent Training Activityb 0.684 * 0.000
Unemployment - Primary Schoolb -0.363  0.074
Unemployment - Secondary Schoolb -0.547 * 0.005
Employment Gap - Tertiary – Secondaryb -0.573 * 0.003
Sources: a Adult Literacy Survey; b Eurostat; c UNESCO; d  (Kurosawa 2001; Medvešek-Miloševič 
2007). 
 
A similar group of variables demonstrates the validity of the skill transparency dimension, insofar 
as skill transparency improves individuals’ labor market chances. Since workers with high-level 
skills should face better chances of finding employment in any education system, I focus on the 
labor market prospects of low-skilled workers.  
 
The results provide strong support for the relation between high-levels of skill transparency and 
the chances that low-skill workers avoid unemployment. As the theoretical discussion explained, 
the skill transparency dimensions facilitates training both by improving the chances that 
prerequisites are met as well as by revealing overlap between various skill sets.  
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Table 2.4. Validity Check: Skill Transparency  
 Coefficient P-Value
Low Literacya -0.499 * 0.031
Information Age Literacya 0.585 * 0.011
Percent Early School Leaversb -0.219  0.294
Gross Tertiary Enrolmentc 0.430 * 0.018
Participation in Continuing Educationa, b, c, d 0.714 * 0.000
Percent in Recent Training Activityb 0.716 * 0.000
Unemployment - Primary Schoolb -0.375  0.065
Unemployment - Secondary Schoolb -0.484 * 0.014
Employment Gap - Tertiary – Secondaryb -0.569 * 0.003
Sources: aEurostat; ´b UNESCO; c  (Kurosawa 2001; Medvešek-Miloševič 2007). 
 
These calculations therefore provide evidence for the validity of the education system indices. 
Higher rankings on the skill acquisition and transparency dimensions lead to higher training 
activity and better labor market outcomes among low-skilled workers.  
Implications for Integration 
Given that education system influences the skills levels and training of workers, a further 
extension of this argument is that education systems improve the efficiency of programs that 
facilitate the reintegration of marginalized workers. In general, low-skilled workers face a much 
higher risk of unemployment. In countries with high rankings on the skill acquisition and 
transparency dimensions, however, the skills of these workers will be relatively strong and more 
visible to employers than in countries with low rankings. Since the original index for skill 
acquisition included a variable for active labor market policies, I have removed this variable for 
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these correlations so that the indices do not correlate with the various measures of active labor 
market policies.  
 
Table 2.5. Education and Integration through ALMP  
 Skill Acquisition Skill Transparency 
 Coefficient 
P-
Value Coefficient  
P-
Value
Spending on 
Active Labor 
Market 
Policies 0.698 * 0.000 0.526 * 0.010
Subsets of 
ALMP: 
Training 0.793 * 0.001 0.498 * 0.013
Subsets of 
ALMP: 
Recruitment 0.712 * 0.000 0.219  0.303
Subsets of 
ALMP: 
Disabled 0.488 * 0.016 0.333  0.112
Subsets of 
ALMP: 
Direct Job 
Creation -0.035  0.872  0.193   0.366
Source: OECD.     
Indeed, the correlation of the two indices with an aggregate measure of active labor market 
spending (of GDP weighted by the unemployment rate) shows a strong relationship. Breaking 
down spending on active labor market policies shows that not all aspects of active labor market 
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policies correlate highly with skill acquisition and transparency. High rankings on the educational 
system indices relate to high spending on training and, in the case of skill acquisition, on 
recruitment subsidies and support for the disabled. Neither index correlates highly with spending 
on direct job creation, nor are the results for the skill acquisition dimension actually negative. 
Given the relative success of training and recruitment subsidies and failure of direct job creation 
programs, a potential interpretation of these findings could be that high investment in education 
and transparent certification procedures improves the efficiency of active labor market policies.  
Political Determinants 
Looking to the political factors associated with the indices of educational systems, correlation 
coefficients also suggest the possible role of left parties and employer organizations in bolstering 
both skill acquisition and skill transparency. In terms of skill transparency, Christian democratic 
parties are negatively associated with high rankings on this dimension. 
Table 2.6. Education and Political Factors  
 Coefficient  
P-
Value  Coefficient  P-Value 
Cumulative Left 
Cabinet Share 0.667 * 0.003  0.562 * 0.015 
Cumulative 
Religious Cabinet 
Share -0.094  0.710  -0.519 * 0.027 
Employment 
Organization 0.421  0.082  0.300  0.227 
        
These findings support previous work by Busemeyer (2008), Boix (1998), Iversen and Stephens 
(2008) that relate left parties to high spending on education policy. Compared to other work that 
finds Christian democratic parties relatively less supportive of educational spending, the results for 
Christian democratic government also demonstrate a weaker relationship between this regime and 
education. Although the the varieties of capitalism approach identifies both Social Democratic and 
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Chrsitian Democratic welfare states as coordinated market economies, these two groups appear to 
follow two divergent paths in terms of educational reform. Both regimes purportedly invest highly 
in specific skills, yet the degree to which the education system promotes the acquisition of new 
skills and the recognition of complementarities between different professional occupations varies 
tremendously between these two groups. It is perhaps not surprising that liberal market economies 
promote skill transparency, since reducing the costs of exit from professional occupations is not an 
issue with employers. In coordinated market economies, however, employers depending on 
specific skills should be wary about making it easier for their workers to find jobs in different 
industries.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have introduced the education system as a key explanatory variable for defining 
the range of workers’ employment opportunities. The education system consists of policies that 
create the capacity to learn, the opportunity to learn, and the transparency of earned skills. Due to 
skill-biased technological change, trade, financial liberalization, and the growth of the knowledge 
economy, the potential for the education system to address the heightened risk of skill 
obsolescence has increased.  
 
In order to substantiate the theoretical discussion, I constructed two indices, the skill acquisition 
index and the skill transparency index. By correlating these indices with measures of the 
observable implications of the theoretical discussion, I provided validation that the indices 
measure what I intended. Correlations with spending on active labor market policies also 
confirmed that the structure of the education system relates to the spending on active measures and 
the more efficient subsets of active measures in particular. These results provide groundwork for 
further analysis into the causal nature of the relationship between the structure of the education 
system on the one hand and the efficiency of public policies promoting the integration of the 
unemployed on the other.  
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Finally, correlations between the two indices and measures for left party incumbency, Christian 
democratic incumbency, and employer organization corroborate the theoretical expectations of the 
power resources theory that relates working class organization to the expansion of social policy. 
Christian democratic incumbency, however, is weakly negatively related to the skill acquisition 
dimension and strongly negatively related to the skill transparency dimension. To the extent that 
education policy is understood as a subset of social policies, these results place in question the 
interpretation of Christian democratic parties as welfare state parties. At the same time, the 
emphasis on insurance-based social policy and vocational training in Christian democratic welfare 
states suggests an alternative role for education policy in these contexts. Finally, the organization 
of business correlated positively but not significantly with the two dimensions. In sum, whereas 
both social democratic and Christian democratic incumbency relate to high social spending, these 
findings do not travel well to the specific case of education policy. Although social democratic 
incumbency correlates strongly with both the skill acquisition and skill transparency indices, 
Christian democratic incumbency is not related strongly to the composite index of skill acquisition 
and correlates strongly negatively with the skill transparency index.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DETERMINANTS OF SKILL ACQUISITION AND SKILL TRANSPARENCY 
 
What leads to high levels of skill acquisition and transparency? Having established measures of 
skill acquisition and transparency and demonstrated the importance of these policy dimensions for 
addressing changed economic conditions, the causal forces that explain the rankings on these two 
dimensions deserve attention: Why did some countries manage to develop policies that promote 
one or both of these dimensions? Why do countries sometimes score high on one dimension and 
low on another? Why do welfare regimes appear to play a relatively small role in explaining the 
country rankings? This chapter addresses these questions by using fuzzy set and regression 
analysis. Fuzzy set analysis excels at identifying causal configurations when the number of 
observations is small and testing multiple pathways to the observed outcome. Regression analysis 
complements this initial step by introducing stricter conditions for testing the significance of a 
causal relationship between the explanatory variables and the two indices of skill acquisition and 
skill transparency.  
 
The results support the strong relationship between left party incumbency, trade union density, and 
public employment and the passage of policies that promote skill acquisition and skill 
transparency, and the negative relationship between veto points and the creation of such policies. 
Christian democratic incumbency appears to obstruct the passage of policies that promote skill 
transparency, whereas right party incumbency obstructs policies that support skill acquisition. The 
results for wage bargaining coordination and employer organization are less straightforward. For 
the skill acquisition dimension, the fuzzy set analysis always include high levels of wage 
coordination in the causal combination leading to high rankings on that dimension, although the 
regression analysis shows that the coefficient for wage bargaining are not always positive making 
conclusive results about the directional effect of coordinated wage bargaining more difficult. The 
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directional results for employer coordination for the skill acquisition dimension are ambiguous 
(can be both positive and negative) in the fuzzy set and positive in the regression analysis. In 
terms of the results for the skill transparency dimension, both the fuzzy set and regression results 
reveal ambiguous results for both wage bargaining coordination and employer coordination.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I review the variables that are theorized to influence the 
rankings on the skill acquisition and skill transparency indices. The, I review fuzzy set 
methodology to set up the paper and create fuzzy set scores for the two indices (dependent 
variables). I then conduct the analysis with fuzzy sets as well as regression, discuss the results, and 
conclude.  
Literature Review 
The next step is to identify relevant causal factors that are hypothesized to influence the passage of 
policies that expand opportunities to acquire skills as well as support the transparency of these 
skills. I identify eight variables that I draw from the welfare state and comparative political 
economy literatures and hypothesize lead to membership in these two sets.  
 
1. Left parties incumbency – Left parties incumbency has been shown to lead to equitable social 
policies and outcomes (Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979). This logic of ‘power resources,’ or the 
consequence on social spending of political influence in left parties and unions among lower 
income workers, has been applied to education policy. Studies find that left parties support high 
education spending in order not only to support lower income workers but also to forge an alliance 
with the middle class (Busemeyer 2008). Given this emphasis not only on education in general but 
also on higher education, I hypothesize that left parties will also support skill transparency in order 
to facilitate education among individuals with diverse educational backgrounds. To test the 
influence of left party incumbency, I use the level of cumulative left party incumbency between 
1960 and 2000 (Huber et al).  
 
38 
2. Christian democratic incumbency – Christian democratic parties are also related to social 
policy expansion (Hicks 1999; Huber & Stephens 2001; Huber Stephens et al 1993; van 
Kersbergen 1995), although the nature of Christian democratic support for education spending is 
contingent. Whereas Christian democratic parties support vocational training, their willingness to 
invest highly in other forms of education is weaker (Iversen & Stephens 2008). Given that 
vocational training may disadvantage students who follow less prestigious vocational ‘tracks,’ 
spending does not necessarily indicate the promotion of skills if vocational degrees limit future 
educational and work opportunities. The emphasis on occupational based social benefits may also 
belie a broader orientation towards support for rigid occupational categories, thereby frustrating 
efforts to increase skill transparency. To test the influence of Christian democratic party 
incumbency, I use the level of cumulative religious party incumbency between 1960 and 2000 
(Huber et al).  
 
3. Right party incumbency – The preference of right parties for minimal government intervention 
in the government and social affairs reduces their willingness to invest in education. As case in 
point, they have been tied to more radical cuts in social policy in the period of welfare state 
retrenchment (Allan & Scruggs 2004) and rely on limiting labor market regulations in order to 
promote growth rather than investing in education as a growth strategy (Boix 1998). At the same 
time, right parties tend to rely on support from high income workers (Hibbs 1977) who tend to 
represent business interests. Since business may rely on specific skills for their production 
processes (Hall & Soskice 2001a; Mares 2003), right parties may sometimes demonstrate a 
preference for education in order to ensure these skills. Also, since business prefers to maintain a 
high supply of skilled labor in order to sustain production and keep labor costs down, businesses 
in expanding industries should promote skill transparency in order to facilitate the movement of 
workers into their industry; businesses in declining industries, however, should oppose steps to 
increase skill transparency, however, because they will fear losing workers. To test the influence 
of right party incumbency, I use the level of cumulative right party incumbency between 1960 and 
2000(Huber et al).  
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4. Employer organization – Employers may support social policy expansion in order to induce 
investment in specific skills (Hall & Soskice 2001b; Iversen 2005) and business organization has 
been related to the expansion of the welfare state (Martin 2000a; Swenson 1991), and active labor 
market policies in particular (Martin 2004b; Martin & Swank 2004; Martin 2004c). High level of 
business organization influence the supply of social policy by offering “governments the 
institutional vehicle through which to build business support for social welfare initiatives” (Martin 
& Swank 2004, p. 598) as well as the demand for social policy by forging broad collective goals 
between different business groups (Martin 2000a; Martin & Swank 2001; Martin & Swank 2004; 
Schmitter 1981; Streeck 1992). I use the average measure of employer organization between 1980 
and 1998 from the database used for Martin and Swank (2004). 
 
5. Wage bargaining centralization –The centralization of coordinated bargaining facilitates the 
realization of socially optimal outcomes by creating discipline among members of interest 
organizations (and thereby limiting in a credible way the pursuit of particularistic goals) as well as 
generating a formidable bargaining partner(s) on the national level who lobby for members’ 
collective goals (Schmitter 1981). These capabilities improve the probability that socially optimal 
policies supporting skill acquisition and transparency will be implemented. I use the average level 
of coordinated bargaining centralization between 1960 and 1998  (Huber et al).  
 
6. Union density – As with left parties, the improved ‘power resources’ of workers organized in 
unions increases their capacity to realize collective goals. Given that workers face the need to 
acquire new skills throughout their career, they are hypothesized to prefer policies expanding skill 
acquisition and transparency; their chances of achieving policy reforms that reflect these 
preferences are hypothesized to increase if more individuals are union members. I use a measure 
of the average union density since 1960.5  
 
                                                 
5 This measure was provided by Professor John Stephens and Sung Park and compiled from OECD data. 
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7. Veto points - Veto points constitute formal institutional constraints that arise from the 
dispersion of political power in representative institutions. Institutions that allow dissenting 
minorities to block legislation represent veto points (Huber & Stephens 2001; Immergut 1990). To 
the extent that improving skill acquisition and skill transparency require political reforms, the 
number of veto points is hypothesized to frustrate this process. I use a composite measure of 
federalism, parliamentarism, bicameralism, and use of popular referenda to capture the number of 
veto points (Huber et al). 
 
8. Size of state  – The “state-centric” perspective on welfare state development points to the role 
of (assumed autonomous) state bureaucrats in formulating social policy as well as the role of state 
structure in sustaining existing policy (Heclo 1974; Skocpol 1988). Recent work also points to the 
continued importance of the state in the current period of welfare state retrenchment: “a strong 
state and a large public sector shore up national coordinating capacities in their impact on 
government strategies and capacities and in their impact on alliances and strategic options of 
other actors (especially but not exclusively the export sectors).  The former inspires greater 
attention to social solidarity, while the latter supports a political climate favorable to its 
realization” (italics in original) (Martin & Thelen 2007). In particular, Martin and Thelen draw on 
the additional point that the state retains an interest in improving the productivity of low-wage 
workers in order to justify public expenditures (Spicker 1997) and that there is a higher likelihood 
of low wage workers to be hired in the public sector. Since skill acquisition and transparency 
improve adjustment to changed economic conditions, the size of the state is hypothesized to 
support skill acquisition and transparency. I use the average level of public employment since 
1982 as a measure of state size (Huber et al). 
Fuzzy Set Methodology 
Background Information 
Fuzzy sets developed from qualitative comparative analysis which was intended for ‘crisp’ sets, or 
Boolean set where variables either assume the values of 0 or 1. In this version of set analysis, 
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items are either in or out of a given set. This works well with qualitative data and in instances 
where the set under consideration does not exhibit multiple defining characteristics. Examples 
include the presence of judicial review and the introduction of national health services. Many 
phenomena in political science, however, exist in degrees. For instance, one could categorize 
federalism as binary variable (either a country has federal units or it does not), but this would 
ignore the range of activities that characterize the extent of power-sharing between the federal 
units and the centralized government, such as taxation, executive and legislative rule, and 
constitutional authority.  
 
Where the object of inquiry exhibits multiple defining characteristics, fuzzy set analysis presents a 
viable alternative to crisp set analysis. Following from the above discussion, fuzzy set may be 
better suited to analyze federal systems than crisp set analysis. Fuzzy set analysis could also be 
applied to the indices of education mobility, where each index consists of multiple variables that 
each approximate a different aspect of skill acquisition or skill transparency, respectively. 
Compared to crisp analysis, fuzzy set analysis does not force cases to be either fully in or fully out 
of a given set. For instance, in terms of skill acquisition and skill transparency, we might conceive 
of two sets that define cases that unambiguously promote skill acquisition (SA) or skill 
transparency (ST). Although some cases may fall clearly into set SA or ST, there is little 
theoretical reason to believe that all countries necessarily exist completely in or completely out of 
this set. As the theoretical discussion in the preceding chapter discussed, a high value on one item 
may not necessarily indicate a high value on another. For instance, high spending on secondary 
education does not imply necessarily high spending on tertiary education. Fuzzy set analysis 
allows researchers to account for these cases that do not fall unambiguously into the set under 
consideration. 
 
Continuous fuzzy set analysis is the form of this methodological approach that allows for the 
greatest flexibility in terms of the degree of set membership. Although fuzzy set scores vary 
between 0 and 1, they can assume any value in this range. The coding of fuzzy set scores, 
42 
however, relies more on theoretical considerations than maintaining the integrity of the original 
interval scale, in particular with respect to the coding of full membership (1) and nonmembership 
(0). In this way, “[f]uzzy membership scores address the varying degree to which different cases 
belong to a set (including the two qualitative states, full membership and full nonmembership), not 
how cases rank relative to each other on a dimension of openended variation” (Ragin 2007, p. 3). 
Therefore, the highest ranking does not automatically receive the unique label of full set 
membership. Rather, to the extent that other high-ranking cases also complete the theoretical 
conditions for set membership, they should also be coded as full members, or receive a score of 1. 
The same is true when coding cases that are fully out of the set or do not belong at all to the set. A 
final ‘anchor’ in fuzzy set analysis includes the value of 0.5, when a set is neither fully in nor fully 
out of the set. Consideration should be given to the value that represents a theoretical tipping 
point, where cases cannot be considered more in than out. 
 
Fuzzy set analysis also allows one to test both for causal configurations, where a variable only has 
an impact within a given subset of other variables, as well as multiple pathways, where an 
outcome occurs due to different subsets of variables. Using fuzzy set analysis to examine the 
causal precursors to the education mobility indices improves on regression analysis in three ways. 
First, in regression analysis, causal configurations are tested with interaction terms. Generating 
consistent parameters of interaction terms demands a high level of observations not available in 
small N datasets (here N=18). Interpreting coefficients for interaction terms with more than 2 
variables is also extremely problematic in regression analysis. Finally, regression analysis treats 
interaction terms as demonstrating a multiplicative effect, where qualitative comparative analysis 
treats any case aspects that occur together as potentially interdependent (Epstein et al 2007, p. 2). 
Fuzzy set analysis thereby assess causal configurations with consideration for both data limitations 
and causal complexity. 
 
Fuzzy set analysis also helps to spot multiple pathways to a specified outcome. In regression 
analysis, a potential aspect of a causal process (independent variable) that systematically fails to 
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produce a given outcome receives a low coefficient, even though this variable may indeed play a 
significant role in producing the outcome when in conjunction with other variables. Therefore, 
fuzzy set analysis addresses the possibility not only that an outcome may occur by a 
‘configuration’ of variables, but also that variables may express different causal force depending 
on the combination of other variables with which they interact. In this way, fuzzy set analysis 
captures the way in which causal mechanisms vary across contexts that share some attributes but 
not others.  
 
Creating Fuzzy Scores from Skill Acquisition and Skill Transparency 
The first step before conducting the analysis is to create fuzzy set scores for the two dependent 
variables. First, I will code the skill acquisition index. Countries range from 5.5 to 14 on the skill 
acquisition index, and I am interested in first identifying the cases that are fully in the set SA or 
ST, respectively.6 Referring to Figure 1, Denmark clearly represents the highest value on the skill 
acquisition index and is followed only quite distantly by Norway and then Sweden. Where 
Norway might be considered quite close to the Danish case, quite important differences remain in 
terms of lower primary and secondary spending. Sweden looks quite a bit more different with 
lower secondary school spending, low regulation of continuing training, and no framework linking 
occupational categories. For these reasons, Denmark is coded as 1 for full membership in SA. On 
the other end of the distribution, it is less clear which countries should be coded as completely out 
of the SA set: on the one hand, Ireland receives the lowest ranking of 5.5, but, on the other, seven 
other countries receive rankings of 7 or below. At this point, the decision whether to code one or 
eight countries as ‘0’ or completely out of the set is a theoretical decision that should be made 
based on empirical knowledge of the cases. Therefore, given the relevant differences between 
these eight cases and the potential of continuous fuzzy set analysis to cope with values between 0 
                                                 
6 Due to data limitations on the independent variables, only 18 of the original 30 countries in the indices in 
Chapter 1 can be included in this analysis. These countries include Australia (AUL), Austria (AUS), Belgium 
(BEL), Canada (CAN), Denmark (DEN), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (FRG), Ireland (IRE), Italy 
(ITA), Japan (JAP), the Netherlands (NET), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland 
(SWZ), the UK (UKM), and the US (USA). 
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and 1, I code Ireland as 0 and consider the other aforementioned countries as ‘almost’ out of the 
set. 
Figure 3.1. Rankings on the Skill Acquisition Index 
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Having coded the cases for completely in and completely out of the SA set, the last value to be 
aware of before coding the remaining cases is the ‘cross-over’ point of 0.5. This point 
distinguishes cases that are equally in and out of the set. An appropriate dividing point seems to be 
between Finland and Belgium on the one hand and Netherlands and Italy on the other: although all 
systems contain aspects of their education systems that promote skill acquisition, the 
comprehensive schooling system of Finland brings it closer to Denmark and the stratifying 
educational policy in Italy (due to ‘tracking’ and low support for tertiary education) places it 
closer to Ireland. With this cross-over point in mind, the remaining values are coded using the 
formula (raw value-minimum)/range. Figure 2 shows the fuzzy set scores plotted against the raw 
values. 
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Figure 3.2. Skill Acquisition: Raw Values and Fuzzy Set Scores 
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Having coded the skill acquisition set, or SA, I now turn to the skill transparency index in order to 
code set membership in ST. The highest ranked country on the skill transparency index is New 
Zealand, whereas the worst performer is Italy. I code New Zealand as 1, for full membership in 
ST, and Italy as 0 for being completely out of ST.  
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Figure 3.3. Rankings on the Skill Transparency Index 
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I identify the cross-over point as lying between Ireland and Belgium. Although the countries 
demonstrate quite similar scorings, Ireland’s framework for linking different occupational 
qualifications within the education system places it closer to New Zealand and Belgium’s lack of 
such a framework places it closer to Italy. As before, I then create the fuzzy scores using the 
formula (raw value-minimum)/range to code the remaining cases. The raw values of the skill 
transparency index are plotted against the fuzzy set scores in Figure 4. 
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Figure 3.4. Skill Transparency: Raw Values and Fuzzy Set Scores 
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Figure 3.5. Independent Variable Plots: Raw v. Fuzzy 
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Analysis 
Having created fuzzy set scores for the dependent variables, or indices on skill acquisition and 
skill transparency, and the independent variables, I now turn to the analysis. Beginning with the 
fuzzy set analysis, I test which combinations of independent variables best explain membership in 
the two sets, SA and ST. Where fuzzy set analysis excels at assessing the influence of 
combinations of independent variables in explaining a given outcome, however, it does less well 
at establishing that the effect of a given independent variable is significantly different from zero. 
For this reason, I follow up the fuzzy set analysis with a regression analysis where the dependent 
variables are regression on all possible combinations of the independent variables, with a 
maximum of three variables per regression and a minimum of two.  
 
Fuzzy Set Analysis 
Fuzzy set analysis is used to analyze the relationship between the eight causal factors described 
above and the two indices of educational mobility as captured in the two sets, SA and ST. The 
analysis is conducted using fs/QCA 2.0.7 The software denotes set membership (fuzzy set score 
above 0.5) with capital letters and non-membership with lower case letters. I maintain this practice 
throughout the analysis.  
 
After specifying which independent variables to include in the model, the next step in fuzzy set 
analysis is creating a truth table. Since I have two dependent variables, I create two truth tables, 
which are below in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. The truth table lists all possible combinations of the 
independent variables. Since I have eight variables, there are 28 or 256 possible causal 
configurations.  
 
The ‘number’ column indicates how many cases conform to the causal configuration, or, in other 
words “the number of cases with greater than 0.5 membership in each combination” (Ragin 2007, 
p. 14). Out of the 18 cases under examination, 16 find expression in the causal configurations. The 
                                                 
7 The software and supporting material can be found at www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml. 
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remaining 2 cases cannot be categorized as definitively belonging to a given causal configuration 
due to scores of 0.5, where they are neither more in nor more out of a given set. It is important to 
mention that although the other 16 clearly belong to one of the 256 possible causal configurations, 
these are not the only cases used to assess the likelihood of observing various causal 
configurations. Aspects of all cases are used to construct the most important statistic in fuzzy set 
analysis, the consistency score. For example, a case with a fuzzy set score for left party 
incumbency (LEFT) of 0.90 is also understood as expressing non-membership (left) with a fuzzy 
set score of 0.10. Also note that it is impossible for countries to rank above 0.5 in both a given 
category and its negation. 
 
The main purpose of the truth table is to calculate consistency scores for each causal combination. 
Consistency refers to the sufficiency of each causal combination in producing the given outcome 
or the extent to which causal configurations are subsets of the outcome. Specifically, it is the 
measure of the degree to which membership in the outcome set is equal to or greater than 
membership in the causal configuration, which can be expressed as: consistency (xi < yi) = 
∑(min(xi,yi))/ ∑(xi). A consistency score of 1 indicates that the causal configuration is a perfect 
subset of the outcome, where a score of 0 shows no relationship. 
 
Using the ‘number’ and ‘consistency’ scores, two decisions need to be made to complete the 
analysis. First, for all the cases where number is equal to or more than one, the consistency scores 
are used to determine the range of causal configuration that can be considered reasonable subsets 
of the outcome. Table 1 shows the causal configurations that are represented in the data (16 of 
256), sorted by their consistency score. Ragin (2004) recommends using a minimum consistency 
score of 0.75 although higher scores are preferable. I use a minimum score of 0.80. These cases 
are therefore coded as 1, as demonstrated by the italicized numbers in Table 3.1.  
 
The second decision to be made before estimating the results involves how to handle 
counterfactual cases. As described above, there were 28, or 256, possible causal configuration, 
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because there eight independent variables. Since the data only find recognition in 16 cases, there 
are 240 counterfactual case for which there is no empirical evidence. The program fs/QCA can 
handle these counterfactual case in two ways: either by assuming that they could have indeed 
existed (in fs/QCA, this is the ‘don’t care’ or parsimonious option) or by assuming that the fact 
that they were not instantiated empirically means that they are negative examples of the outcome 
(in fs/QCA, this is the ‘false’ or complex option). 
 
The decision of how to deal with counterfactuals is highly relevant because these counterfactuals 
can help to sort out which parts of given causal configuration hold the most weight. In the first 
four rows of the truth table in Table 1, the only variable that appears in all rows is wage 
coordination. It could be argued that the remaining six variables that show up are extraneous in the 
causal mechanism that produces high skill acquisition. Choosing the ‘don’t care’ option uses the 
additional 240 cases in order to eliminate aspects of these causal configurations represented in the 
data.  
 
Table 3.1. Truth Table from Analysis of Eight Causal Conditions of Skill Acquisition 
  
Left CD Right 
Employer 
Organization 
Wage 
Coordination
Union 
Density Veto
Civilian 
Government 
Employment # DV Consist Pre Product
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 3  0.938 0.9 0.851
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2  0.649 0.3 0.221
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2  0.546 0.2 0.092
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1  0.465 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1  0.573 0.2 0.142
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1  0.557 0.2 0.099
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1  0.312 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1  0.49 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  0.639 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1  0.917 0.4 0.367
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1  0.84 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1  0.667 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1  0.802 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1   0.894 0 0
 
Before showing the results for both the complex (‘false’) and parsimonious (‘don’t care’) 
solutions, I will briefly review the truth table for the ST fuzzy set on skill transparency. To be 
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consistent with the previous discussion, I use 0.80 as a consistency threshold. Notice that the 
number of causal configurations present in the data remains constant even though the dependent 
variable has changed. This is to be expected since independent variables are the same. The only 
values that have changed are the consistency scores, because the extent to which the 256 causal 
configurations represent subsets of the set of SA countries is different that the extent to which they 
are subsets of ST.  
 
The two tables below show the solution sets for SA and ST, respectively. The first part of each 
table contains the complex results, where the remaining counterfactual cases were not used. The 
second part of each table shows the parsimonious results where the remaining cases were indeed 
used, on the assumption that they could have been empirically instantiated, in order to eliminate 
potentially superfluous members of the empirically instantiated causal configurations with high 
(>0.80) consistency. 
 
The main to interpret these findings is with reference to the consistency scores. As with the truth 
table, the consistency scores refer to the extent to which the causal configuration is a subset of the 
outcome. The second term used to interpret the results is coverage, which refers to “the proportion 
of the sum of the membership in an outcome that a particular configuration explains. Very low 
coverage scores indicate that even if a causal configuration is consistent with the outcome, it is 
substantively trivial. 
Coverage and consistency often are inversely related to one another, because very particular or 
exact explanations (which may be highly consistent) tend to be less generalizeable. ‘[R]aw 
coverage’ scores refer to the proportion of the outcome scores covered by an explanation by itself, 
while ‘unique coverage’ refers to the proportion of  outcome scores covered, net of that solution's 
coverage overlap with the other solutions identified” (Epstein et al 2007, p. 12-13). These two 
terms, coverage and consistency, can be used to interpret the Tables 3.3 and 3.4.  
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Table 3.2. Truth Table from Analysis of Eight Causal Conditions of Skill 
Transparency 
Left 
C
D Right 
Emp 
Org Wage 
Uni
on 
V
eto CGE # 
D
V Consist Pre Product 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 3  0.98 1.00 0.96 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2  1.00 1.00 0.99 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2  1.00 1.00 1.00 
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1  0.89 0.80 0.67 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1  0.85 0.80 0.65 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1  0.88 0.70 0.62 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1  1.00 1.00 1.00 
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1  1.00 1.00 1.00 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  0.29 0.20 0.05 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1  0.81 0.80 0.61 
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1  0.80 0.10 0.05 
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1  0.85 0.60 0.53 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1  0.99 1.00 0.97 
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1   0.88 0.40 0.39 
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Table 3.3. Solution Sets for Skill Acquisition Index 
   Coverage    Consistency 
 Raw   Unique   
      
Complex (no simplifying 
assumptions)      
      
left*CD*right*employer*WA
GE*union*veto*public+           0.08  0.08  0.92 
LEFT*cd*right*EMPLOYER*
WAGE*UNION*veto*PUBLI
C  0.49  0.49  0.94 
      
solution coverage: 0.57      
solution consistency: 0.93      
      
Parsimonious (simplifying 
assumptions)      
      
PUBLIC+              0.75  0.64  0.94 
CD*WAGE*union*veto     0.14  0.00  0.80 
CD*employer*WAGE*union 0.12  0.02  0.88 
right*WAGE*union*veto 0.18  0.00  0.66 
      
solution coverage: 0.86      
solution consistency: 0.88      
      
Intermediate (simplifying 
assumptions)      
      
right*CD*left*employer*WA
GE*union*veto*public 0.08  0.08  0.92 
LEFT*cd*right*EMPLOYER*
WAGE*UNION*veto*PUBLI
C 0.48  0.49  0.94 
      
solution coverage: 0.57      
solution consistency: 0.93          
Table 3.3 shows the results for the causal configurations that make up subsets of the SA set or the 
set of countries promoting skill acquisition. Looking first at the complex solution sets, three causal 
configurations make up possible causal pathways to SA set inclusion. As a reminder, the capital 
letters represent inclusion, whereas lower case letters imply negation or absence.8 The two causal 
configurations that make up the complex solution sets explain 57 percent of membership patterns 
in SA and 93 percent of the aspects in these causal configurations make up subsets of the outcome, 
membership in SA. 
                                                 
8 The abbreviations in Table 3 and 4 refer to the following variables: Left=left party incumbency; Cd=Christian 
democratic incumbency; Right=right party incumbency; Employer=employer organization; Wage=wage 
bargaining coordination; Union=union density; Veto=veto points; Public=public employment level. 
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Table 3.4. Solution Sets for Skill Transparency 
   
   Coverage    Consistency 
 Raw   Unique   
      
Complex (no simplifying 
assumptions)      
      
LEFT*cd*right*EMPLOYER*W
AGE*UNION*veto+   0.39  0.32  0.98 
left*cd*employer*wage*union*ve
to*public+     0.29  0.04  1.00 
left*cd*RIGHT*employer*wage*
veto*public+     0.27  0.01  1.00 
left*cd*RIGHT*employer*WAG
E*UNION*VETO*public  0.08  0.03  1.00 
      
solution coverage: 0.66      
solution consistency:  0.99      
      
Parsimonious (simplifying 
assumptions)      
       
cd*UNION 0.61  0.36  0.98 
cd*veto*wage 0.44  0.18  0.92 
      
solution coverage: 0.79      
solution consistency: 0.94      
      
Intermediate (simplifying 
assumptions)      
       
left*cd*employer*wage*union*ve
to*public+    0.29  0.04  1.00 
left*cd*RIGHT*employer*wage*
veto*public+          0.27  0.01  1.00 
LEFT*cd*right*EMPLOYER*W
AGE*UNION*veto+         0.39  0.32  0.98 
left*cd*RIGHT*employer*WAG
E*UNION*VETO*public     0.08  0.03  1.00 
      
solution coverage:  0.66      
solution consistency: 0.99          
 
Table 3.3 identifies two paths towards set membership in the set ‘Skill Acquisition.’ The first path 
contains the components belonging to the singular case of the Netherlands, whereas the second 
path represents the cases of Norway, Denmark, and Sweden. Making simplifying assumptions, 
these paths can be reduced mainly to the presence of public service sector employment. In sum, 
the predominant path towards policies that facilitate skill acquisition can be categorized as a 
Scandinavian one. These countries share a capacity for consensual decision-making between 
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diverse governmental actors and the social partners, which can be seen in the high membership 
scores in union density and employer organization. Although the Netherlands does not reveal high 
scores on these variables, the weak density and organization scores mask a high capacity of the 
peak organizations to coordinate diverse interests. Also, these countries share a strong electoral 
record among social democratic parties, the relative inability of confessional and right parties to 
dominate the government, and low veto points.  
 
There are more varied paths towards set membership in the set ‘Skill Transparency.’ Of the four 
identified in Table 3.4, the first path is the most similar to the second listed in Table 3.4 with many 
of the same countries, including Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and one new-comer Finland. 
However, the three remaining paths are quite different.  
 
The remaining three have in the common the following variables: low incumbency among left and 
Christian democratic parties, weak employer organization, and low public employment. The 
second path in Table 3.4 belongs to the Netherlands, and although this path resembles the latter 
two, the characteristics of the Netherlands are more similar to the countries belonging to the first 
path.  
 
The countries belonging to the last two paths have more in common. The countries belonging to 
the third path include New Zealand, the UK, and France, whereas Australia alone is represented in 
the fourth path. Technically the third path is distinguished by the high incumbency of right-wing 
parties, whereas the fourth path also has high union density, many veto points, and strong wage 
coordination. Beyond the technicality of these path components, however, these countries all 
represent un-coordinated market economies that nevertheless demonstrate historical legacies of 
market capitalism combined with redistributive elements. In all four countries, social democratic 
parties were electorally successful although nevertheless able to make it into government 
regularly. Also, these countries differ markedly from the USA, Canada, and Ireland by the 
organizational capacity of their trade unions and employer organizations. In short, the last two 
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paths suggest that not all liberal market economies are based fundamentally on market forces 
alone. Rather, to the extent that policies promoting skill transparency are considered redistributive 
in nature, the organization of capitalism in these countries also demonstrates coordinated elements 
as well.  
 
Regression Analysis 
In order to complement the fuzzy set analysis, I now conduct an additional regression analysis. 
Due to the small number of observations, I follow a method employed by Lane Kenworthy (2009), 
whereby the two indices for skill acquisition and skill transparency, respectively, are regressed on 
all possible combinations of the eight explanatory variables where the number of variables in any 
given regression was either two or three. Due to multicollinearity, I dropped regressions with both 
left party incumbency and either union density (correlation 0.82) or public employment 
(correlation 0.77) as well as both employer organization and wage bargaining coordination (0.80). 
This led to a total number of sixty-four regressions. Each variable was included between fourteen 
and twenty-five times. 
 
The results are presented below in Figures 3.6 and 3.7. The line in each box represents the median 
coefficient, the sides of the box represent the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentile coefficient, 
respectively, and the “whiskers” represent the minimum and the maximum, respectively. The 
circles outside of the boxes represent outliers.  
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Turning to the results for the skill acquisition dimension, Figure 3.6 presents the spread of the 
coefficients of the eight explanatory variables. The coefficients for left party incumbency and 
public employment are unambiguously positive, and the coefficients for veto points are 
unambiguously negative. The remaining variables take on both positive and negative values. With 
regards to Christian democratic and right party incumbency, the coefficients are predominantly 
negative with three-fourths of the coefficients falling below zero. The coefficients for union 
density and employer organization demonstrate the opposite trend, with three-fourths of their 
coefficients falling above zero.  The coefficients for the wage bargaining variable, on the other 
hand, are more evenly distributed. 
 
 
 
 
    Figure 3.6. Regression Results: Hypothesized Determinants of the Skill Acquisition 
58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With regards to the results for the skill transparency dimension, the results are quite similar to 
those for the skill acquisition index except that the coefficients for Christian democratic party 
incumbency becomes unambiguously negative and those for right party incumbency less so. 
Indeed the coefficients for right party incumbency tend to be more positive than negative.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Having completed the fuzzy set and regression analysis, this section compares the results in order 
to draw some conclusions about the determinants of the two indices of skill acquisition and skill 
transparency. The two methods have two quite different perspectives of causality: fuzzy set 
analysis comes from set theory and uses to the concepts of ‘necessary’ and ‘sufficient’ conditions 
to build arguments about the relationship between set membership in the independent variables 
 Figure 3.7. Regression Results: Hypothesized Determinants of the Skill Transparency 
Dimension     
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and that in the outcome variable; regression analysis assesses the average, individual effect of an 
independent variable on the outcome variable.  
 
The fuzzy set analysis produced two ‘paths’ towards high rankings on the skill acquisition index, 
which could be traced back to cases of the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden. These 
paths shared strong wage bargaining institutions and low veto points, but differed in every other 
variable (a variable present in the first path was absent in the second). Since fuzzy set logic allows 
a variable’s effect to vary across cases, one might come to the conclusion that each component 
played an important causal role in producing the observed outcome, membership in set SA, but 
that this role was contingent on the particularities of that individual path.  
 
However, it may also be the case that lack of variation in the independent variables makes it 
impossible to exclude irrelevant variables. Starting from this idea that some components of these 
two paths may be more relevant than others, the regression results become interesting in pointing 
out path components that pass the high hurdle of statistical significance. These results indeed 
indicated that low veto points, a common variable to both paths, leads to higher scores on the skill 
acquisition index. Low veto points weaken the capacity of dissenting minorities to block 
legislation aimed at expanding educational opportunities. Also, the second path contains high left 
party incumbency and high public sector employment, which were both related to higher scores on 
the skill acquisition index. Left parties are the historical proponent of working class interests, 
which can be extended to the education policy field as an explanation for these parties strong 
relationship to the skill acquisition index. Finally, public sector employment speaks to the 
responsibility and capacity of the state to train public employees. In sum, the second path 
identified towards set membership in SA can explained by the high incentives of political and state 
actors to support the expansion of education opportunities and the relative lack of opportunities for 
their opponents to block policy proposals.  
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Whereas these results largely explain the cases of Norway, Denmark, and Sweden in developing 
education policy that invests highly in cognitive capacity and expands educational opportunity, the 
question of how the Netherlands managed to develop such education policy is less clear. Outside 
of low veto points, the results from the regression analysis do not suggest other components of the 
Dutch path that increase the probability of membership in the SA set. The ‘parsimonious’ solution 
sets from the fuzzy set analysis provide some insight to this question. In particular, these results 
from Table 3.4 suggested that high levels of wage coordination led to membership in SA when in 
combination with weak union density and various combinations of high Christian democratic 
incumbency, low veto points, and weak employers’ organizations. The Dutch case indeed provides 
an example of a case where coordinated bargaining institutions at the peak level continue to 
produce consensual outcomes in terms of education policy, which suggests that wage bargaining 
situations within the Dutch context could have been conducive to set membership in SA.  
 
Also, the individual scores on components of the skill acquisition index for the Dutch case suggest 
a relatively larger role for wage bargaining institutions. The Dutch case ranked relatively more 
strongly on policies related to higher and continuing training rather than investments in initial 
education. Whereas the high incumbency of left parties and public sector employment in the cases 
of Norway and Sweden likely explain the high scores in spending on initial education, political 
support for high investment in initial education are weaker in the Netherlands. Although left 
parties were often in the opposition, they never managed to dominate the government over 
consecutive electoral cycles. Indeed, the entire structure of initial education remains characterized 
by the principle of pillars, where students of different faiths are educated in separate schools. 
Policies for higher education, however, are not faith-based, and firms’ interest in obtaining 
university educated students suggests that the social partners may play a role in furthering the 
creation of policies to expand access to higher education. Coordinative capacity of the social 
partners is also a potential hypothesis for the highly regulated continuing training legislation as 
well as reforms in the qualification system.  
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However, if high levels of wage bargaining coordination proved to be highly relevant in the Dutch 
case, why was not this factor sufficient in other cases? The high levels of veto points in Germany, 
Australia, and Switzerland provide a possible explanation why these countries failed to rank 
highly on the skill acquisition index. The cases of Austria, Belgium, and Japan are more difficult 
to explain, and the differences between these cases and the Netherlands likely has to do with 
omitted variables as well as additional characteristics of the included variables that are not 
captured in the available measures. A tentative suggestion at an omitted variable would be the 
high electoral success of left parties in the Netherlands, which nevertheless does not translate into 
high levels of left party incumbency because these parties did not constitute a large part of the 
cabinet. Also, the existing measure of public employment may not capture well the role of the 
state in the Netherlands. The state, despite not employing a high percentage of the workforce, 
nevertheless plays a powerful guiding role in developing a forum for open debate between the 
social partners as well as placing pressure on these actors to cooperate. 
 
Turning to the skill transparency index, the fuzzy set results suggested again a Scandinavian path 
as well as a more liberal path towards high skill transparency. The analysis provides substantial 
evidence for the negative consequences of Christian democracy for skill transparency. All paths 
towards set membership in ST specified the absence of high Christian democratic incumbency as a 
necessary component, and the regression results supported these findings by showing that all 
coefficients for the measure of Christian democratic incumbency were negative, regardless of 
model specification. 
 
These results also provide an explanation for the ambivalent findings on the wage bargaining, 
union density, and employer organization variables. Many countries with strong Christian 
democratic incumbency also score highly on these variables, which suggest that the effect of 
Christian democratic incumbency on education policy outcomes is stronger than these other 
factors.  
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In sum, this chapter sought to draw out the explanatory factors for high rankings on the skill 
acquisition and skill transparency dimensions, respectively. The analysis applied continuous fuzzy 
set and regression methods to estimate both the combinations of variables as well as the strength 
of individual variables in explaining the policy expansion that expands opportunities to acquire 
skills and ensures the clear certification of skills. 
 
Characteristics typically assigned to the Social Democratic welfare regime appeared to facilitate 
the development of policies that constitute the skill acquisition and skill transparency indices. In 
terms of skill transparency, however, a second path also seemed to lead to high rankings on this 
index. This path included countries with a strong legacy of right party incumbency that 
nevertheless exhibited some characteristics of coordinated market economies such as organized 
social partners.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CASE SELECTION 
The theoretical chapter used quantitative measures on education policy in order to substantiate two 
arguments: first, that education systems vary cross-nationally in the extent to which they create 
opportunities to enter into education and promote skill transparency; and, second, that these 
characteristics of education systems play a significant role in increasing the workers’ skill levels 
and their capacity to apply these skills to jobs in the labor market. By using comparative historical 
case study analysis to examine three countries that differ substantially in the structure of their 
education systems, the next five chapters aim at extending these initial arguments by providing 
additional validation of the skill acquisition and skill transparency indices, on the one hand, and 
analyzing causal explanations for variation in education policy, on the other.  
 
With reference to this first goal, scrutinizing the pace, content, and political coalitions of 
educational reforms in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands can validate the measures of 
education systems created in Chapter 2 by relating the quantitative components of the two indices 
to political debates and policy outcomes. In terms of identifying causal mechanisms, comparative 
historical analysis holds the potential to illuminate factors that explain differences between these 
countries’ education systems by way of systematic comparison of the actors and institutions that 
forged or thwarted reforms in each country.  
 
In particular, in chapters five through nine, I will analyze developments in five broad categories of 
education policy. The first category is the comprehensive schooling movement, which refers to 
efforts to remove institutional barriers within primary and secondary school structures that inhibit 
educational mobility. The second category is state planning, which encompasses investments in 
primary through tertiary education as well as structural reforms of the education system in order to 
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respond to changed labor market demands. Firm-based training is the third category and active 
labor market policies constitute the fourth. The final category refers to the certification system, 
which focuses on reforms aimed at making the certification of qualifications in the labor market 
transparent and flexible.  
 
This chapter sets up the comparison of Danish, German, and Dutch education reform in three 
ways. First, I review the theory of case section that resulted in the inclusion of these three 
countries, focusing not only on the strengths but also on the weaknesses of this approach. Second, 
I link the components of the skill acquisition and skill transparency indices to education policy 
more generally in order to contextualize the earlier theoretical discussion. Third, I provide an 
overview of the main trends in education reform in order to create a baseline from which to 
understand the individual case studies and the comparative analysis.   
Case Selection Procedure: Strengths and Weaknesses 
Comparative case study analysis excels at analyzing the causal explanations of integrative 
education policy for a few reasons. First, case studies do extremely well at developing conceptual 
validity. Just as case studies on democratization expanded understandings of democracy by 
cultivating what some call ‘democracy with adjectives,’ in-depth analysis of education policy 
creation can lead to richer understandings of the role of education policy in addressing different 
types of social needs across diverse sets of communities and historical moments. Education as a 
social policy has not received much attention in the political science literature and therefore the 
debate on political contestation over education policy is limited. In this way, considerable room 
exists to expand the comprehension of the varied distributional consequences of different types of 
education policy. Moreover, interpretation of political debates surrounding education depends on 
priors about the expected role of education in that context. In most accounts, the literature 
identifies two roles of education policy: a redistributive role, in which the focus lies on the 
equality of educational opportunities between different groups in society, as well as a conflict 
dimension that depends the types of skills that education imparts, where skills can either be 
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general or specific. The ideas and political dynamics that structure political debates over education 
can provide information about the reasons why certain understandings or dimensions of education 
are more salient in different contexts.  
 
Second, process tracing, or the linking of potential causes with outcomes, demonstrates some 
advantages that cannot be attained with statistical analysis. For instance, since process tracing 
focuses on “sequential processes within a particular historical case, not on correlations of data 
across cases” (George & Bennett 2005, p. 13), the use of process tracing allows the researcher to 
focus on the complex meaning of a relationship between two phenomenon rather than the 
probability of two phenomenon occurring in tandem. Whereas correlations are very useful at 
inference, deeper examination of the intentions, expectations, strategic interaction, and bargaining 
dynamics, for example, is necessary in order to develop a strong understanding the relationship 
between cause and effect, an understanding which is particularly important in forming 
expectations about the implications of a given correlation. Also, many outcomes that we are 
interested in grow over time, and process tracing allows one to be sensitive to the convoluted 
nature of many historical policy developments (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer 2003; Pierson 2004).  
 
The comparative historical studies of these three cases aim to explain the different capacities of 
the generous welfare states of Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands to reform their education 
systems. As detailed in Chapter 2, changed economic conditions underscore the need for education 
policy to create opportunities to acquire skills which, in turn, are most easily applied to jobs in the 
labor market by certification procedures and other policies that make individuals’ skills 
transparent. Although all workers portend to benefit from such policy changes, workers who face 
a high risk of skill obsolescence and therefore marginalization within the labor market stand to 
receive the highest returns from education policy reform. As such, education policy that facilitates 
skill acquisition and skill transparency can be thought of as ‘integrative’ education policy. 
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Despite demands for integrative education policy, countries demonstrate large differences in the 
extent to which they have enacted such policies. Education reform capacity can be gauged from 
the two indices constructed and displayed in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 in Chapter 2. As the tables show, 
Social Democratic welfare states demonstrate high rankings on both indices. Turning to Christian 
Democratic states, however, the picture is less clear: with respect to the skill acquisition index, 
Germany appears a distinct laggard; on the skill transparency index, Germany, Austria, 
Switzerland, and Italy all receive below average rankings. One conclusion of these observations is 
that differences in reform capacity cannot be fully attributed to conventional factors explaining 
welfare state generosity. Comparative historical analysis of generous welfare states, with different 
degrees of integrative education policy, aims to explain why factors traditionally identified for 
having facilitated the passage of social policy do not necessarily lead to the passage of integrative 
education policy. 
 
In selecting cases, a central aim is to provide for high variation with respect to rankings on the 
integrative education policy indices while controlling closely for other factors that influence the 
passage of generous welfare state policy. As such, I follow John Stuart Mill’s method of 
difference, which abides by the following logic: “If an instance in which the phenomenon under 
investigation occurs and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in 
common save one, that one occurring in the former; the circumstances in which alone the two 
instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause of the phenomena” 
(Mill 1862 [1843], p. 429). This logic has also been referred to by Przeworski and Teune (1970, p. 
33) as the ‘most similar systems design’ and has been recognized as the strongest of Mill’s 
approaches (Skocpol 1979). To apply Mill’s method it is necessary to first identify the 
‘phenomenon under investigation’ as well as the circumstances that countries have in common. 
According to the method of difference, the remaining differences explain variation among 
countries in the phenomenon under investigation. 
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I first identify the phenomenon under investigation as the determinants of integrative education 
policy understood as the various policies that increase the capacity of individuals to learn, the 
opportunities to enter education, and the transparency of earned skills. I would like to understand 
why some countries find it easier to construct or reform their education systems in such a way as 
to extend opportunities to acquire education as well as make clear the skills that individuals earn 
either in education or on the job. Although there may be multiple paths to the formation of 
integrative education policy, I choose to select countries with relatively similar levels of welfare 
state generosity in order to control, albeit imperfectly, for conventional antecedents to 
redistributive policies and thereby both address the problem of complex or compound causation as 
well as contribute to our understanding of the significance of traditional welfare state theories in 
explaining the passage of integrative education policies. For these reasons, in the following five 
chapters, I am specifically interested in the determinants of integrative education policy in 
generous welfare states. 
 
Having identified the phenomenon under investigation, I now turn to the process of case selection. 
With respect to Tables 2.1 and 2.2, I begin by selecting by the generosity of states’ welfare states, 
which eliminates the Liberal welfare states and East European countries. Although there may be 
alternative routes to integrative education policy, I am primarily interested in addressing the 
explanatory power of traditional theories of welfare state expansion. As an aside, however, it 
should be mentioned that few countries without relatively generous welfare states manage to score 
highly on both dimensions. From this group of generous welfare states, which consist of the Social 
Democratic and Conservative (Christian Democratic) welfare regimes as defined by Esping-
Andersen (1990), I identify two extreme cases as well as a case that represents the median point 
between the extremes. The inclusion of a third ‘mid-point’ case that can provide a point of 
comparison with the other two cases, because it exemplifies characteristics of both a highly 
integrative education system as well as a weakly integrative education system. 
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To start the selection, a case that exemplifies a ‘high’ extreme includes Denmark, which ranks at 
the top of both indices. A country that comes closest to a generous welfare state with non-
integrative education policy is Germany, which ranks below average on both indices. In addition 
to ranking almost directly between Denmark and Germany on the two indices, the Netherlands 
provides a case that embodies characteristics of both countries: on the one hand, the Netherlands 
has a strong Christian Democratic tradition, similar to Germany; but, on the other, the capacity of 
the Netherlands to reduce income inequality brings it closer to the Social Democratic ideal type. In 
this way, the experiences of education reform in the Netherlands not only likely exhibit clear 
examples of both reform success and failure, as witnessed by its position between Denmark and 
Germany on the indices, but it also shares institutional structures that provide further points of 
comparison. The Netherlands is therefore included as a third case which can bridge the differences 
between Denmark and Germany by providing supplemental evidence of a Christian Democratic 
welfare state that nevertheless managed to reform its welfare state.  
 
In terms of circumstances common to all three countries, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands 
share well-established workers and employers’ organizations as well as a social democratic party 
that was to share power with more right-leaning parties. The power resources approach identifies 
the organization of workers in left parties and unions as a key predictor of redistributive policies 
(Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979) with the logic that workers prefer generous social policy and their 
political representation improves the likelihood of realizing these goals. In terms of social 
democratic parties, the Danish SD, German SPD, and Dutch PvdA, developed strong 
organizational roots during the late eighteen and early nineteen hundreds, which buttressed the 
passage of generous welfare state policies later in the twentieth century. The incumbency of left 
parties is highest in Denmark, where social democratic cabinet share averaged 32.18 percent in the 
post-war period, followed by Germany (14.56) and the Netherlands (13.66). Considering for a 
moment the frequency with which social democratic parties were present in the cabinet, however, 
regardless of the percentage of seats they held, the results for the Netherlands increase. Where the 
Danish social democrats were present in the cabinet 68 percent of the time between 1960 and 
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2000, the results for the Dutch PvdA and the German SPD are 56 percent and 49 percent, 
respectively. 
 
In the late eighteen hundreds, workers also found political representation in the form of trade 
union organizations. The Danish LO, German DGB (formerly GGD and AGDB), and Dutch FNV 
(formerly NVV) all provided workers with an association capable of negotiating with 
governmental agencies, ministries, and political parties.  
 
Besides the strong representation of working class interests, research also underscores the 
importance of employers in the passage of redistributive policy (e.g. Baldwin 1990; Estevez-Abe 
et al 2001; Hall & Soskice 2001b; Mares 2003). The varieties of capitalism approach defines the 
economies of continental and northern Europe as coordinated market economies, in which 
employers, due to their dependency on specific skills, support the passage of passive social policy 
(e.g. Estevez-Abe et al 2001; Hall & Soskice 2001a; Iversen 2005). Work building on these ideas 
relates the organizational capacity of employers to the passage of active labor market policies 
(Martin 2004a; Martin 2004b; Martin & Swank 2004; Martin 2004c). The countries selected all 
demonstrate highly developed peak employer associations illustrated by the DA in Denmark, the 
DBA in Germany, and the VNO-NCW in the Netherlands. 
 
Selecting cases by their common attributes theoretically eliminates the possibility that these 
characteristics account for variation in the phenomenon under investigation. These common 
attributes are therefore in a sense control variables. Following the logic of Mill’s method of 
difference, the factors that explain variation in countries’ integrative education policy lie in the 
remaining differences between Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. In contrast to a 
controlled experiment, however, the analysis cannot perfectly control for two contaminating 
effects. First, these common attributes vary in important ways across countries, which may be 
relevant for the occurrence of the dependent variable. Second, clear differences between these 
three cases may alter the behavior of these control variables to such an extreme that the capacity to 
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claim that these control variables indeed control, in this case, for strength of the welfare state 
lobby is reduced. The two qualifications to the method of difference will each be discussed in turn. 
 
To approach the first potential contaminating effect, the characteristics previously identified as 
similar across all three cases, including well established social democratic parties, trade unions 
and employer associations, despite their relative similarity as compared to all countries in the 
sample in fact vary in important ways. For instance, Denmark distinguishes itself from Germany 
and the Netherlands in terms of union structure. Denmark has a Ghent union structure, which 
means that the unions manage and administrate unemployment insurance. In the period of high 
unemployment, workers in countries with Ghent systems remained in trade unions or even decided 
to join trade unions in order to guarantee access to unemployment insurance, whereas workers in 
countries with state mandated unemployment insurance do not share this incentive (Rothstein 
1992). As case in point, according to OECD data on union membership in 1994, 71 percent of the 
Danish workforce were members, whereas German and Dutch membership levels stood at 32 and 
25 percent, respectively.  
 
At the same time, it is important to remember that low membership levels in Germany and the 
Netherlands mask the strong political presence of trade union organizations in policy-making 
circles in these countries. As such, although actual membership remains low, the bargaining power 
of unions stretches beyond union ranks. One example is that collective bargaining coverage 
remains above 50 percent of firms in all three countries (Tijdens & van Klaveren 2007).  
 
Another qualification to the selection method described above involves the possibility that the 
three shared characteristics may behave differently due to additional contextual differences 
between Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. On the one hand, these additional contextual 
factors may simply be considered explanatory factors in their own right. On the other hand, to the 
extent that they fundamentally alter the preferences of social democratic parties, unions, or 
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employer organizations, they weaken the degree to which these control variables indeed capture 
common tendencies between the three countries. 
 
For instance, as the above discussion detailed, the social democratic parties were forced into 
coalition with additional parties, yet the Social Democrats’ coalition partners represented quite 
different parties in each country. While ‘coalition partners’ may be seen to constitute a difference 
between these countries, this factor may also influence the politics of the social democrats in each 
country and therefore the validity of constrained social democracy as a control variable. In 
Denmark, the SD was frequently forced into coalition with the Liberals. In Germany, the main 
competition for the SPD was the Christian Democratic CDU/CSU. Finally, the Dutch PvdA was 
frequently forced to share power with the Christian Democratic CDA and liberal VVD and D66. 
As a result, the nature of political competition is expected to be different in these three cases, 
which could influence the policy objectives that Social Democrats pursue. Table 4.1 below 
provides information on political parties’ ideological positions on education policy. Christian 
Democratic parties can be understood as occupying a position between the Conservative and 
redistributive Social Democratic ideologies. The Liberal ideology should assume the greatest 
importance in Denmark, followed by the Netherlands and then Germany. Conservative tendencies 
should be present in all three countries, but in different flavors given the strong presence of 
Christian Democratic parties in Germany and the Netherlands.  
Table 4.1. Political Ideologies in Education 
  
Political Ideology Core Value Core Form of Control 
Liberal Freedom Market 
Conservative Tradition Authority 
Social Democratic: focus on redistribution Equality Corporatist 
Social Democratic: focus on culture Community, Democracy ‘from 
Source: (Rasmussen 2002) 
 
Soskice and Carlin (2007) also elaborate on another potential contextual factor that reduces the 
effectiveness of integrative education policy in large countries and therefore the incentives of 
parties to pursue such policies. Ever since growth rates slowed in the early 1980s, governments 
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sought ways in which to restore competitiveness and thereby limit unemployment growth. A key 
reform measure, real wage restraint, was pursued in most countries in this period, but, according to 
Soskice and Carlin, the size of the economy influences the consequences of this reform measure. 
Where real wage restraint leads to increased export competitiveness and decreased consumption, 
the relatively larger non-tradables sector in Germany means that the latter effect overwhelms the 
former. The export sector flourishes in all cases, but the larger percentage of the population in the 
German case who receive less money each month become increasingly discretionary in their 
spending behavior as the incentives to save rise. As a result, domestic aggregate demand in 
Germany falls far below that of smaller open economies and unemployment remains high. In this 
context, integrative education policy which equips workers with marketable transparent skills does 
not reduce unemployment because the jobs simply do not exist. In the context of low domestic 
aggregate demand, political pressure to develop responses to labor supply are likely to fall second 
to pressure to address demand issues related to the creation of new jobs.  
 
However, this argument only explains weak political support and weak left party support in 
particular, towards integrative education policy since 1980. The roots of integrative education 
reform, however, stretch back at least to the 1950s. Furthermore, the level of vacancies in 
Germany remains quite high throughout the period since the 1980 despite high levels of in 
unemployment, which suggests a strong role for integrative education policy in addressing an 
apparent skill mismatch. 
 
German unification has also presented tremendous challenges to political parties and interest 
associations in the former West Germany to integrate the population from the new federal states. 
The goal of maintaining equality understood as the complete transfer of existing labor regulations 
and social rights to the former East overwhelmed the reform impetus to resolve existing 
inefficiencies in the West German model. Similar to the argument regarding aggregate demand 
discussed above, German unification created political problems that assumed priority over 
educational reform. 
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Finally, the ‘shadow of the state’ in Denmark and the Netherlands creates incentives for trade 
unions and employer associations to work together that are not as strong in the German case. In 
Denmark and the Netherlands, the state frequently threatens to intervene if the social partners do 
not manage to arrive at a consensus. In the German context, the state is strictly barred from 
intervening in wage setting due to the principle of Tarifautonomie, or the principle that the social 
partners alone merit the right to collective bargaining. As a result, the coordinative capacity of 
social partners in Denmark and the Netherlands is more likely to yield results than in Germany. 
 
Although I am unable to ‘control’ in a reliable way for the differences between these three 
countries, elimination of alternative hypotheses through controlled comparison is by no means the 
only goal of the case studies. I am also intent on applying process-tracing in order to understand 
better the variety of factors that were salience in their own right or in combination with other 
factors in explaining education policy outcomes. Therefore, accumulation of knowledge about the 
variety of factors related to education reforms in all their complexity stands as a major goal of the 
case study analysis.  
 
Moreover, reliance on process-tracing as a method for getting at causality is in no way an inferior 
tool to that of statistical control. Paralleling the statistical logic of experimental control, Mill’s 
method of difference tells us that the single factor differentiating cases where an outcome is 
observed from those where it is not can be identified as the cause of that outcome. However, while 
this method provides an explanation for eliminating competing hypotheses, it does provide an 
explanation for how the resulting causal factor leads to the given outcome. In other words, 
statistical control does not provide a clear answer for why the factor leads to the outcome.  
 
Historical analysis, on the other hand, does better at providing explanation, hence the oft-heard 
claim that qualitative analysis aims at causal interpretation whereas statistical analysis aims at 
causal inference. The value of historical analysis lies foremost in perceiving the nature of causality 
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as a sequential phenomena that therefore calls for diachronic evidence, which, in turn, also helps 
to establish agency (Rueschemeyer & Stephens 1997). Moreover, much work in this tradition 
disagrees with the assumptions of most statistical analysis that causal influence is additive and 
linear. Rather, the impact of a causal factor may depend on context and the path towards a given 
outcome may not only proceed but also at times regress. Process-tracing therefore allows the 
research to gain insight into the precise mechanism by which a given causal factor relates to the 
outcome in question as well as establish agency.  
 
To summarize, I decide to scrutinize education policy reform in three generous welfare states 
because process tracing holds the potential to contribute to theory development in the relatively 
understudied area of education politics. In particular, close analysis of ideas and policy coalitions 
supporting integrative education policy reform can reveal information about the stakes of such 
reforms, which can be compared with expectations developed from other theoretical approaches in 
order to develop a theory of integrative education politics. In terms of case selection, I employ 
Mill’s method of difference in order to explore why relatively similar countries implemented 
different degrees of integrative education policies. By controlling for characteristics recognized 
for supporting the expansion of generous social policy, this approach excels at eliminating 
alternative hypotheses. As the above discussion illuminated, however, issues persist in controlling 
for constrained social democracy and coordinated employer and worker associations, either 
because the structure of these organizations differ across countries or because additional 
contextual factors mediate the preferences of left parties and the social partners and thereby 
occlude the firm assumption that these actors’ preference, under similar circumstances, would 
align closely.  
Overview of Political Party Systems 
The role of partisanship was already touched on in the preceding chapters as a critical explanatory 
factor for differences in education policy outcomes. Beyond the individual programmatic 
orientation of parties within Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands, the overall profile of parties 
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within a given system as well as the rules surrounding the process of government formation and 
policy-making also structure education policy outcomes. Given the relevance of the party system 
of these three countries in the policy-making process, I will briefly outline the structure of the 
party system to provide background information for the case studies. 
 
The most conventional way to categorize party systems is according to the number of parties in 
government. Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands are all multi-party systems (Duverger 
1954). In terms of size of the governing coalition, Denmark typically forms minority coalitions, 
Germany usually has minimum winning coalitions, and the Netherlands mainly had over-sized 
coalitions in the immediate postwar period before forming more minimum winning coalitions 
since roughly 1980.  
 
In terms of the types of parties present in these three cases, Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage theory 
provides key insights (Lipset & Rokkan 1967). Lipset and Rokkan argued for the salient role of 
the sequencing of conflicts revolving around class, religion, and distribution of power between the 
center and the periphery in the period between the Protestant Reformation and the Industrial 
Revolution. In particular, they identify four central cleavages: a center-periphery cleavage, a state-
church cleavage, a rural-urban cleavage, and an owning class-working class cleavage. These social 
divisions become political by passing three main thresholds of legitimacy, incorporation, and 
representation, a process which results in the formation of viable political parties. 
 
The center-periphery cleavage produced regionally distinct political parties in all three cases. The 
state-church cleavage was not pronounced in Denmark, where religion largely ceased to be a 
socially divisive issue by the end of the nineteenth century and the state consolidated control over 
the churches. In Germany and the Netherlands, however, religious differences represented salient 
social cleavages that the state was unable to attenuate. In Germany, the Catholic Center Party, 
Zentrumspartei, formed in 1870 and dissolved in 1933, gave way to the creation of the modern-
day Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union in the post-war period. In the 
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Netherlands, many small religious parties were formed in 1880. These parties represented 
different confessions of Christianity, but nevertheless oftentimes formed political coalitions. In 
1980, these different parties were united in the formation of the Christian Democratic Appeal, 
Christen Democratisch Appèl.  
 
The rural-urban cleavage resulted in the formation of the agriculture-based party in Denmark, the 
liberal party Venstre. In Germany, agricultural interests were accommodated within religious 
parties in the former German Empire and in conservative parties in Prussia. In the Netherlands, 
liberal parties have a long tradition and were a strong political force for free trade. The modern-
day People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, formed 
in 1948, exhibits roots from a large number of liberal parties that played a large role in Dutch 
politics in the preceding hundred years.  
 
Finally, the owning class-working class cleavage resulted in social democratic parties in all three 
cases. In Denmark, the Social Democrats, Socialdemokraterne, formed in 1871, whereas the 
Social Democratic Party of Germany, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, draws on roots 
from 1863. In the Netherlands, the Labor Party, Partij van de Arbeid, draws on roots from 1894.  
Contextualizing the Indices of Skill Acquisition and Skill Transparency 
The differences between countries in terms of creating opportunities to obtain new skills and 
making skills transparency did not develop in the course of one policy-cycle. Although some 
individual reforms were indeed path-breaking, their passage typically depended on preexisting 
legislation, policy debates, and political movements. Before turning the discussion to causal 
origins of integrative education policy in the following three chapters, it is therefore necessary to 
clarify the policies and their forerunners that underlie the measures used in the skill acquisition 
and skill transparency indices in order to make clear the various policies that the case studies will 
analyze.  
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The skill acquisition index includes eight variables that capture the extent to which education 
policy increases opportunities to enter into new forms of education. These eight variables cluster 
into three groups which I will discuss in turn. The first group measures the degree of government 
investment in education, from the primary to tertiary levels, as well as a variable for class size. 
Government spending on education speaks to the degree of states’ human capital investment. 
Referencing UNESCO’s methodological notes, the total spending variable can be understood as a 
composite measure of spending on teacher salaries and benefits, welfare services, teaching 
materials, the construction of schools, furniture and equipment for schools, and 
telecommunications. Although the measure of total spending per student is inherently meaningful, 
the statement that ‘no one argues over spending per se’ rings true (Pierson?). Rather that simply 
calling for more money, debate over educational reform covered real issues such as the creation of 
new schools. Along similar lines, the variable for the student to teacher ratio speaks to state 
investment in teacher salaries and benefits as well as the degree of state planning in education. 
Therefore, where the spending variable speaks to states’ investment in human capital and ensuing 
consequences for students’ cognitive capacity, the empirical evidence of contestation over 
spending takes the form of political debate over specific policy issues.  
 
The second group of variables in the skill acquisition index captures the degree to which structures 
of secondary education separate students by vocation and aptitude and, in doing so, influence their 
opportunities to enter post-compulsory education and training. Evaluations of policies that divide 
student cohorts along either vocational or aptitude lines, labeled either ‘tracking’ or ‘streaming’ in 
the literature, pay attention to two related consequences of such policies including differentiation 
between tracks in terms of prestige or labor market outcomes. The literature does not come out 
fully against or in favor of streaming precisely because of discrepancies in evaluations based on 
these criteria. As a result, praise or condemnation for streaming tends to reference to a specific 
case or period rather than directed at the idea itself, although general public opinion towards 
streaming has become more negative over time. In order to understand why the debate over 
streaming remains inconclusive, I will discuss aspects of streaming that influence the 
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aforementioned issues of prestige and labor market outcomes: issues of restricted access to 
education and of differentials in school funding between different tracks. 
 
Since the beginning of organized education, access to education has been characterized by 
restrictions based on wealth and intellectual capacity. Even after compulsory education was 
introduced, the wealthiest families continued to send their children to usually religious-based 
grammar schools, while poorer children attended village schools. The former schools were better 
funded, provided a better education, and led to high status, well paid jobs. In short, due to the 
wealth of their parents, rich children enjoyed education opportunities that far exceeded those of 
their poorer neighbors. The role of socio-economic background continued to play a strong role 
over time on access to education and educational attainment, although constitutional rights to 
compulsory and state financial support for needy families does work to moderate this relationship. 
 
Besides socio-economic background, state-run educational institutions continued to shape 
children’s education opportunities based on criteria established early on in their lives. In 
particular, although parental discretion and as a result family wealth often plays a large role, 
aptitude assessments tend to decide whether students follow a general or vocational path. The 
general path is viewed as demanding a higher level of academic ability, which implicit in the 
selection mechanism in place in most Germanic countries can be fully assessed at the age of 10. 
The early division between general and vocational tracks limits occupational choice insofar as 
students cannot switch tracks later in life. The opportunity to change paths depends on the creation 
of structural pathways linking different tracks as well as complementary policies that encourage 
independence in occupational choice. These policies are therefore influential in creating 
educational opportunities. 
 
A related way to assess the effect of tracking on stratification is to measure the discrepancy 
between different tracks in terms of school funding and students’ future wage differentials. For 
instance, entering vocational training in Germany in the 1960s typically provided students with 
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employment in a company that was frequently prepared to offer apprentices long term 
employment, a good salary, and further training if necessary. More generally speaking, however, a 
stigma frequently exists with regards to students who choose to enter vocational training. 
Oftentimes, students who pursue vocational degrees attend relatively under-funded schools and 
face worse job prospects than their fellow students who attended general education. The relative 
funding of schools therefore provides an indication of the equality of resource distribution 
between schools and reputation of different education tracks. 
 
The final group of variables focuses on the financial and regulatory support for post-compulsory 
education, which includes variables for financial aid in general, costs of tertiary education, 
regulation of firm-based continuing education, and spending on active labor market policies. The 
provision of financial aid signifies recognition by the state of enduring inequalities in access to 
educational opportunities as a result of low income and the provision of financial resources that 
can be used to reduce these inequalities. The consequence of financial aid for educational 
opportunities is quite clear and the only addendum necessary to understand the relevance of this 
variable is the recognition of the strong role of the central state in addressing social inequalities 
that the passage of such policies infers.  
  
 
80 
 
Table 4.2. Measures of Education Systems: From Data to Empirics 
Measure Policies 
Education spending/ Teacher 
Student Ratio 
• Construction of Schools 
• Teachers’ Salaries 
Separation by Ability and 
Vocation 
• Cost of Education 
• Parental Discretion Over Division by Ability 
• Access to Information in Schools on Occupational  
Fields Prior to Tracking 
Post-Compulsory Education 
(Financial Aid, Cost of 
Tertiary Education, 
• Financial Aid Policies 
• Legislation on Tuition Costs and Possible Exemptions 
• Key Agreements and Legislation on Continuing 
Skill Forecasting • Date of First Forecast 
• Regularity of Forecasts 
Transparency of Skill 
Content (Centralization of 
Qualifications Framework, 
• Centralization of Education Authority (or lack thereof) 
• Responses to EQF 
• Establishment of Mechanisms to Recognize (Certify) 
Transparency in Skill 
Complementarities 
(Framework Linking 
• Establishment of Framework Linking Occupations 
• Establishment of Module-Based Learning 
 
The costs of tertiary education and related financial support to students for attendance to 
university deserve more attention. The measure of tertiary education costs acted as a proxy 
measure for the facility of entering this level of education. However, a host of factors may inhibit 
the expansion of tertiary education: the failure of state planning to provide sufficient places; the 
high costs of doing so; and merit-based prerequisites for tertiary education admissions. In addition 
to policies governing the costs of acquiring a tertiary education degree, therefore, the case studies 
will assess a broader array of government policies that influence tertiary enrolment. 
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The fourth variable that comprises the group on post-compulsory education includes the regulation 
of continuing training. While the regulation of continuing training increases opportunities for 
training, the passage of such policies rests on placing the necessity to train throughout the career 
on the agenda not only of political parties but also of firms. Policies related to regulation of 
continuing training therefore also speak to recognition among political parties and firms that 
training is necessary as well as the willingness of firms to fund coordinated training policies and 
surrender the autonomy required to realize these collective goals. As such, the passage of policies 
regulating firm-based training was frequently preceded by various informal agreements. 
 
Where the regulation of continuing training addresses the need to create opportunities for training 
among employed individuals, active labor market policies speak to the support for training and 
employment among marginalized or unemployed individuals. The measure of active labor market 
policies is a composite measure of expenditure on employment services, training, job rotation, 
wage subsidies, disability subsidies, and direct job creation.  
 
Turning to the skill transparency dimension, three groups of variables capture the policies or 
regulations that promote skill transparency. First, skill forecasting provides information about the 
establishment of institutions devoted to measuring general trends in skills needs relative to supply. 
The included variable measures the tradition of skill forecasting within each case and in doing so 
intends to depict the standardization of forecasting practices and thereby the quality of forecasts. 
High quality skill forecasts provide valuable information to education policy-makers that can be 
used to update curricula in initial and continuing education as well as facilitate labor mobility 
towards growth sectors. The case studies therefore detail not only the introduction and perfection 
of skill forecasting techniques, but also the ways in which forecasts are used to inform decisions 
made with regard to school curricula and public policies aimed at promoting labor mobility 
towards growing sectors.  
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The second group of variables in the skill transparency index illustrates policies that make clear 
the skills inferred by qualifications that individuals hold. The variable for the centralization of the 
qualification framework, accreditation of prior learning, and percent of firm training in public 
institutions comprise this group. The centralization of countries’ qualifications framework finds its 
roots in quite early decisions about the degree of centralized control over education more 
generally. Recent EU legislation creates new rules concerning the comparability of education 
across countries, which has prompted some trends towards centralization in Member States.  
 
The second and third measures included in this group speak to the transparency of skills earned 
during employment. While the measure for the accreditation of prior learning represents a clear 
policy outcome pursued by governments since the mid-1980s and more recently as a result of EU 
legislation, the measure of firms using external training institutions operated as a proxy for the 
clear certification of formal firm-based training. Rather than necessarily implying a national 
legislated policy, this latter measure speaks to the development of behavior norms and regulations 
describing the inter-firm coordination over certification of firm-based training. 
 
The final group of variables speaks to the recognition of complementarities between different 
occupational skill profiles as measured by the existence of a framework linking occupations and 
modularized educational courses. Both of these policy initiatives represent recent moves to 
facilitate occupation mobility, which build on earlier developments most predominantly the 
centralization of education. 
 
In order to address the causal mechanisms of education policy, I group the aforementioned 
policies thematically and examine the development of education policy over time within the three 
cases. The three themes include comprehensive schooling, continuing education policies, and 
active labor market policies.  
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Overview of Trends in Education 
Although countries ultimately pursued quite distinct paths in educational reform, trends in the 
political debate around education policy exist across countries. Reviewing these trends provides a 
baseline for understanding country-specific deviations, which I will discuss in the following three 
chapter. For sake of clarity, I break up the discussion into three parts which align with structural 
economic shifts and trends state-building in Europe.  
 
>1950 
The first period covers the origins of education systems until 1950. While schooling has roots in 
religion organizations, the state typically began to assume responsibility in the nineteenth century. 
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, lasting decisions were reached about the 
control and financing of state run schools as well as the strength of alternatives to state-run 
schools, which typically expressed elements of local or religious control.  
 
Another significant development in this period was the organizational developments of vocational 
education in terms of school development and interest organizations. Issues of control between 
workers, employers, and the state were debated and the resulting distribution of authority played a 
fundamental role in the continuing development of the vocational education system in each 
country. 
 
Relating this period to the policies discussed above that constitute the skill acquisition and 
transparency dimensions, respectively, this period had massive consequences for the ‘education 
spending’ and the ‘pupil to teacher ratio’ measures as well as the institutionalization of vocational 
training and, related, streaming policies. Industrialization and the growing organizational capacity 
of the working class prompted long-term debates on education policy in all countries and the 
relative influence of conservative forces played a key role in determining the extent to which 
popular demands were realized.  
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The definition of the states’ role in funding schools and organizing teacher training received 
attention in this period. The degree of centralization of the education system was also largely 
determined during this period. Although adult education received attention, the definition of adult 
typically referred to children who had completed primary school and was not highly developed in 
this period. 
 
1950-1980 
The period from 1950 to 1980 represents a period of high growth and welfare state expansion. As 
Lutz (1984) describes, the postwar period experienced such high growth rates that industrial 
production appeared to reduce differences between social classes. Whereas society in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was wrought with occupational divisions (craftsman, 
tradesman), industrial growth seemed to hold the potential to subsume all workers within an 
industrial class and education policy was seen as a tool with which to socialize workers in these 
new economic developments. The theme of equality of opportunity therefore took hold in the 
immediate postwar period and infused the debate on education policy throughout Europe until the 
economic slowdown of the 1970s.  
 
A common policy response to the call for equality was comprehensive schooling. Many advocates 
of democratic reform pushed for these changes, but growing demand for high skilled manpower 
also supported the call for equal access to secondary education (Ryba 1980, p. 107). The 
institutionalization of secondary schools developed in this period generally continues until today. 
 
The comprehensive school debate had clear consequences on the educational opportunities of 
children on the lower end of the ability spectrum. In addition to institutional changes that delayed 
the division of students until the end of compulsory education, the movement inspired policies that 
created opportunities for students who had at some point fallen out of the formal education system 
to restart their education.  
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1980< 
The late 1970s and early 1980s introduced a period of permanent austerity. Low growth rates and 
international financial liberalization frustrated the capacity of governments to balance their 
budgets. At the same time, the lofty expectations that many held concerning the potential for 
education policy to reduce socio-economic inequalities were not fully realized. The relation 
between educational attainment and social background still appeared to be quite strong, and 
creating more inclusive education policy did not do away with a existence of a group of low-
achievers at the secondary level  (Ryba 1980, p. 108). Nevertheless, differentiation of curricula 
between vocational and general education narrowed in the post-1980 period, and more and more 
students chose to pursue higher educational degrees. 
 
Given changed economic conditions and higher life expectancy, increased attention has also been 
given to the issue of lifelong learning. The topic has reached both national and international policy 
debates. 
 
European integration also prompted a number of policy changes in the field of education during 
this period. Where as the Lisbon treaty restricts the EU’s role in education, youth training, and 
vocational training, the Bologna Process nevertheless sets an agenda for the full harmonization of 
the Member States’ higher education systems and thereby creates pressure to develop clear 
definitions of degrees as well as quality assurance methods. The Erasmus program, which has 
existed since 1987, facilitates mobility of students throughout the Member States on the level of 
higher education. 
 
The main policy areas effected by developments in this period include financial support for those 
without sufficient financial means, particularly for those who want to enter tertiary education, and 
issues related to the promotion of post-compulsory training both on the job through regulation of 
continuing training as well as for those marginalized in the labor market by way of active labor 
market policies. 
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The need to enforce the transparent certification of skills has also received attention. Coordinating 
efforts of the European Union have played a role in disseminating information about best practices 
in this area between Member States. Two policies broadly discussed on the European level include 
the recognition of prior (or informal) learning and dividing the coursework necessary for degree 
program into thematic components, called modules, in order to facilitate labor mobility. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an introduction to the case studies of Denmark, Germany, and the 
Netherlands. First, I explained the advantages of case studies in examining causal processes. In 
particular, I explained how case studies are able to get to the bottom of issues of complex 
causation as well as provide insight into the intentions of key actors. Second, I detailed the case 
selection process of Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. Employing Mill’s method of 
difference, I selected countries that varied in terms of their rankings on the skill acquisition and 
skill transparency dimensions, the dependent variable, and shared similar values on the 
conventional explanatory variables for the expansion of social policy. Third, I summarized the 
political systems in each country. 
 
Fourth, turning to education policy, I discussed in greater detail the policies that make up the 
measures included in the skill acquisition and skill transparency indices in order to clarify the 
variables to be examined in the comparative historical analysis. Finally, I provided an overview of 
the three main periods of educational reform in order to place the individual experiences of the 
three cases in context.  
 
The following three chapters detail and compare the historical development of education policy in 
Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. Drawing on the elements of the skill acquisition and 
skill transparency indices, these chapters detail the reforms that resulted in or otherwise led to the 
structure of the education system that exists today and thereby reveal information about the 
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political coalitions that underlie education reforms. The case studies elaborate on the indices 
measures of spending effort and regulatory structures to explain more clearly the ways in which 
the education system created opportunities to learn and developed regulations to certify skills 
transparently. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
COMPREHENSIVE SCHOOLING 
 
The comprehensive schooling movement encompasses efforts to remove institutional barriers 
within primary and secondary school structures that inhibit educational mobility. In Europe, 
legislative attempts at a unified primary school occurred in the late nineteenth to early twentieth 
centuries, whereas the 1950s and 60s witnessed sweeping reform attempts in secondary education.  
 
In general, those advancing the comprehensive school agenda include social democratic parties, 
liberal parties, and elementary school teachers’ associations. Opponents to reform include 
conservative and Christian democratic parties as well as the teachers and parents’ associations of 
elite schools. The extent of reform success within in each country aligns closely with the relative 
power resources of those supporting reforms vis-à-vis the opponents of reform.  
Background Information 
In Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands, formal education largely originated in religious 
organizations. In Denmark, cathedrals opened Latin grammar schools in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries, which, by the Church ordinance of 1539, were extended to all market towns. Similar 
Latin grammar schools arose in Germany in the sixteenth century. After breaking with Rome as a 
result of the Protestant Reformation, churches allied with local princes to establish Latin grammar 
schools. A similar pattern is observed in the Netherlands, with churches overseeing the foundation 
of these schools with the aid of local authorities. In all three countries, the Latin grammar schools 
were the forerunners of the modern day gymnasium or academic high school.   
 
Denmark 
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The process of state-building led to the expansion of educational opportunities by way of 
legislation on compulsory schooling. In Denmark, primary education became mandatory in 1789, 
although cost burdens precluded many municipalities from realizing these statutes (Wright 2000). 
The Education Acts of 1814 made compulsory seven years of primary education, facilitated 
largely by ground-breaking land reforms at the end of the eighteenth century. State funds ensured 
the implementation of this new law by establishing schools for the common people, or 
almueskolen, which were the forerunners of the primary school, the folkeskole, and built on 
existing ‘writing-and-counting’ schools that rose up in the middle ages. The clear differentiation 
between rural almueskolen and urban Latin grammar schools, on the primary level, persisted 
throughout the nineteenth century. On the secondary level, the Latin grammar schools provided 
secondary education to children from wealthier families and, due to the freedom of trade act in 
1857, technical schools grew up alongside existing apprenticeship, and served students who had 
finished the primary school and wished to pursue further commercial education. 
 
Germany 
The political units composing the future German state also established compulsory education 
during this period, although the structure of the school system was far more differentiated. In 
1717, Prussia introduced compulsory education, which only covered 17.5 percent of elementary 
age children but was nevertheless efficiently enforced. By the nineteenth century, education was 
made compulsory throughout the future German states. Although the structure of schooling 
differed largely by political unit, the administrative structure of schools was highly organized by 
the 1820s and 1830s (Geissler 2005, p. 66; Russell 1899, p. 92). On the primary school level, three 
types of schools existed that aligned clearly with different social classes and remained strong 
during the initial fifty years of the German Reich. Wealthy families sent their children to the 
Vorschulen, which prepared students for secondary school and held the unique advantage that its 
students were not required to take a secondary school entrance exam. Middle class families sent 
their children to the Bürgerschulen and working class children went to the Volkschulen (Lamberti 
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2002, p. 18). Whereas the Volkschulen were largely free, the other two more elite-schools charged 
fees, which restricted entry to wealthy families. 
 
On the secondary level, the school system was even more stratified. The Latin grammar schools 
became the modern day Gymnasium (Geissler 2005). The other main secondary school was the 
Realschule which gained official recognition in 1855 (Russell 1899, p. 104). Compared to the 
Gymnasium, the Realschule followed a more practically oriented curriculum and was of a shorter 
duration. Between Gymnasium and Realschule four additional types of secondary schools existed, 
including Realgymnasium, Oberrealschulen, Progymnasium, and Realprogymnasium, which 
varied in their curriculum and the length of study between that of the Gymnasium and the 
Realschule. Until the mid-twentieth century, school fees for secondary school were required and 
totaled approximately ten percent of the gross wage of an average worker (Riphahn 2006, p. 1). 
 
Netherlands 
Similar to the Danish and German school systems, the Dutch primary and secondary schools 
demonstrated class-based divides. Children of lower classes attended a non-compulsory primary 
school, and children from wealthy families went to the Latin grammar school, which led to 
university (Velema 1963). Despite legislation establishing state schools in the nineteenth century, 
compulsory education was only passed in 1900.  
 
Ever since the French invasion in 1795, the Dutch Reformed Church has been officially separate 
from the state (Sturm et al 1998). This set the stage for growing tensions between progressive 
forces that viewed the establishment of liberal non-religious schools as the foundation of a new 
nation state and the Calvinists who rejected these new liberal ideas. These tensions developed into 
the so-called ‘school war’ or schoolstrijd.  
 
State responsibility in the field of secondary education became legally organized in 1863, as a 
result of the Act on Secondary Education. The Act created an academic school for middle class 
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families called the Hogere Burger School, which was similar to the Bürgerschulen in Germany. 
The Latin grammar schools continued to exist and were seen as the precursor to higher university 
education. These Hogere Burger Schools however acted as preparation for “the faculties of 
science, mathematics, medicine, and for the Technical College in Delft as well as or even better 
than the gymnasia. As a result, in 1917, the secondary school was given the privilege of qualifying 
students for these faculties; and the gymnasia, without losing their high intellectual standing, lost 
their exclusive status as pre-university institutions” (Stellwag 1967, p. 361). 
 
Besides these more elite schools for general education, there also existed an advanced primary 
school, which acted as a bridge for the lower classes to secondary education as well as training 
colleges for elementary school teachers (World Survey of Education, UNESCO, 1965, Paris). In 
1865, an additional school was created for technical education, the Ambachtschool, and 
apprenticeships, which often required a diploma of advanced primary school also provided 
technical education. 
 
To summarize, in all three countries, elite Latin grammar schools established in the medieval 
period under ecclesiastical control constructed the founding building block of education systems 
in all three countries. From these similar beginnings, however, the process of state formation 
changed the structure of education in important ways in each country. In Denmark, compulsory 
primary education was established early and liberal values won out over conservative and 
religious ones. In Germany, the Latin grammar schools were just a stepping stone to the 
construction of a highly differentiated primary and secondary school system with enduring 
ecclesiastical roots. In the Netherlands, the degree of differentiation lies somewhere between 
Denmark and Germany and religious differences were entrenched in the Netherlands, unlike in 
Denmark, albeit in the form of consociationalism that protected individuals’ freedom with regard 
to the role of religion in schools (Lijphart 1968). 
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A Unified Primary School 
The permeation of liberal ideas in the field of education followed by the growing momentum of 
the workers’ movement drove movements for unified primary schools in Denmark and Germany. 
In contrast, the early twentieth century, when Denmark and Germany were unifying primary 
school structures, saw the legislative protection of school divisions by religion in the Netherlands.  
 
Denmark 
Division between free primary school and private primary and secondary school was eradicated by 
the Liberal party at the turn of the century. The Act on General Secondary Education on 1903 
established a four-year middle school to create a link between the primary education and upper 
secondary education, the gymnasium. Middle schools were implemented in both grammar schools 
(originally only in market towns) and other municipal schools. Following an exam in the fifth year 
of primary school, students could enter the middle school. After passing the middle school 
examination at the end of the four years, students had three choices: leave school; continue one 
more year to prepare for the lower secondary school leaving examination, the réaleksamen; or 
apply to three years of upper secondary education in the grammar school (Eurydice 2006/7, p. 7).  
 
Germany 
The Weimar Republic introduced a period of “exuberant pedagogical innovation and optimistic 
plans to reform the stratified educational system in the name of democracy and social justice" 
(Lamberti 2002, p. 1). Practically on the eve of the declaration of the Weimar Republic, these 
ideas were proposed in the form of a draft bill that later became the Primary School Act of 1920, 
or Reichsgrundschulgesetz. The elite secondary school, the Vorschule, was abolished, which made 
way for a single primary school, the Grundschule. Attendance was compulsory for four years, and 
no fees existed. The conservative parties did manage, however, to take advantage of a loophole in 
the original legislation to retain the religion as a basic component of the curriculum. Besides the 
Primary School Act of 1920, however, many progressive ambitions during the Weimer period 
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were not realized. Indeed, Greiner notes that the Act was the only bit of legislation that was able to 
get passed in this period (Greinert 1994, p. 54). 
 
The responsibility for the success of the Primary School Act of 1920 falls largely with two 
progressive educational thinkers, Johannes Tews and Paul Oestreich. Oestreich continued working 
for educational reform after the implementation of the Primary School Act through his work as 
director of the Bund entschiedener Schulreformer. The organization promoted a single 
comprehensive school, which they discussed broadly in their publication, die Neue Erziehung. A 
central result of this movement was the proposition in 1932 from Pädogogisches Zentralinstitut to 
introduce comprehensive schooling (Robinsohn & Kuhlmann 1967, p. 319).  
 
Netherlands 
At the same time that Denmark and Germany were unifying the structure of their elementary 
schools, the Dutch government secured the right to differentiation. The schoolstrijd, or conflict 
between religious and liberal views on education, was finally settled by the Act on Primary 
Education of 1920 that guaranteed equal funding of denominational schools settled the dispute 
(Kemenade 1991, p. 105). This solution, called the pacification, led to the pillarization or 
verzuiling of Dutch education, which remains a strongly defining characteristic of Dutch 
education. The consequence of the law was that parents who had previously placed their children 
in private religious schools switched their children to public religious schools. 
The Unified Primary and Secondary School 
The postwar period ushered in an economically prosperous period that appeared to provide the 
means to reduce economic inequality.  
 
Denmark 
In general, the 1950s and 1960s are characterized by the belief that education was a ‘profit-
yielding investment’ (Winther-Jensen 1980, p. 128). The comprehensive schooling movement 
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embodied the belief that extending educational opportunities to all students would greatly reduce 
inequality as well as buttress economic growth. Swedish reforms in 1950 implemented the 
comprehensive school system, instigating reform movements in other countries. The 1950s proved 
to soon, however, for a similar Danish reform.  
 
The popular School Reform of 1958 abolished the geographical distinction between both market 
town grammar schools and non-market village schools as well as the differentiation between the 
primary and middle school, thereafter creating a 7 year comprehensive school with some tracking 
in the last two years. The success of this Reform can be traced to Joerg Joergensen, who held a 
strong position in the Danish parliament, the Folketing, as well as the ideas of the renowned 
pedagogical thinker Grundtvig, who rejected examinations and ‘bookish’ knowledge. According 
to the 1958 legislation, there was a ‘mild division’ after the 5th year, where students were divided 
according to ability with parents’ considerations in mind. There was an exception where parents 
could delay the streaming until the end of compulsory education two years later; this exception, 
however, became the rule with 90 percent of students delaying tracking (Winther-Jensen 1980). 
After compulsory education, students could leave school, move up to the 3 year real department 
with traditional academic curriculum, or continue education in the existing institution for up to 
three more years (Winther-Jensen 1980). In order to improve access to higher education, the 
government also added a 2 year general education stream (HF) in 1960, which is for students who 
have finished 10 years and, along with the gymnasium, provides access to tertiary education. 
 
In the mid-1960s, the Folketing created a 9-point program, which laid down plans for a 10 year 
comprehensive school. The plan arose as a result of the ‘social inheritance’ debate that related 
social inequality to education institutions that reproduced family wealth across generations. The 
1975 Act combined primary and secondary to make a compulsory 9 year program with voluntary 
10th year. There existed two legal exceptions where streaming could exist: children with 
exceptional difficulties could be removed for remedial learning and for math, languages and 
sciences both a general and an advanced course existed where placement depended on parental 
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prerogative (Winther-Jensen 1980). Despite this clause, however, roughly 400 of the 1400 
folkeskolen eliminated streaming altogether (Winther-Jensen 1980).  
 
The debate over the ‘U-90’ Report issued 1978 marks a turning point in education policy, where 
the focus shifted from equality to quality of education (Rasmussen 2002). First, the content of the 
report is divided between issues of equality and new issues of linking education to working life. 
Second, liberal and conservative parties were extremely critical of calls for greater equality in 
education, unenthused by a larger role of the state in education policy and equating equality with 
uniformity (Wagner 1978). Wagner elaborates: “In Parliament the debate was mostly negative: 
‘that everybody should be equal means everybody equally ignorant’; ‘the school as an institution 
to question the values of home means a new authorised 'episcopal church' in which the state 
becomes the dictator of opinions and ethics’. ‘The teacher becomes an instrument of the state.’ 
‘The school may become a self-contained system as we knew the church during the period before 
the Reformation’ (216). After Bourgeois parties won the election in 1982, “the political power 
balance also shifted and there was no longer a majority supporting educational equality as a 
dominant goal” (Rasmussen 2002, p. 631). The issue of inheritance and equality in education lost 
its centrality in the political debate as of the late 1970s and remained dormant throughout the years 
of Bourgeois rule in the 1980s. 
 
Germany  
After the defeat in the second world war, German education policy was established in accordance 
with the constitution of a newly constituted Germany state. In 1947, Allied Control Commission 
wrote a directive to the German ministers that called for education to be comprehensive 
(Robinsohn & Kuhlmann 1967, p. 312). In the Soviet occupied areas, the Einheitsschule, covering 
eight grades was introduced in 1946, as a result of the Framework Education Act (Mitter 1991, p. 
156). These comprehensive schools later became the Polytechnical High Schools, or 
Polytechnische Oberschule, in the German Democratic Republic in 1959. In 1991, the system of 
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differentiated secondary schools in West Germany was extended to the East Germany as a result 
of unification.9  
 
The recommendation of a comprehensive school did not receive much attention from the West 
German political parties and interest groups, and the differentiated school system that existed 
before the war was maintained. The Basic Law, or Grundgesetz, which governed West German 
education, incorporated some of reform suggestions of the Commission, but the calls for a unified 
primary and secondary school were not addressed. 
 
In 1953, the federal government together with the Länder appointed a committee of experts, the 
Ausschuss für das Erziehungs- und Bildungswesen, which assessed necessary reforms. The 
committee recognized the low ability of the West German education system to respond to 
demographic changes. In particular, the low percentage of students who completed secondary 
education motivated the committee’s reform proposals, a concern that was echoed in the OECD’s 
negative evaluation of the West German education system in both 1960 and 1970. Among other 
critiques, the OECD contended the differentiated school system could not manage to cope with 
changed economic conditions.  
 
As a result of these conditions, the debate over social stratification arising from the educational 
structure eventually became politicized. In particular, Ralf Dahrendorff played a fundamental role 
in bringing the issue into the parliamentary debate in his work on the illiberal education policies of 
the West German state (Dahrendorff 1965). Around this time, various groups came forward with 
different reform proposals. 
 
Responding to these concerns, the Ausschuss für das Erziehungs- und Bildungswesen called for 
broad reforms, which it presented in the 1959 Rahmenplan. Although the recommendations did 
not fundamentally change the differentiated structure of the secondary schools, the plan did 
                                                 
9 Given that the East German states adopted the West German education system after reunification, I will not 
discuss further the East German education system and focus completely on the West German education system. 
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recommend a two-year Förderstufe, or comprehensive level, that would follow primary education 
for those students which were not already transferred to the Gymnasium. During these two years, 
teachers from all the secondary schools would work together to develop the entire cohort’s 
academic potential before allocating students to the different secondary schools (Robinsohn & 
Kuhlmann 1967, p. 321).  
 
Two additional reform proposals followed suit, which mimicked the Rahmenplan though only in 
certain respects. The Teachers’ Union, Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Lehrerverbände, presented 
the Bremer Plan; the only difference between their proposal and the committee’s proposal 
involved the former’s suggestion that all students participate in the Förderstufe, and the 
similarities between the two is an indication of the effect of internal pressure on silencing more 
reform-oriented opinions (Robinsohn & Kuhlmann 1967, p. 321). The SPD introduced a more 
radical proposal in 1964, which retained the Förderstufe but only as a forerunner to the eventual 
unification of all secondary schools in the formation of a comprehensive secondary school, the 
Gesamtschule (Robinsohn & Kuhlmann 1967, p. 322).  
 
Rather than representing fundamental reform, however, these efforts resulted in small changes and 
the failure to fully implement a comprehensive secondary school. The Ministers of Education 
from the different Länder arrived at consensus to establish alternative pathways into higher 
education, zweiter Bildersweg, and to invest more highly in the vocational schools, although only 
2 to 3 percent of those who completed higher education in 1967 did so via the zweiter 
Bildungsweg (Robinsohn & Kuhlmann 1967, p. 323). Those Länder with uninterrupted Social 
Democratic/Liberal governments set up unified, or Gesamtschulen, as an alternative to the 
differentiated secondary school, although the traditional school system remained an option in these 
areas.  
 
Returning to the discussion about the opposition to comprehensive reforms, explanations for the 
lack of more far-reaching reforms can be classified as either a manifestation of weak state capacity 
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or the strength of Realschulen and Gymnasium teachers’ and parents’ lobby and its consequences. 
To begin, weak state capacity is first visible by the lack of institutions present to coordinate 
education policy. The decision in the Basic Law to shift powers to the Länder demonstrated more 
than an effort to balance centralized state control. As a result of the traumatic experience of total 
state control over education and culture between 1933 and 1945, any plans for giving the central 
state capacities in these areas generated strong suspicions (Smart 1975, p. 154). A federal Ministry 
of Education was only created in 1959, and it was only responsible for vocational and higher 
education (Geissler 2005, p. 76). Ever since 1950, there also existed the Standing Conference of 
the Ministers of Education of the States, which met frequently but, due to the veto powers of each 
Land Minister, failed to exercise a strong planning function (Smart 1975, p. 155).  
 
Besides the weak planning capacity of the central state, the organizational lobby of the 
Realschulen and Gymnasium teachers and parents’ associations, and the relative weakness of the 
elementary school teachers, presented a considerable obstacle to reform measures (Heidenheimer 
1974; Robinsohn & Kuhlmann 1967). The example of the failure of the SPD comprehensive 
school plan is indicative of the power and preference of this group to retain their position of 
advantage. Since the more conservative parties opposed the comprehensive school plan by the 
1950s (Robinsohn & Kuhlmann 1967, pp. 323-324), the general failure of this reform movement 
does not appear surprising in their long period of incumbency between 1949 and 1966. 
Nevertheless, during this period, Social Democratic incumbency in certain Länder paved the way 
for local proposals for comprehensive schools. Although the Farmers’ Association eventually 
joined the comprehensive school movement, the strong divisions within the teachers’ unions and 
the relatively powerful lobby of the Realschulen and Gymnasium teachers’ associations ultimately 
led to the defeat of the plan.  
 
The capacity of the Realschulen and Gymnasium teachers’ and parents’ associations to stall reform 
hinged critically on the weakness of the elementary school teachers’ associations. The teachers’ 
association that boasted the highest number of elementary school teachers, the Education and 
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Scientific Workers Union, experienced difficulties recruiting new members due to divisions based 
on class, religion, and status. For these reasons, the union deferred taking a strong position on the 
comprehensive school issue, despite stark inequalities between primary and secondary schools; for 
instance, in 1956, primary school teachers earned roughly half of what secondary school teachers 
earned and, in 1950, per pupil expenditure at elementary schools was a third of that for secondary 
schools (Robinsohn & Kuhlmann 1967, p. 318). Only in the mid-1960s, after the comprehensive 
school debate had largely run its course, did the Education and Scientific Workers Union declare a 
preference for a ‘differentiated Gesamtschule‘ (Heidenheimer 1974, p. 394).  
 
The Realschulen and Gymnasium teachers and parents’ associations therefore formed a coalition 
with organized industry and trade, and the church, in defense of the existing differentiated system 
(Robinsohn & Kuhlmann 1967, p. 324). A common defense used by these organizations to justify 
the existing school system was that a comprehensive school promoted dirigisme and would be 
submitting to the needs of social change rather than the intellectual needs of the individual 
(Heidenheimer 1974, p. 390; Robinsohn & Kuhlmann 1967, p. 324). In the face of the divided 
organizations of elementary teachers, the Gymnasium teachers’ association, the 
Philologenverband was able to “safeguard all the advantages which its members traditionally 
enjoyed over the elementary teachers” (Fuhrig 1969, p. 106). At the Land level, the SPD in 
Hessen, despite a strong record of electoral success, nevertheless failed to take on ‘fortress 
Gymnasium’ in their efforts to promote a comprehensive school system due to the veto-powers of 
the State Parents' Council, of which only one out of fifteen was a member of the SPD 
(Heidenheimer 1974, p. 395).  
 
The centrality of the organizational structure of both teachers and parents from the different 
educational levels is examined in an articulate study of comprehensive school reforms in Germany 
and Sweden by Heidenheimer (1974). Although working class parents and Gymnasium teachers 
represent barriers to reform in both cases, the power of the elementary school teachers in Sweden, 
Heidenheimer argues, was decisive in securing the passage of the comprehensive school reform in 
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1950. Whereas the lower expectations of working class parents for their children’s’ educational 
attainment became an excuse for anti-reformers in Germany for the futility of comprehensive 
reforms, the Swedish case proved that parental expectations can change quite quickly: despite 
initial scepticism around the time of the passage of comprehensive schooling in Sweden in 1950, 
by the mid-1960s, one-third of working class parents in Sweden hoped that their children would 
not only finish secondary school but continue on to university (Heidenheimer 1974, p. 391). 
 
When the SPD managed to gain enough votes to join the CDU/CSU in a grand coalition in 1966, 
they placed education and training firmly on the agenda. On November 27, the Ministers for 
Education and Culture in the Federal Republic of Germany, Bund-Länder-Kommission für 
Bildungsplanung und Forschungsförderung, set up a pilot program for comprehensive schools. 
However, in 1982, the  review of the pilot programs of the 78 comprehensive schools and 
subsequent inaction led to the ‘consolidation’ of the tripartite system (Mitter 1991).  
 
Netherlands 
In the immediate postwar period, proposals for a comprehensive lower secondary school were 
made by social democratic and confessional coalitions (Bronneman-Helmers 2008). However, 
none of these proposal developed into actual draft bills.  
 
The Bill on Continued Education (or all post- primary education) passed in the Dutch parliament 
in 1963. Called the ‘Mammoth Act,’ the Bill pulled on ideas motivating reforms in other Western 
European countries at the time. One of the key steps of the Bill was to reduce the previous seven 
options facing primary school leavers to three, a university preparatory option (VWO), general 
school option (HAVO), and a vocational school option (VMBO). The vocational track, VMBO, is 
followed either by SBO or an apprenticeship. The general upper secondary track, HAVO, is 
followed by professional education, HBO. The pre-university track, VWO, is followed by 
university, WO. Through this consolidation of higher secondary education, the Act created the 
structure of education that exists today.  
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In addition, in order to facilitate the transfer to secondary school, the first year of secondary school 
was to act as an orientation period, during which all academic topics would be taught (Stellwag 
1967). In this way, the Mammoth Act did make some steps to facilitate the introduction of a 
comprehensive lower secondary school. The Minister of Education Veringa and the Minister of 
Social Affairs Roolvink, who were both members of ARP, recommended experiments with 
compulsory education at the lower secondary level (Wolthuis). Although the PvdA and the trade 
unions supported immediate legislation introducing a comprehensive lower secondary school, the 
confessional parties wanted to wait for the results of the experiments whereas the right liberals, the 
VVD, and the employers opposed a full integration of the lower secondary school system 
(Wolthuis 1999). The ARP stood out as an exception to the remaining confessional parties by 
becoming more open to ideas of social justice and a strong welfare state in the 1960s.  
 
In 1973, Dr. J.A. van Kemenade from the PvdA became the Minister of Education under a new 
center left government. His appointment represented the first time since the end of the war that a 
non-denominational party held the position as Minister of Education (Wolthuis 1999). He drew up 
plans for a comprehensive middle school, which would replace the existing lower secondary 
school structures and therefore delay streaming until the eleventh school year when most students 
are on average 15 years of age. The plan was well received by education ministers outside of the 
Netherlands (OECD 1976), but drew much criticism from professional groups within the 
Netherlands (Wolthuis 1999). Although experiments with a comprehensive middle school began 
in 1976, the election of a new CDA-VVD government in 1977 meant that the topic of a 
comprehensive middle school was dropped (Wolthuis 1999). 
 
In 1982, Christian Democratic-Liberal government introduced austerity measures in response to 
unemployment and slow growth, and merging schools became a way to save money. In 1985, 
primary schools and kindergartens were merged and the government supported the merger of all 
small primary and secondary schools as well as higher vocational institutions, by raising the 
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minimum size eligible for government funding. In this way, comprehensive education occurred in 
many schools as a matter of default. 
 
In 1987, the Scientific Council for Government Policy, or the Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het 
Regeringsbeleid, which had since 1972 provided scientifically based policy advice to 
governments, published a paper called Basis Education. The policy paper advised the government 
to legislate a unified lower secondary school. However, the political parties never placed a 
comprehensive school on their political agendas and the school system remained differentiated.  
Comparison and Conclusion 
The brief overview of the comprehensive school movement in Denmark, Germany, and the 
Netherlands draws out the main policy developments that explain modern-day variation between 
these countries. In Denmark, the liberal party pushed for a single primary school and the social 
democrats led the movement for the comprehensive primary and secondary school that was 
eventually established in 1975.  
 
Similar policy initiatives can be seen in Germany. Pressure for a single state-funded primary 
school existed around the beginning of the twentieth century and was finally realized during the 
period of exuberant social democratic reformism of the Weimar Republic. The immediate postwar 
period, however, was one of conservative governments and a weak state. Although the SPD stated 
a position for a comprehensive school, the Gesamtschule, they were only able to build a broad 
support coalition in Länder in which they held strong incumbency and even there, as the case of 
Hessen demonstrates, they faced strong opposition from parents and teachers’ associations of the 
Gymnasium and Realschule.  
 
The Dutch case differs from these two other cases. On the primary level, the intense school wars 
of the nineteenth century resulted in a compromise, the pacification, that secured equal funding for 
all schools although school structure was decided mainly by parents. Equal funding guaranteed 
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equal opportunity to some extent, although the strength of denominational divisions meant that 
students from different religious backgrounds did not compete in the labor market and information 
about inequality within religious groups remains quite scarce. In contrast to Denmark and 
Germany, however, the social democratic PvdA never promoted comprehensive schooling. 
Primary education did not exhibit class-based divides as a result of the pacification, but rather 
religious divisions that continue on to the present day. On the secondary level, policy circles 
advised the construction of a comprehensive lower secondary school, which never materialized. In 
1985, however, some comprehensive schools were indeed created by default. 
 
The comprehensive school debate can largely be understood as a conflict between social 
democratic parties on the one hand and conservative and Christian democratic parties on the other, 
where the former group of parties stress comprehensive schooling to support individual freedom, 
fulfill market needs, and reduce educational inequality and the latter group oppose comprehensive 
schooling in defense of class-based privileges embedded in stratified school structures. This 
explanatory framework fits quite well for the Danish and German case.  
 
The Dutch case remains quite distinct from these cases since religious issues often took 
precedence over calls for unified school systems. In the debate over comprehensive reforms of 
lower secondary schools, however, the divide between the social democratic PvdA and the 
confessional and right-wing liberal parties are visible. 
 
Relating these results back to the findings in Chapter 3 presents some difficulties, because the 
measure for dividing students by ability and vocation each constitute only 5 percent of the entire 
skill acquisition index. Therefore, whereas the finding that social democratic parties represent a 
key advocate of comprehensive school systems confirms the results in Chapter 3, the finding that 
Christian democratic parties predominantly blocked reforms at comprehensive schooling does not. 
To the extent, however, that stressing tracking by ability and vocation creates occupational 
divisions and therefore impinges upon the potential complementarities between different 
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occupational skill groups, these results confirm a key finding that Christian democracy is very 
infrequently part of the causal chain towards policies that promote skill transparency. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONTINUING TRAINING 
 
Public policies and firm-based initiatives in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany reveal vast 
differences in policy responses to increased demand for firm-based continuing training. This 
chapter draws out factors that explain these differences. 
 
The first section reviews the heightened need for training, the reasons why individual firms under-
invest, and the possible policy responses of the government and business organizations to the 
dilemma of private underinvestment. The second section analyzes policy responses pursued by 
governments and business organizations in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands in order to 
expand our understanding of the differing extend to which these countries create opportunities to 
gain new skills and make these skills transparent. 
Literature Review 
Relevance of Firm-Based Training 
Industrial restructuring and technological change increase demand for training and therein creates 
a new space for education policy to address the need for lifelong learning. Regulatory 
developments in the field of continuing training expand the opportunities of workers to enter 
training courses. For this reason, countries able to regulate firm-based training through a number 
of policy avenues such as levies or training funds, scored more highly on the skill acquisition 
index than those that were not. Within the group of countries that managed to regulate firm-based 
training, countries that negotiated centralized agreements on training, as compared to industry-
based, received the highest scoring, because these agreements encompass the largest number of 
workers. In short, countries that develop training policies, particularly on a centralized level, are 
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expected to create relatively more opportunities for workers to undergo training and should 
therefore demonstrate higher levels of training activity.  
 
Problems in Supplying Training Opportunities 
Despite the growing need for more training provision, various issues may preclude the expansion 
of market responses to meet these needs. The most prominent contribution to this debate includes 
Becker’s (1964) theory for the willingness of firms to invest in training. Becker conceives of skills 
as either general or specific. According to his model, firms are willing to invest in specific but not 
general skills, because the latter are mobile and firms cannot guarantee a return on investment in 
these skills. As such, the theory predicts that firms will subtract training costs from trainees wages 
in the case of general skill training or establish an apprenticeship contract where initial training 
costs are high, whereas firms would be willing to share the costs of training for specific skills.  
 
Applied more directly to the case of post-compulsory (post-apprenticeship) training, Becker’s 
theory predicts that firms will be relatively risk-averse in establishing further training 
opportunities. Where new skill needs are firm-specific, firms may be willing to pay for a share of 
the costs. However, firms will be unwilling to pay for, either financial or with work time, training 
that endows workers with marketable general skills, because such training would potentially incite 
poaching behavior from competing firms.  
 
Contributing to this discussion, Dougherty and Tan (1999) list at least six reasons why market 
failures occur in the provision of continuing firm-based training. First, firms may exhibit non-
profit maximizing behavior. Although identifying specific cases where training would definitively 
increase profits presents difficulties, it may in fact be the case that firms fail to pursue profit-
increasing training opportunities. At the same time, sufficient training institutions may simply not 
exist to service the specific needs of a given firm. In contrast to irrational behavior on the part of 
the firm, individual workers may actually bear the responsibility for the failure to invest in training 
in cases where they underestimate the return on a training investment.  
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The second set of explanatory factors for why firms may not develop training involves problems 
in developing financing institutions. Since training must be financed partly from wage costs à la 
Becker, wage rigidities caused by minimum wage legislation and compressed wage structures 
remove the regulatory tools to finance training. An underdeveloped risk market precludes 
investment in training, because the deferred return on training creates a reliance on credit 
borrowing options that in fact do not exist. Finally, in-firm training may also face severe financing 
problems because, in contrast to apprenticeship training, workers who have completed initial 
training will be unwilling to put up with wage cuts in exchange for training and should expect 
wage increases in line with productivity increases.  
 
Policy Responses to Underinvestment by Individual Firms 
Underinvestment in training, caused by the various factors outlined above, can be addressed by 
public policies such as informational campaigns to promote training, investment in training 
facilities, and financial incentives. In terms of financial incentives, governments may create levies 
on firms or design tax deductions. At the same time, employer organizations can create also 
establish industrial training funds. The next section elaborates on the policy responses of 
Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands in order to assess the factors which explain the varied 
capacity for policy innovation in each country. 
Case Study Analysis 
Denmark 
In Denmark, there is a long history of adult education, or folkeoplysning, tracing back to the adult 
high schools, folkehojskole, established in the nineteenth century and government sponsored 
training programs set up in the 1950s to deal with the high percentage of unskilled workers. The 
reforms in the 1950s and 60s led to a well established system of adult education courses and 
management structures. Adult vocational training, arbejdsmarkedsuddanelser, was run by 
tripartite boards in order to bolster the skill level of most workers. On the national level, the 
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tripartite Educational Council, Uddannelserådet, oversees the content of training content. There 
are also fifty Further Training Councils, Efteruddannelsesudvalgene, which also help to develop 
courses and are organized by sectoral or occupational divisions. This structure follows from the 
1937 agreement that established a system of ‘occupational self-governance,’ or ‘det faglige 
selvstyre.’ 
 
In light of greater training needs in the late 1970s, the Employers’ Reimbursement Scheme, 
Arbejdsgivernes Elevrefusion, was set up in 1977. The scheme was financed from employer 
contributions and funded training activities. In 1989, contributions totaled 674 million Danish 
kroner, which grew to 2,323 in 2007. Due to rising training costs in the 1990s, the government 
subsidies helped to cover additional costs, which first totaled just under 8 billion Danish kroner in 
1990 and increased to just over 12 billion in 2007. 
 
Besides supply-side factors leading to higher training activity, increased pressure for training 
opportunities increased in the 1980s and early 1990s. Developments during this period linked 
firm-based training to training measures for the low-skilled and unemployed. The adult education 
support scheme, VUS, was established in 1989 and provide workers with low skills reduced 
working time funded by unemployment insurance in order to participate in training courses 
(Compston & Madsen 2001). In 1991, a broad coalition of conservative, liberal and social 
democratic parties along with the peak collective bargaining organizations complemented this 
original legislation by allowing an unemployed individual to replace the worker undergoing 
training. In 1992, the trade unions also managed to push through the Paid Time Off for Education 
Bill, or Betalt Frihed til Uddannelse, which allowed employed workers two weeks off for 
educational purposes. 
 
Germany 
In contrast to Denmark, there is no strong public policy focus on firm-based continuing training in 
Germany. The system emphasizes rather the initial period of education. However, attempts have 
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been made to develop the area of adult training since about 1970. In that year, the Education 
Committee published the Structural Plan for the Education System, Strukturplan für das 
Bildungswesen, which emphasized the need for adult education. 
 
The late 1970s witnessed a host of different policies initiatives, some of which became law, that 
together tried to expand the role of the state in adult education. Most importantly, the Länder each 
passed legislation on adult education during this period. Efforts to expand the state’s role, 
however, did not grow deep roots and the movement stagnated in the early 1980s and by 1993 an 
implicit agreement was struck that adult education would be allocated to the private sector (Nuissl 
& Pehl 2000, p. 14). 
 
As part of the Alliance for Jobs, Training, and Competitiveness, Bündnis für Arbeit, Ausbildung 
und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, in 2001 employers recognized the need for more training, but few 
coordinated solutions to higher training demand had indeed at that point been developed. Workers 
within the metal-working industry pushed for greater rights in terms of training and qualifications 
in the 2001 bargaining round. These demands stemmed from a campaign organized by the trade 
union IG Metall, entitled Decent Work, or Gute Arbeit, which involved a survey to several 
thousand workers in over 400 companies. In April 2006 after much negotiation, IG Metall and 
Gesamtmetall arrived at a collective agreement that contained an explicit chapter on the 
responsibilities of the employers to provide training opportunities. Given the lack of coordinated 
solutions to training needs, it is perhaps not surprising that firms have developed their own 
individualized training programs or that the private training market remains similarly varied and 
disorganized.  
 
Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, the debate over the need for more firm-based training is embedded in a broader 
discuss about the importance of employability. While definitions of employability abound 
(McQuaid & Lindsay 2005), a working definition taken from the Confederation of British Industry 
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explains: “Employability is the possession by an individual of the qualities and competencies 
required to meet the changing needs of employers and customers and thereby help to realise his or 
her aspirations and potential in work” (CBI 1999, p. 1). Given the weaker capacity of employers in 
the last two decades to guarantee long-term job stability, workers face the a heightened need to 
maintain their competitiveness on the external labor market despite weak employer incentives to 
provide training, as detailed above in the theoretical section. Employers share an interest in 
coordinating training policies that aim at improving employability in the labor market in general, 
because of their interest in developing high skilled workers. Due to the preference to increase 
economic growth and reduce labor market marginalization among low-skilled workers, the 
government also theoretically holds an incentive to support projects aimed at improving 
employability. In short, employability infers a implicit bargain whereby a relaxation of the 
commitment towards job stability is met with expanded opportunities for skill-upgrading. 
Expanding this new employability agenda means developing awareness of the positive aspects of 
employee mobility as well as overcoming collective action problems within firms with regards to 
training provision.  
 
In 1984, the government-appointed Wagner Commission agreed that training should be the joint 
responsibility of the government, employers’ organizations, and training institutions. The 
consequence of these agreements was a boost in the number of apprenticeship places provided, the 
presence of business groups on governmental committees on training, and, most importantly, the 
establishment of a coordinated financing system for firm-based training. In the mid-1980s, 
sectoral training funds, or opleidings en ontwikkelingsfondsen, were formed. The source of 
funding is a levy on the gross wage costs of firms within that sector. The average levy is roughly 
0.5 percent of wage funds, where levies in the retail industry can be as low as 0.1 and in the 
construction industry as high as 3 percent (Meijers et al 2006, p. 7).  
 
In 1990, a second commission, called the Rauwenhoff Commission, furthered these initial steps by 
establishing that all workers should hold a defined minimum qualification and calling for greater 
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coordination between training organizations and firms. The main consequence of these discussions 
was the Adult Education and Vocational Training Act, passed in 1996 and implemented in 1997. 
The Act created one coherent structure for initial and continuing education. By 1998, 46 regional 
training centers, or Regionale Opleidings Centra, were created from the approximately 1900 
public institutions. Students who successfully completed coursework at these regional centers left 
with a nationally recognized qualification, and those unable to complete the entire coursework 
nevertheless received qualifications for the individual courses, or modules, that they did indeed 
manage to complete, which theoretically facilitates later completion. 
 
Individual companies also developed their own approaches to increase employability. Stork, a 
Dutch engineering firm, developed a ‘mobility centre’ called Mobility 2000 which aims to 
increase internal flexibility by shifting workers within the company to address fluctuations in 
demand. KLM also boasts an employability center, which facilitates internal as well as external 
mobility since employees are free to discuss future career plans either inside or outside the 
company. 
Comparison 
The overview of firm-based training in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands demonstrates that 
Denmark and the Netherlands have, over the course of three decades, established quite articulate 
firm-based approaches to addressing demand for training, whereas Germany lags and has only 
recently witnessed the inclusion of training in an important collective agreement. The differences 
described above between Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands can be substantiated by 
comparative data sets that measure training activity. Conducted in 2000, the Continuing 
Vocational Training Survey II provides information about the structure and frequency of firm 
training in these three countries.  
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Table 6.1 Training Activity and Forms of Agreements (measures are percent of all 
firms in sample) 
 
Trai
ning 
firm
s  
Firms 
with 
impact 
of 
public 
measur
es on  
CVT 
Firms 
who 
establis
h 
worker
s' 
training 
needs 
Firms 
with a 
training 
budget 
including 
provision 
for CVT
Firm
s 
with 
a 
train
ing 
plan 
inclu
ding 
CVT  
Firm
s 
with 
an 
agre
eme
nt on 
CVT 
UK 90 45 81 27 42 10 
Norway 86 5 55 28 23 20 
Denmark 85 33 73 25 24 23 
Austria 81 43 66 22 20 4 
Sweden 78 37 73 34 27 8 
Finland 77 25 63 23  6 
Netherlands 75 52 84 20 17 7 
France 74 56 61 42 29 17 
Czech 
Republic 72 21 69 19 19 2 
Slovenia 72 30 72 22  4 
Germany  69 18 41 18 15 3 
Estonia 67 20 75 14 11 8 
Belgium 63 60 66 19 22 2 
Hungary 49 0 69 10 12 2 
Spain 47 38 63 11 16 8 
Lithuania 46 15 68 8 9 1 
Portugal 44 54 56 10 19 8 
Romania 40 8 72 10 7 4 
Latvia 36 24 43 7 6 1 
Poland 35 25 84 6 9 1 
Italy 32 17 43 8  5 
Bulgaria 29 32 72 6 9 2 
Greece 21 59 76 7 5 3 
       
AVERAGE 59.5 31.2 66.3 17.2 17.1 6.5 
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As Table 6.1 shows, the number of training firms is high in most all countries. The highest 
percentage of Danish firms exhibit training activity followed by Dutch and then German firms. 
Almost double the percentage of firms in Denmark and the Netherlands, or 73 and 84 percent, 
respectively, assessed workers’ training needs, whereas only 41 percent of Germany firms did so. 
Roughly 20 percent of firms in all three countries have a training budget for continuing training 
and this corresponds closely with the percentage of firms also drawing up a training plan for their 
workers. Only in Denmark, however, do firms appear to commit strongly to training by 
establishing an agreement on continuing training. 
 
Looking more closely at firms without any training activity in Figure 6.1, Danish, German, and 
Dutch firms report quite different results for the lack of appropriate courses and the expense of 
existing courses in deterring them from training. In Germany, firms cited these two reasons most 
often. In Denmark and the Netherlands, the expense of training courses was infrequently cited as a 
reason, only by roughly 10 percent of firms in both cases. Dutch firms almost never cited the 
unavailability of training courses as a reason for not training, although roughly 9 percent of 
Danish firms did. 
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Figure 6.1. Reasons from Non-Training Firms on Why Not Training 
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Looking at the provision of training courses in Figure 6.2 also produces some interesting patterns. 
In Denmark, training is largely a public endeavor with provision by public institutions accounting 
for 40 percent of all training courses matched by 40 percent of courses provided by private 
institutions. The public aspect is only slightly weaker in the Netherlands, where 30 percent of 
training is provided by public institutions and 50 percent by private institutions. In Germany, the 
role of public institutions is much weaker, as roughly 15 percent, although private institutions 
provide 55 percent of all courses. The relatively larger role for public institutions in Denmark and 
the Netherlands confirms the case study data, which detailed the longstanding commitment of the 
state to training. In both cases, state oversight was matched with strong coordination on the part of 
the social partners. In Denmark, the highly developed institutional structures at all levels of firm 
organization generate consensus on training where considerable pressure is exerted from the peak 
organizations. In the Netherlands, the state has certainly played a central coordinating role and 
provided a larger percentage of the training courses, although industry organizations govern the 
financing of training through training funds. 
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Graph 6.3 provides an additional insight into the German case by demonstrating the relatively 
large role of the social partners in providing training. Although the role of trade unions is quite 
small in all cases, Germany, along with Denmark, rank the highest with 4 and 3 percent of training 
provided by trade unions in each case, respectively. Employer organizations and chambers of 
commerce provide a high ratio of total training, however. Roughly 22 percent of all training in 
Germany is provided by these organizations, compared to about 5 and 2 percent in Denmark and 
the Netherlands. The high percentage of employer-sponsored training suggests a substitute for the 
relative lack of public training facilities.  
Figure 6.2. Relative Use of Public and Private Institutions by Training Firms 
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Figure 6.3. Relative Use of Union and Employer Organization Training by Training Firms 
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Conclusion 
Denmark and the Netherlands have managed to create broad consensus for coordinated responses 
to the demand for higher levels of firm-based training. In Denmark the passage of the Employers’ 
Reimbursement Scheme in 1977 instigated a strong commitment on the part of employers to 
training, which was coordinated largely through organizational networks at different levels of firm 
structure, from the individual firm to the peak organization. The state mirrored the employers’ 
commitment to training, but expanding public facilities for training and later by contributing 
considerable financial support. In the Netherlands, tripartite organization often produced results, 
such as the training funds established in the mid-1980s, although the management of training 
policy was oftentimes delegated to local authorities. Finally, in Germany attempts at putting 
training on the public policy agenda were largely unsuccessful. The state did not appear to have 
the coordinative capacity to develop collective policy proposals. The social partners do indeed 
play a role in the provision of training, although these organizations do not appear to have a strong 
capacity in influencing firm-training as seen in the lack of coordination between firms.  
 
The discussion here provides some validation for the results in Chapter 3 on the determinants of 
the skill acquisition dimension. In particular, the principal pathway towards education policy that 
promotes skill acquisition included well organization social partners in a centralized bargaining 
system, a relatively dominant left party, high public employment, and few veto points. Both 
Denmark and the Netherlands conform quite well to this path, whereas the high level of veto 
points and weaker history of left party incumbency means that the German case does not fit very 
well. 
118 
CHAPTER 7 
 
ACTIVE LABOR MARKET POLICIES 
 
Since the mid-1970s, rising levels of unemployment, and long-term unemployment in particular, 
instigated a policy debate over how to increase both the incentives and capacity of individuals to 
take up paid employment. Given the traditional passive nature of welfare state policy, increasing 
employment rates required a comprehensive reassessment of the relationship between the worker 
and the market (see Peters et al 2004). The new policy debate emphasized the need to ‘activate’ or 
increase the ‘employability’ of marginalized workers, and this discourse underlined the 
importance of shifting the focus of social policy from income maintenance during labor market 
absence to income support for renewed labor market participation. Active labor market policies 
assumed pride of place within this new policy agenda, and, indeed, throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, shifting funds from passive to active labor market policies became an objective of many 
countries (Blondal & Scarpetta 1998).  
 
Beyond sharing a common objective of increasing employment levels, Denmark, Germany and the 
Netherlands exhibited marked differences in the policies they each applied to attain these goals, 
the salience of active labor market policies within this policy kit, and the overall success of these 
reforms in terms of reducing unemployment. In order to illuminate the factors that account for 
these divergent reform pathways in these three countries, I review the definition of active labor 
market policies and explain how changes in active labor market policies fit into the broader 
process of welfare state change. Second, I sketch the historical development of active labor market 
policies in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands, before analyzing more closely changes in 
active measures since the mid-1970s. 
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Active Labor Market Policies: Definitions, Relation to Skill Acquisition, Skill Transparency, and 
Welfare State Reform 
The implementation of active labor market policies stretch back to the labor exchanges of the late 
middle ages and play a large role during industrial downturns in the early twentieth century. On 
the other hand, the financial unsustainability of passive social policies combined with the 
imperative of the state to address unemployment problems carved out a central role for activation 
policies on the policy reform agenda aimed at adjusting labor market policy to the changed 
economic climate since the mid-1970s. Welfare state reforms during this period work to attain 
three theoretical goals, according to Pierson (2001): recommodification, which means increasing 
individuals’ work incentives, cost containment, which means reducing budgetary costs, and 
recalibration, which means either rationalization, or the realignment of existing programs to new 
conceptions of the role of social policy, or updating, or the reform of policies to address new 
social needs. 
 
Table 7.1 below provides a schematic of different policies that influence employment levels. 
Active labor market policies represent a subset of the policies listed in Table 8.1. Specifically, 
based on OECD and Eurostat definitions, active labor market policies refer to micro-level policies 
including wage subsidies, training, counseling, vocational rehabilitation, and direct job creation.  
 
Relating this discussion to the theoretical dimensions of skill acquisition and transparency 
developed in Chapter 2, active labor market policies correspond mainly to the dimension of skill 
acquisition, where active policies represent opportunities for participants to acquire new skills. For 
instance, training programs aim to provide unemployed or marginalized workers with marketable 
skills. Wage subsidies to private firms and public sector jobs also portend to provide participants 
with marketable skills through on-the-job experience.  
 
Although active labor market policies were only discussed with reference to the skill acquisition 
dimensions, they also may relate to the skill transparency dimension. Counseling and guidance 
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services can, under certain circumstances, help reveal the breadth of skills that individuals hold 
from both formal education and on-the-job experience. Where public employment agencies simply 
act as a forum between job-seekers and employers, this function is not likely to exist. However, 
especially recently, placement counselors conduct examinations of the different competencies of 
job-seekers, which improves the quality of information with which to assess the fit of an 
individual to a given job profile. In short, the expansion of active labor policies creates 
opportunities to gain new skills among marginalized workers and can also work to make these 
workers skills more transparent.  
Table 7.1. Activation Policies 
 Demand Supply 
Macro 
Influencing 
economic, social 
and institutional 
contexts and 
conditions 
• National wage policy 
• Government budget 
policy 
• Monetary policy 
• National investment 
policy 
• Trade and industrial 
policy 
• National education 
policy 
• Health programs 
• Care provisions 
• (De)commodification 
of labor, e.g. pensionable 
age rules, early exit 
programs, social insurance 
policies 
Micro 
Influencing 
individual 
qualifications, 
choices and 
behavior 
• Wage subsidies 
• Tax benefits 
• Quota schemes 
• Bonuses and penalties 
• Additional labor 
(direct job creation) 
• Training and 
schooling 
• Counseling and 
guidance 
• Vocational 
rehabilitation 
• Bonuses and penalties 
• Work enforcement 
• Work related benefit 
rights 
Source: (van Oorschot 1999). Italicized parts not in original. 
 
The main explanatory factors for the expansion for active labor market policies include changed 
economic conditions, social democratic incumbency, employer organization, and external pressure 
from the European Union. Rising unemployment derived from lower growth rates and industrial 
change constitute a central explanation for the massive growth in active labor market policy 
expenditure across advanced industrialized countries.  
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Beyond the changed economic climate, the political science literature explains the expansion of 
active labor market policies as the result of high organizational capacity of workers as well as 
employers, which provides leverage in explaining different levels of spending across countries. 
From within the power resources approach, many studies demonstrate a relationship between 
social democratic incumbency and spending on active labor market policies (Esping-Andersen 
1990; Huber & Stephens 2001; Korpi 1983). Whereas the power resources approach generally 
views social policy largely as a redistributive policy, scholars from within the varieties of 
capitalism approach understand social policy as influencing the productive capacity of firms. 
Citing the positive effects of actives measures for worker output and motivation, studies 
demonstrate a link between employer organization and spending on active measures (Martin 
2004a; Martin & Swank 2001; Martin & Swank 2004).  
 
External pressure to expand active labor market policies also originates from the European Union. 
With the goal of increasing innovation and knowledge accumulation in Europe, the European 
Union formed a unified approach towards activation. In November 1997, the European Union 
launched the European Employment Strategy at the Luxembourg Job Summit. The Summit 
created targets for employment rates in the EU. By 2010, the target rates aim at 70 percent 
employment for the working age population, 60 percent for women, and 50 percent for older 
workers. Guidelines developed since the Barcelona Council work to maintain social standards and 
the functioning of the labor market. Guidelines 5 and 8 are central to the activation approach: 
 
5. Increase labor supply and promote active ageing10 
Member states will promote an adequate availability of labor and employment opportunities to 
support economic growth and employment, taking into account labor mobility, as indicated in 
specific guideline 3. In particular, they will: 
                                                 
10 See Peters M, Dorenbos R, van der Ende M, Versantvoort M, Arents M. 2004. Benefit Systems and Their 
Interaction with Active Labor Market Policies, European Commission 
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• Increase labor market participation by using the potential of all groups in the 
population, through a comprehensive approach covering in particular the availability and 
attractiveness of jobs, making work pay, raising skills, and providing adequate support measures 
• Promote active ageing, notably fostering working conditions conducive to job 
retention—such as access to continuing training, recognizing the special importance of health and 
safety at work, innovative and flexible forms of work organization—and eliminating incentives for 
early exit from the labor market, notably by reforming early retirement schemes and ensuring that 
it pays to remain active in the labor market; and encouraging employers to employ older workers. 
 
In particular, policies will aim to achieve by 2010 an increase by five years, at European Union 
level, of the effective average exit age from the labor market (estimated at 59.9 in 2001). In this 
respect, the social partners have an important role to play. Any national targets should be 
consistent with the outcome expected at the European Union level and should take account of 
particular national circumstances and, where appropriate, give full consideration to the additional 
labor supply resulting from immigration. 
 
8. Make work pay through incentives to enhance work attractiveness  
Member states will reform financial incentives with a view to making work attractive and 
encouraging men and women to seek, take up, and remain in work. In this context, Member States 
should develop appropriate policies with a view to reducing the number of working poor. They 
will review and, where appropriate, reform tax and benefit systems and their interaction with a 
view to eliminating unemployment, poverty and inactivity traps, and encouraging the participation 
of women, low-skilled workers, older workers, people with disabilities and those furthest from the 
labor market in employment. 
 
Whilst preserving an adequate level of social protection, Member States will in particular review 
replacement rates and benefit duration; ensure effect benefit management, notably with respect to 
the link between effective job search, including access to activation measures to support 
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employability, taking into account individual situations; consider the provision of in-work 
benefits, where appropriate; and work with a view to eliminating inactivity traps. 
 
In particular, policies will aim at achieving by 2010 a significant reduction in high marginal 
effective tax rates and, where appropriate, in the tax burden on low-paid workers, reflecting 
national circumstances. 
 
These guidelines portray the European Union’s view of activation: Member States should increase 
employment while promoting both the quality of work as well as social cohesion and inclusion. 
The emphasis of the EU’s strategy on both the availability and quality of employment arguably 
stems from two concerns. The first has to do with a desire to protect the social well-being of 
European citizens as an inherent good. The second, however, recognizes the domino effect that 
low-wage competition could have on European trade. While a neo-liberal dimension of European 
integration exists that promotes European integration without re-regulation at the European level, 
the regulated capitalism approach promotes regulation at the European in order to create a social 
democratic dimension to European integration (Hooghe & Marks 1999). The propagation of ‘best 
practices’ assembled from various national reform successes as well as the introduction of the 
‘open method of coordination’ provided mechanisms for disseminating recommendations for how 
Member States should go about implementing activation policies.  
 
Despite these common guidelines and goals, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands reveal 
marked differences with respect to the role of active labor market policies in each country’s 
activation agenda.  
In order to understand the different factors that account for these divergences, I will first provide 
background information on active labor market policies in each country prior to the mid-1970s, 
before analyzing the post-1970s in greater detail. 
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Historical Development of Active Labor Market Policies in Denmark, Germany, Netherlands 
Assessing the historical development of social policy in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands 
reveals the long history of active labor market policies in these countries, although the salience of 
these policies in the broad scheme of welfare state policy remained quite small until the recent 
period. In all three cases, guilds organized the original labor exchanges that formed the foundation 
for modern-day public employment agencies. Beyond these placement services and other means-
tested Poor Laws, active labor market policies remained minimal until the early twentieth century.  
 
Policies constituting the core of the modern welfare state initially developed in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries and concerned the passage of passive social policies, which insured 
against social risks such as unemployment, sickness, and disability. The aforementioned social 
policies are passive insofar as income support occurs in times when recipients are not working and 
does not otherwise depend on the willingness of the recipient to work.  
 
Table 7.2. Initial Legislation of Passive Social Policies   
 Unemployment 
Insurance 
Sickness and 
Maternity 
Insurance 
Old Age, Disability, 
Survivors Insurance 
Denmark 1907 1892 
1891 (old age), 1921 
(disability) 
Germany 1927 1883 1889 
Netherlands 1949 1931 1901 
 
Economic downturns in the early twentieth centuries witnessed the expansion of state-supported 
active labor market policies. This period also witnessed the rising political power of the social 
democratic parties in each country. In Denmark, the Social Democratic party attained a plurality in 
1924, which it would remain until 2001 despite periods in governmental opposition. In Germany, 
the Weimar Republic ushered in a period of electoral wins for the Social Democratic party which 
only broke with the defeat to the National Socialists in 1932. In the Netherlands, in contrast, the 
Social Democratic PvdA never managed to collect more votes than the religious or liberal parties 
in the 1920s or 1930s. The different capacity of social democratic parties to win majorities in 
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Denmark and Germany provides one explanation for the relative abundance of active measures 
passed in these countries compared to the Netherlands in the period between the wars.  
 
Contrary to the passive policies described above, these active measures provided income support 
that depended on and indeed aimed at facilitating labor market participation. In Denmark, besides 
the passage of the Social Reform Bill in 1933 which increased the universal nature of the 
aforementioned passive policies, trade unions and municipalities developed extensive work 
programs, where participants build sports areas, walking paths, and sometimes taught basic 
courses (Jonasen).  
 
In Germany, the Weimar Constitution established the ‘right’ to work and the obligation of the 
state to uphold this right (Janoski 1994, pp. 63-64). In light of the growing unemployment 
problem especially among youth, the constitutional declaration led to the expansion of various 
state-led active measures. The Labor Exchange Law of 1922 created a employment office funded 
by contributions from employers and employees and responsible for job creation measures, and 
subsequent legislation in 1927 shifted the administrative authority to the social partners and the 
central government, thereby removing the powers of the local communities (Janoski 1994, p. 40 - 
45). The Labor Exchange Law also replaced the transfer-based compensation system for 
unemployment, developed only in 1920, with a system of grants and loans for various job creation 
policies (Janoski 1994, p. 64).  
 
In addition to building up a stronger system of public employment offices in the Netherlands in 
the 1920s from the initial nineteenth century labor exchanges (Gerritsz 1923), some municipalities 
such as Rotterdam also implemented a “two-for-one system” for male workers under 20, whereby 
this age group were restricted to part-time work in order to create more jobs (Winslow 1937). 
Beyond the employment services, however, active labor market policies did not represent a tool to 
fight unemployment, and the state and social partners generally focused on passive income 
support (Rodenburg 2004). 
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From these significant yet modest origins, the welfare state in the post-war period grew 
exponentially. Indeed, the development of welfare state regimes largely occurred in the thirty 
years between 1950 and 1980. In terms of political parties in government during this period of 
massive welfare state expansion, social democratic and religious parties experienced the highest 
rates of government incumbency. The political success of the Danish Social Democrats continued, 
and they governed for the first three decades of the post-war period either in majority coalitions 
with the Radicale Venstre or alone in minority coalitions. In contrast, in Germany, the religious 
CDU/CSU and the liberal FDP governed for the first two decades of the post-war period before 
the SPD managed to gain enough votes to enter into a grand coalition with the CDU/CSU in 1966. 
In the Netherlands, the government was characterized by oversized coalitions, which usually 
included one of the religious parties, KVP, CHU, or ARP, and either the social democratic PvdA 
or the liberal VVD. 
 
Active labor market policies were increased in this period, although the massive expansion of 
passive social policy generosity eclipsed the small expansion of active measures. A central reason 
for the relatively small increases in active labor market policies in this period is due to the 
relatively low unemployment rate across advanced industrialized countries. Policy-makers 
recognized part of this problem as arising from the high levels of unskilled workers. To respond to 
this problem, the Social Democratic government developed five schools for unemployed unskilled 
workers, which were subsumed under the Act on Vocational Training for Unskilled Workers, 
arbejdsmarkedsuddannelserne, in 1960. The law provided for general vocational training for those 
lacking these skills. It also provided for additional facilities for the State Schools for Semi-Skilled 
Workers, or Statens specialarbejderskoler. From the beginning, these courses were structured as 
modular classes that were between 1 and 6 weeks in length.  
 
In Germany, expenditures on active labor market policies remained quite low in the 1950s and 
early 1960s due to the strong economic situation. The recession of 1967-68 along with the new 
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SPD-CDU/CSU coalition paved the way for the path-breaking legislation of the Labor Promotion 
Law, or Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, of 1969. The law represented a massive expansion in 
expenditure of active labor market policies, which represented an increase of over 900 percent if 
comparing the three years before the law with the three years following the legislation (Janoski 
1990, p. 118). Training opportunities represented the main policy tool expanded under the Labor 
Promotion Law, although direct job creation also made up a relatively large proportion of the 
newly enacted policies. 
 
The development of active labor market policies in the Netherlands was minor in the first three 
decades of the postwar period. Even in situations of serious industrial restructuring, government 
programs were not developed to facilitate the movement of these workers into new jobs. Rather, 
“these workers were helped with negotiated social plans in which the unions tried to cushion the 
pain of redundancy with extra severance payments above otherwise modest unemployment 
insurance and social security payments” (Visser & Hemerijck 1997, p. 121). As such, even in 
periods when retraining measures were needs, passive social policies were used to facilitate 
adjustment. 
Mid-1970s Onwards: Active Labor Market Policies in the Period of Permanent Austerity 
Whereas the golden years of welfare capitalism witnessed an expansion of benefits in most 
advanced industrialized countries, the mid-1970s ushered in a new era. The social and political 
foundations of leftist organizations were weakened and trade liberalization and capital mobility 
threatened to undermine national governments’ control over macroeconomic policy and therefore 
their capacity to provide social welfare. Moreover, dependency ratios, or the ratio of those 
drawing on welfare benefits to those paying into the benefits, increased dramatically as a result of 
lower fertility rates, an ageing population, and structural unemployment; coupled with falling 
productivity growth, financing the welfare state grew increasingly difficult. 
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The main labor market consequences of this new context included increased levels of 
unemployment as well as the heightened risk associated with nonparticipation. Whereas low 
growth increased unemployment, the inability of the state to absorb this growing risk led to 
heightened market dependency. In other words, precisely as the availability of working positions 
decreased, the need to obtain such positions in order to maintain one’s standard of living 
increased.  
 
As Figure 7.1 illustrates below, the mid-1970s witnesses a stark increase in unemployment in 
Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. Also, whereas Denmark and the Netherlands 
demonstrate more serious problems earlier on, they also managed to reduce their levels of 
unemployment to a much higher degree than Germany by the late 1990s. At the same time, 
Denmark and the Netherlands differ markedly in the total percentage of the working age 
population employed in this period. Whereas roughly 73 percent of the Danish labor force was 
employed between 1960 and 2000, the Dutch labor force declined between 1960 and 1985 from 
roughly 60 to 50 percent. Only in the late 1980s and 1990s did Dutch employment levels grow 
rapidly to reach barely 70 percent by the late 1990s. Meanwhile, German employment rates as a 
whole declined between 1960 and 2000 from 70 to 65 percent. To summarize, despite initial 
unemployment problems in all countries and a very low employment rate in the Netherlands, both 
Denmark and the Netherlands managed to increase employment and reduce unemployment to a 
higher degree than Germany. By tracing social policy change in these three countries from the late 
1970s until 2004 in each country, I examine below the political coalitions and related policy 
reforms responsible for these different outcomes in terms of unemployment and employment 
levels. In particular, I focus on the development of active labor market policies and their role 
within an ‘active’ welfare state agenda. 
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Figure 7.1. Unemployment Rates Between 1960 and 2000 
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Source: OECD.  
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Figure 7.2. Employment Rate of the Active Population between 1960 and 2000 
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To provide an overview of the developments in active labor market policies in Denmark, 
Germany, and the Netherlands, Figure 7.3 shows an upward trend in spending between 1980 and 
2000, which can be seen in Figure 7.3.  All countries begin with quite low spending as a 
proportion of the unemployed, although Denmark and the Netherlands increase spending 
considerably at the latter half of the period. Whereas Germany spends highly in the early 1990s as 
a result of unification, spending decreases from 1992 onwards.  
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Figure 7.3. Spending on Active Labor Market Policies (as percent GDP/unemployment rate) 
between 1980 and 2000 
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Figure 7.4. Spending on Active Labor Market Policies (as percent GDP) between 1980 and 
2000 
.5
1
1.
5
2
A
LM
P
 S
pe
nd
in
g 
(a
s 
%
 G
D
P
)
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year
Denmark Germany Netherlands
 
Source: OECD. 
Denmark 
The Danish welfare state reflects the long incumbency of Social Democratic parties throughout the 
twentieth century. Despite a long tradition of adult training, the Danish welfare state nevertheless 
remained predominantly passive in nature until the Social Democratic reforms of the mid-1990s, 
which fundamentally shifted the Danish welfare state by making many forms of social welfare 
contingent on labor market participation. In contrast to the immediate post-war period, 
conservative parties governed during the 1980s, early 1990s, and early 2000s. 
 
Social Democratic Coalition, 1977-198211 
                                                 
11 The coalition included the Liberals, Venstre, from 1979 to 1981 and then the Social Liberals, Radikale 
Venstre, from 1981 to 1982.  
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At the beginning of this period, unemployment had reached 7.3 percent. This represents a massive 
increase from levels of below 2 percent throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. GDP growth was 
also suffering, at just 1.6 percent in 1977. The changed economic situation represented a new 
challenge for the Social Democrats, who had been in government for most of the post-war period. 
The party system was also under considerable strain since the “earthquake” elections in 1973 
when a number of new parties entered the political scene. 
 
The Danish Social Democratic led government embarked on a number of pro-cyclical policies. 
Part of these projects included wage subsidies to private firms, public employment projects at the 
local level and early retirement schemes (Torfing 1999, p. 12). From 1978 onwards, long-term 
unemployed were offered a subsidized job in the private sector for 9 months as part of the Job-
Offer Scheme, Arbejdstilbudsordningen.  
 
However, despite the active component, these policies were created in order to assure that the 
long-term unemployed did not lose eligibility for unemployment insurance since they were 
obliged to have worked at least 26 weeks in the last three years (Madsen 1992; Torfing 1999). 
This policy design demonstrates the continued dominance of the passive welfare state paradigm, 
where the main prerogative of social policy was to secure income support. Along similar lines, the 
post-employment wage scheme was established in 1979 as an early retirement scheme to soak up 
the excess labor supply. 
 
Bourgeois Coalition, 1982-199312 
Unemployment had reached an unprecedented 10.3 percent the year as the bourgeois coalition 
entered office in 1982. Growth rates were at 3 percent in 1982, but this followed two years of 
negative growth in 1980 and 1981. While in office, the Social Democrats had been unable to 
                                                 
12 The coalition was the “Four-Leaf Clover” from 1982 to 1988, including the Liberals, Venstre, the 
Conservatives, Konservative Folksparti, the Center Democrats, Centrum-Demokraterne and the Christian 
Democrats, Kristendemokraterne. From 1988 until 1990, the coalition included Konservative Folksparti, Venstre 
and Radikale Venstre. From 1990 to 1993, the coalition included Konservative Folksparti and Venstre.  
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produce wage restraint and manage the macroeconomic situation more generally. In 1982, they 
handed government control over to the bourgeois parties without calling new elections.  
 
The bourgeois government in the 1980s managed to bring inflation under control. They froze 
voluntary early retirement, unemployment and sickness benefits for three years and introduced a 
waiting day for sickness benefits (Green-Pedersen 1999, p. 247). At the same time, numerous 
policies were expanded, including maternity leave, national pension, disability pension, child 
allowances and social assistance benefits (Green-Pedersen 1999, p. 247; Ploug & Kvist 1999). 
 
This coalition maintained the subsidized job programs of the late 1970s, although, still within the 
passive welfare state paradigm, these programs continued with the main purpose of re-qualifying 
the long-term unemployed for unemployed insurance. In addition, there was an experimental 
“Youth Guarantee Experiment” which was to provide all youth with either training, education or a 
subsidized job, although “[t]he experiment was cancelled in the mid-1980s, and training and 
education never really became a dominant job strategy” (Torfing 1999, p. 13). In short, ten years 
of conservative control ushered in many liberal reforms, although, as Green-Pedersen points out, 
the government also expanded many social policies aimed at addressing new social risks during 
this period. Nevertheless, the early 1990s saw the worsening of the economic situation in 
Denmark, which called for more drastic reforms. 
 
Social Democratic Coalition, 1993-200113 
By the early 1990s unemployment had reached 10 percent in 1993. Growth was at a steady zero 
percent. After entering government in the context of economic recession, the Social Democratic 
coalition passed key reforms that fundamentally altered the passive nature of the Danish welfare 
system. The roots of these reforms can be traced back to a series of White Papers published in the 
early 1990s (Torfing 1999, p. 14). Although these White Papers had been well-received by the 
                                                 
13 This coalition consisted of the Social Democrats, Socialdemokratiet , the Social Liberals, Radikale Venstre, 
and the Center Democrats, Centrum-Demokraterne .  
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previous bourgeois government, there had not been any serious legislative reaction to these 
publications.  
 
The main effect of the Social Democrats’ active labor market reforms of the 1990s was to limit 
considerably the duration of unemployment. These requirements were gradually made more 
restrictive: the duration of unemployment benefits was lowered from 7 to 5 years in 1993, 5 to 2 
years in 1997, and finally to one year in 1999 (and six months for those under 25 years of age). 
The enforcement of this policy was secured by better counseling services for job-seekers and the 
massive expansion of wage subsidy and job creation policies that provided job opportunities for 
the unemployed where regular job placement was not sufficient. 
 
The active labor market reforms consisted of five employment and training options in addition to 
leave schemes . The employment and training programs included: (1) Job Training that provided 
employers with a subsidy for hiring an unemployed person; (2) an individual who had been in a 
Job Training program for more than six months became eligible for training or education; (3) 
Public Sector Pool Jobs were provided by the Public employment agency and designed to provide 
employment for up to three years in a public organization; (4) The Entrepreneur Allowance 
Scheme is designed for those who have been unemployed for over five months and wish to begin 
their own business; (5) Finally, Job Rotation schemes are those in which employed workers take 
leave for education or training purposes during which time an unemployed worker fills in. The 
leave schemes extended the previous early retirement scheme and included three comprehensive 
leave schemes: the Child Care Scheme, the Sabbatical Leave and Educational Leave. The goal of 
these policies was fundamentally different than the training and subsidy programs introduced in 
the early 1980s. Participation in such program no longer functioned to qualify workers for passive 
rights (Benner & Vad 2000, p. 451).  
 
The reforms garnered the support of all the main actors in the reform process including 
mainstream political parties and the peak union and employer organizations, LO and DA. The 
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only dissenter to the reforms was the LO affiliated union SiD, the General Workers Union. The 
union was disappointed with the additional cutbacks in benefit levels, which would adversely 
effect many of their members who worked in seasonal and part-time jobs (Petersen 1998).  
  
Liberal Coalition, 2001—200514 
The new Venstre led coalition continued a shift from a rights based to a workfare system. The 
government also launched a campaign entitled ‘Bringing more people into employment,' Flere i 
arbejde, which focused on rationalizing the organization of labor market policies and orientating 
training policy more closely towards the needs of the market. The government has cut back on the 
leave programs designed in the mid-1990s. They have also expressed interest in creating a state-
run unemployment insurance fund and devolving responsibility for unemployment programs to the 
municipal level, which both raised the scorn of both LO and DA. Although the government 
repealed its proposal to create its own unemployment insurance fund and has not made progress 
on devolving powers to the municipalities, a reform was passed in 2002 that allowed for cross-
sector insurance funds. 
Germany 
During the economic downturn throughout most of the period between the mid-1970s and 2005, 
the government tended to respond to unemployment problems by reducing labor supply. Active 
labor market policies were expanded, although the generosity of policies generally decreased 
during this period, and, contrary to Denmark, active labor market policies did not act as a 
springboard out of unemployment. Part of the reason for this was that active labor market policies 
were financed out of unemployment insurance funds, which meant that financial resources for 
active measures diminished in periods of high unemployment (Manow & Seils 2000). 
 
SPD/FDP Coalition, 1969-1983 
                                                 
14  This coalition included the Liberals, Venstre, and the Conservatives, Konservative Folksparti. 
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At the beginning of this period, unemployment was at .9 percent and growth was at 7.5 percent. 
The Deutschmark was floated against the dollar in May 1971, and the Bundesbank switched to a 
tight monetary policy almost instantaneously. The immediate effect was an appreciation in the 
currency and resulting slow-downs in output and increases in unemployment. The government 
tightened fiscal policy in 1976 and made some cuts in pension and health insurance expenditure. 
In order to deal with the large amount of workers made redundant by industrial closings, early 
retirement was facilitated (Manow & Seils 2000, 274). 
  
Active measures already embedded in the recent Employment Promotion Act of 1969 were also 
expanded. Vocational training was expanded, but was soon cut again as a result of austerity 
measures. Although active measures had played a role in preventing unemployment in the golden 
years, since 1975 active measures were generally pro-cyclical (Bleses & Seeleib-Kaiser 2004, p. 
51). 
  
CDU/CSU/FDP Coalition, 1983-1998 
The Kohl government sought to fight the public deficit, privatize state-owned enterprises, and 
reduce the levels of taxation. They were mainly successful, not least because the economic 
recovery after 1983. The government also increased the VAT from 12 to 13 percent in June 1983.  
 
One way that the government managed to control tax increases, was to shift the financial burden 
of funding social schemes onto the social partners. Contribution rates were increased throughout 
the early 1980s. The steady increase in contribution rates made more fundamental reforms in the 
social security system necessary. Both health and pension systems were reformed, but without the 
national or state governments obligated to pay for the bill, reform in the funding system was 
avoided (Alber 1996).  
 
The CDU/FDP government initiated the “Qualification Offensive” after coming to office and 
continued to expand active measures until 1987 although the generosity of these policies was 
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reduced (Bleses & Seeleib-Kaiser 2004, p. 52). At the same time, the government increased the 
weeks of previous employment necessary to qualify for unemployment insurance from 24 to 36 
months (Clasen 1994, p. 160). This caused a massive number of individuals to shift from the 
unemployment insurance schemes to locally administered social insurance schemes. Participants 
in these projects would eventually partake in subsidized job projects that would become 
requalified for unemployment insurance. In response to these viscous cycles, the government 
eventually strengthened the work requirements of workfare programs and capped social assistance 
benefits (Jaedicke et al 1991, p. 58). Exempt from these changes were older workers who were 
compensated for labor market exit with early retirement programs.  
 
Unification presented an enormous dilemma, because the weak economic structure of the former 
Eastern German states. Immediately following unification, the federal employment office 
expanded active labor market policies, which they reduced slowly throughout the 1990s.  
 
The Employment Promotion Act, Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, which came into effect on 1 April 
1997,  included measures for the promotion of employment among disadvantaged groups, support 
for the foundation of new firms, and restrictions on job-creation schemes. The Act declared that 
the primary responsibility of employment falls on the employee and employer and that public 
measures should play only a residual role.  
 
SPD/Grünen Coalition, 1998-2005 
In 1998, the SPD returned to government for the first time since 1983, this time, however, in 
coalition with the Greens. After coming into office, the new government attempted a tripartite 
agreement in the form of the Alliance for Jobs, or Bündnis für Arbeit. Tentative agreements were 
reached on basic items to be addressed including pensions, working time, and training. In the end, 
however, the unions walked out of negotiations, because they did not feel that the government or 
the employers were taking enough responsibility for creating new jobs. 
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In 2002, the Vermittlungsskandal or realization that the public employment office had largely 
exaggerated the number of job placements they had successfully completed triggered a series of 
reforms. Of the largest importance, Chancellor Schröder pledged to assign a committee to assess 
the reforms needed to address inefficiencies in the labor market and to merge the unemployment 
assistance and social assistance schemes. In addition, expenditure on training was cut drastically. 
Besides the faulty placement data from the employment agency, training funds for the 
unemployed were exposed as padding the pockets of the firms that trained rather than leading to 
stable jobs for training participants. These events provided the political momentum for the passage 
of the Hartz IV legislation, which merged unemployment and social assistance and thereby greatly 
reduced the generosity of the unemployment system. Active labor market policies were only 
weakly reformed by the remaining Hartz legislation.  
Netherlands 
As in Germany, the Netherlands welfare state system before the 1990s can be characterized as a 
“benefit producer,” uitkeringsfabriek, since social policies were transferred with few 
contingencies. In the same year that the Danish Social Democrats began their massive reforms of 
unemployment policy, the Dutch PvdA entered office. Although the PvdA led government did 
manage to activate the labor market system, they did not expand the role of the state in the 
provision of active labor market policies to the same extent as in Denmark. In particular, reforms 
at the end of the government’s incumbency worked to reduce the role of the state in the provision 
of mediation of unemployed workers.   
 
CDA/VVD Coalition, 1977-1981 
The economic situation worsened considerably during this period leading to what some termed the 
‘Dutch disease.’ Unemployment jumped from roughly 5 to 13 percent. During this time, the 
coalition tried without success to induce wage restraint in order to limit aggregate demand. 
Disagreement between two CDA ministers for Social Affairs and Finance stalled the formation of 
a unified government position (Hemerijck 1995; Snels 1997; Toirkens 1988), which stalled 
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negotiations. In the end, FNV lead Wim Kok refusing to sign the wage agreement and the Finance 
minister Andriessen resigned, because his proposal for more unilateral action did not find support 
(Hemerijck et al 2000, p. 214).  
 
CDA/VVD/PvdA Coalition, 1981-1982 
The 1981 elections resulted in a government coalition that included the PvdA, but the government 
resulted in deadlock and lasted only nine months. 
 
CDA/VVD Coalition, 1982-1989  
New elections returned the CDA-VVD coalition to power. Right away, the social partners 
announced that they had agreed on a compromise that became known as the Wassenaar 
Agreement. The agreement called for wage restraint, lower working hours, and more active labor 
market policies and symbolized a shift towards renewed interest in corporatist negotiations with 
the understanding that the failure to compromise would result in state intervention. Although 
Philips Electronics signed the agreement, however, they did not agree in principle to the idea of 
reducing working hours and, in order to appease the trade unions, constructed a unique program to 
train difficult to place young workers in exchange for foregoing the requirement to reduce 
working hours. The designed a one year training plan for students who had completed vocational 
training and a two-year program for those who had not. By 2004, 10,000 workers had taken part in 
the employment scheme (van den Heuvel 2007).  
 
More generally, active labor market policies were expanded throughout this period, albeit on a 
relatively small scale. Until the late 1980s, the main type of active labor market policy was the 
wage subsidy, loonsuppletie, which was replaced by a number of different policy measures 
between 1986 and 1989 that targeted long-term unemployed and youth (van Oorschot 1999).  
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The government also made adjustments to the social welfare system during their second term, 
having achieved the initial goal of macroeconomic stability. In 1987, the government tightened 
eligibility and reduced benefit levels from 80 percent to 70 percent of previous wages.  
 
CDA/PvdA Coalition, 1989-1994 
Lubbers formed a coalition in his third term as prime minister in 1989, along with the PvdA’s 
Wim Kok as finance minister who was the former FNV leader. As the stipulation for joining the 
coalition, the PvdA reindexed minimum wages and benefits to wage developments. A tripartite 
Common Policy Framework committee was also formed that focused on growth, employment, tax 
relief and wage moderation. Employers also promised to provide 60,000 jobs for ethnic minorities.  
 
During this term, the abuse of the disability scheme became impossible to ignore. In 1990, Prime 
Minister Lubbers described the country as “sick” with almost 1 million individuals on disability 
insurance (WAO). The trade unions and parts of the Social Democrats protested hard against the 
reform (Becker 2000, p. 225), but the government still managed to limit the eligibility 
requirements and make the plan overall somewhat cheaper.  
 
At the end of this term, a New Course agreement was signed between members of the Foundation 
of Labor, which provided increased decentralization, wage moderation, training for the low-
skilled, promotion of part-time work and improved conditions for balancing family and work 
tasks.  
 
PvdA/VVD/D66, 1994-2002 
Both the CDA and the PvdA suffered in the 1994 election, but the losses for the CDA were much 
larger and made it impossible for them to join the new coalition. The consequence was that, for the 
first time since 1917, the governing coalition did not contain a confessional party. In addition, the 
traditionalist wing of the Social Democrats had been weakened to the degree to allow for a 
coalition with the Liberal party. As such, the first ever “Lib-Lab” government was formed. 
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The so-called purple coalition maintained the focus of reforming labor market policy, but “the 
PvdA had a bottom line condition for its cooperation: the level and duration of social policy would 
not be tampered with. Kok had conceded that this position might have to be reviewed after two 
years if developments should turn out unfavorably regarding public sector deficits, inactivity on 
the labor market, and employment. From this very defensive position, the party was entirely 
committed to the ‘jobs, jobs, jobs’ approach as the only way out. This explains its support for 
reforms aiming at improvements in efficiency by introducing financial incentives through partial 
reprivatization of social risks and managed liberalization of social policy administration” 
(Hemerijck et al 2000, p. 223). Following from these events, the main changes in social policy in 
the next few years shifted responsibility towards the social partners.  
 
In 1996, the government proposed two new laws that aimed at attaining flexibility and stability in 
the labor market. The laws, which came into force in 1997, weakened employment protection and 
allowed for a larger role for temporary employment agencies while simultaneously expanding the 
social rights of temporary workers.  
 
In efforts to expand subsidized employment, the government also passed the Law on the 
Integration of Jobseekers, or Wet inschakeling werkzoekenden, in 1998, which subsumed the two 
main preexisting program Youth Employment Guarantee Act and Labor Pools. Alongside these 
policies existed additional active labor market policies that focused on the long-term unemployed, 
known as ‘Melkert Jobs’ after the Minister for Social Affairs and Employment Ad Melkert. 
 
Throughout the 1990s, dissatisfaction with the public employment agencies also spurred reform 
developments, which led to a consolidation of public institutions as well as a privatization of most 
reintegration services in the Netherlands. A new public employment agency was formed, called 
Centres for Work and Income, of which there are 130. The responsibility of the Centres is to 
profile the unemployed to assess their risk of long-term unemployment, direct those at risk to the 
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benefit agency, and provide information about job openings to the remaining job-seekers. By 
2002, the benefit agencies were merged into one organization, UWV or Uitvoeringsinstituut 
Werknemersverzekeringen. 
 
The bulk of the reintegration services, however, were conducted by private reintegration firms that 
would bid for tenders to reintegrate a given number of unemployed workers. These firms would 
offer training and placement services, which are adjusted to the individual needs of the clients. 
Many of the private employment agencies also offer reintegration services, based in part on 
individual agreements with UWV.  
 
CDA/VVD/LPF, 2002—2003 
 
The 2002 election, following quite closely after the assassination of right-wing leader Pim 
Fortuyn, led to a devastating defeat for the PvdA and the two liberal parties VVD and D66. The 
government was extremely unstable and fell after five months. 
 
CDA-VVD-D66, 2003—2006 
 
In 2003, the PvdA regained its electoral position, but nevertheless a center-right coalition was 
formed. In the midst of an economic slowdown that began in 2001, consensus had grown that 
wage restraint was necessary to restore competitiveness.  
 
During this period, two important initiatives were undertaken. The Ministry for Education and 
Social Affairs in conjunction with the Ministry for Education, Culture and Science instigated a 
program entitled Learning and Working, or Leren en Werken, which oversees projects between the 
social partners, training institutions, and local employment offices to improve training 
opportunities. Specifically, the program Learning and Working aims to help young people earn a 
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basic qualification, advice workers on their training opportunities and guarantee that training 
results in transparent qualifications, and devise policies to tackle new training needs. 
Comparison and Conclusion 
Since the late 1970s, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands have all adjusted their welfare state 
systems to reflect the new agenda to activate workers marginalized in the labor market. All 
countries managed to reduce the duration and generosity of unemployment insurance policies and 
stabilize their financial accounts more generally. 
 
On the whole, however, Denmark and the Netherlands witnessed a larger drop in unemployment 
than in Germany, and active labor market policies played a more fundamental role in the 
activation agenda of the former two countries. The 1994 Danish reforms managed to reduce the 
duration of unemployment largely because of the massive expansion of active measures. The 
Dutch reforms were involved to a lesser extent with its unemployment insurance policy. 
Nevertheless, many policies were developed for the reintegration of the unemployed and later 
reforms, such as the leren en werken campaign, demonstrate the attempt at a comprehensive 
approach to the successful integration of marginalized workers in the labor market.  
 
Similar to the Dutch case, German reforms did not aim to activate the unemployed by necessarily 
replacing passive policies with active measures. Job creation and wage subsidy schemes existed, 
as in the Netherlands, but they remained marginal. Whereas the Netherlands eventually a 
comprehensive activation agenda, as seen with the leren en werken campaign, however, the 
German attempts at tripartite agreements, such as the Bündnis für Arbeit failed.  
 
Drawing from the determinants of policies that promote skill acquisition and skill transparency 
established in Chapter 3, possible explanations for Germany’s weak performance include the high 
level of veto points in the political system and the low level of public employment. The various 
paths identified as leading to education policy that promotes skill acquisition typically exhibited 
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many characteristics of the German model, including well-organized social partners, a high degree 
of wage bargaining coordination, and a historic incumbency of religious parties. Developing 
consensus over the reform of the passive welfare state system nevertheless proved quite difficult. 
Due perhaps to the federal structure and low public employment, the state lacked the competencies 
to implement broad reforms, and the entrenched interests of actors at the federal level weakened 
resolve to risk far-reaching reforms at the national level. 
 
The comparison of Germany and the Netherlands helps to disentangle the effects of the two 
potential explanatory variables, because the Netherlands not only share low levels of public 
employment but also  differs from Germany by exhibiting few veto points. As described in 
Chapter 3, a high level of public employment leads the state to assume responsibility for 
improving employability of marginalized workers since it employs a large percentage of the 
workforce itself. The relatively marginal role of the state in designing active labor market policies 
in these two countries may therefore be related to the low levels of public employment in 
Germany and the Netherlands. At the same time, the low number of veto points in the Dutch 
system may providing some leverage in explaining the relatively high degree of consensus 
between the social partners that allowed for successful reform movements in the 1990s and early 
2000s. Therefore, the high level of veto points in the German system appears to be the main 
culprit responsible for the relative failure to develop a successful activation agenda. 
 
However, assigning all explanatory power to the high veto points in Germany incurs problems, 
because Germany exhibits additional unique features that may account for its relative inability to 
develop a comprehensive active welfare state agenda. Unification for instance presented political 
issues that may have taken precedence over progressive labor market reforms. The legacy of 
centralized state power during the second world war also undermines the legitimacy of the state, 
thereby weakening the leverage of the state over the social partners and the as a result the costs of 
non-reform. 
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To conclude, the period since the late 1970s is characterized by a changed economic environment 
that generates high demand for active labor market policies in order to increase and maintain 
employment levels. Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany differ, however, in their capacity to 
establish activation agendas with a strong role for active labor market policies. Analyzing the 
potential causal factors responsible for these differences illuminates the strong role of public 
employment levels in carving out a central role for the state in the provision of active labor market 
policies as well as the impeding role of high veto points in creating national consensus for wide-
reaching activation reforms. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
PRIVATE FIRMS AND ACTIVE LABOR MARKET POLICIES 
 
This chapter examines more closely the relationship between the causal determinants of the 
skill acquisition and the skill transparency indices analyzed in Chapter 3 and active labor 
market policies. I proceed by first clarifying the theoretical link business organizations and 
firms’ propensity to hire from the pool of marginalized workers. I then turn to the cases of 
Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands in order to test the theoretical predictions, 
reviewing the methodology and then the particular experiences with active labor market 
policies in each case. The final section discusses the findings and concludes.  
Theoretical Framework: Private Firm Involvement in the Reintegration of Marginalized 
Workers  
In recent years, increased attention has been given to business interests due to the shift in 
employers’ bargaining power within the national policy-making arena as a result of capital 
market liberalization and the rise of the neo-liberal agenda. The capacity of firms to relocate 
or reinvest outside national borders on the one hand and the growing view that private 
solutions outperform public ones on the other raises concerns about the continued 
participation of business groups within national policy-making circles. In light of these 
changes, governments may appear beholden to these ever more powerful groups in order to 
achieve their own public policy goals, and questions arise about the capacity of governments, 
if any, to woo business groups: Will employers continue to demonstrate an interest in 
responding to the concerns of workers and public authorities? Or will employers use their 
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capacity to relocate or reinvest as a carte blanche to pursue their narrow interests without 
anticipating the need to consider the interests of other economic actors? Will the relative 
dominance of private over public policy solutions lead to a reduction in the role of the state in 
the policy-making process or, in a different way, generate greater potential for public-private 
partnerships?  
 
Studies of business interests in social policy and labor market regulation have increased in 
recent years. Scholarly attention to business interests resulted in large part from the natural 
process of theory development, where the elaboration of differences between conceptual 
frameworks precedes the clarification of similarities (Sartori 1970). Writing in 1993, Colin 
Crouch describes how, over time, scholarship shifted from juxtaposing the analytical 
foundation of their particular theoretical approach to synthesizing their approach with others: 
“The ‘social democratic’ and neo-corporatist schools have, with some surprise, recognized 
their similarity, amalgamated with ‘revisionist pluralism’, and taken advantage of the 
theoretical elegance and rigour to be achieved by casting their arguments in terms of rational 
action and exchange theory” (Crouch 1993, p. 11). As a result of this process, the analysis of 
business interests began to influence understandings of welfare state development and 
change. 
 
A central consequence of considering business interests with regards to the welfare state was 
to recognize the potentiality of employer support for social policy (Baldwin 1990; Hall & 
Soskice 2001b; Iversen 2005; Mares 2003). Scholars making this link generally share the 
view that risks associated with the production process motivate employers’ interests in social 
policy. Those working within the varieties of capitalism framework base their understanding 
of firms’ preferences over social policy on the dominance of specific versus general skill 
production within the national economy. In this view, investment in specific skills involves 
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contracting problems because workers and employers face potentially high costs upon 
interruption of the employment relationship: workers face difficulties finding new jobs that 
suit their skills; and employers cannot easily apply their existing assets to new business 
pursuits. As such, workers with specific skills prefer generous income support, which, in the 
case of unemployment, will allow them sufficient time to find employment suitable to their 
skills. For their part, employers would like some guarantee that they will not lose trained 
workers to competing firms. As a result, in economic contexts where production relies 
heavily on specific skills, known as coordinated market economies, employers will support 
generous unemployment insurance to induce workers’ investment in industry-specific skills, 
high employment protection to induce their investment in firm-specific skills, established 
training standards to ensure the quality of industry-specific skills, and strict social norms 
buttressing high levels of firm-based training to ensure a high quantity of high trained 
personnel (Hall & Soskice 2001b, p. 20-27). Employers in liberal market economies, in 
contrast, will not demonstrate similar support for these social policies and labor market 
regulations, because their relative dependence on general skills does not require them. The 
major consequence of this line of reasoning was to identify two possible institutional 
configurations for efficient capitalist economic organization, and, by extension, the potential 
for achieving economic efficiency and social equality simultaneously in the form of the 
‘coordinated market economy.’ 
 
Other work focuses on production risks originating from a broader range of factors. Baldwin 
(1990) examines how labor market risks of middle class workers, such as shop-keepers and 
the self-employed, played a fundamental role in shaping the passage of solidaristic social 
policy in Denmark, Sweden, Britain, Germany, and France. Focusing on reforms in France 
and Germany, Mares (2003) draws on these foundations to develop a model of employer 
preferences over the expansion of unemployment, sickness, and early retirement benefits, in 
150 
which employers’ preferences are defined by firm size, skill specificity, and the degree of risk 
exposure.  
 
The literature cited above predominantly assesses employers’ preferences over social policy 
on the foundation of firm-based characteristics. Other perspectives, however, see employers’ 
preferences as derivative of organizational factors. Business organizations provide the means 
for coordinating firms’ actions and thereby generating cooperative solutions for social issues. 
For example, business organizations can provide the sanctioning and monitoring mechanisms 
necessary to ensure compliance where collective action problems exist; these organizations 
also facilitate the payment of compensation to employers who do worse off as a result of 
coordinated outcomes but nevertheless lend their support to collective goals. Business 
organizations may also act as a source of new ideas or disseminate information about other 
firms and government policies (Culpepper 2003). Finally, members belonging to such 
organizations may also develop norms of trust and reciprocity that facilitate the formation of 
coordinated outcomes (Crouch 1993; Katzenstein 1985; Traxler 2000).  
 
These studies on business interests over social policy and labor market regulation have 
focused almost predominantly on the period of welfare state expansion, during which 
financial markets were closed and growth rates were on a generally upward trend. In this 
context, business faced fewer opportunities to invest abroad and, according to studies in the 
varieties of capitalism approach, supported passive social policies because of their intrinsic 
role in firms’ production strategies. As outlined above, however, firms’ competitive 
environment has changed, and it remains an empirical question how their increased 
bargaining leverage has influenced their dependence on passive social policies. Also, 
governments, for their part, are more focused on reducing reliance on passive social policies 
and shifting the focus towards active labor market policies, which are policies that have the 
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goal of improving labor market integration by providing income support that is contingent 
upon and indeed directly promotes participation in the labor market. Such policies include 
direct job creation in the public sector, training programs, and various wage subsidies 
directed at private firms. 
 
Compared to passive social policies, however, implementing active labor market policies 
relies on more than building a winning coalition for the enactment of such policies. As much 
of the evaluation literature warns, the passage of active labor market policies alone does not 
guarantee that participants in these programs will acquire stable employment. Rather, 
evidence shows that active labor market policies may exhibit a range of problems. When 
participation in an activation policy re-qualifies participants for social benefits the ‘carousel’ 
effect may arise where individuals rotate between activation policy and passive support. 
Three other problems may exist that are more related to the interaction between active labor 
market policies and market efficiency: deadweight losses arise when firms would have hired 
the person in question regardless of the subsidy; substitution effects arise when the 
employment chances of the target group’s hiring prospects improve at the expense of the non-
target group; and displacement occurs when employment increases in subsidized firms are 
countered by employment losses in non-subsidized firms. On a general level, these problems 
suggest the contingency of active labor market policies success at improving the probability 
of marginalized workers finding stable employment: active labor market policies may just be 
a transfer to private firms, who hire the same people regardless of the subsidy, and they might 
benefit some workers or employers to the detriment of others.  
 
Although I do not pretend to address at length the factors accounting for these problems, the 
evaluation literature does draw on these various problems in assessing the impact of active 
labor market policies, and I make use of their results. Of particular interest for my purposes 
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here is the insight of this literature that subsidies for employment in the private sector 
demonstrate lower economic costs and better employment outcomes for program participants 
than direct job creation (Boone & van Ours 2004; Martin 2000b). The greater effectiveness of 
active labor market policies aimed at private firms, and, indeed, the frequently damaging 
effect of public sector job creation programs on participants’ future employment stability 
motivates the particular focus on the role of private firms in active labor market policies.  
 
Although active labor market policies to private firms stand as the most effective of their 
kind, relatively little is known about the factors supporting the passage of these policies. The 
work by C. J. Martin and D. Swank makes considerable headway in this respect into 
understanding the various factors that explain firms’ investment in active labor market 
policies (Martin 2004a; Martin 2004b; Martin & Swank 2001; Martin & Swank 2004). Their 
macro analysis demonstrates the strong effect of business organization on total spending 
effort on active labor market policies across eighteen advanced industrialized countries with 
potentially complementary effects between social democratic incumbency and business 
organization. Significant results for different dimensions of business organizational strength, 
including coordination, centralization, and influence in policy-making, provide evidence for 
the stability of this finding (Martin & Swank 2001; Martin & Swank 2004).  
 
These findings that business organizational strength corresponds to high spending on active 
labor market policies suggests, more generally, continuity between theoretical determinants 
of social policy in the industrial and the more recent period of ‘permanent austerity.’ The 
organizational capacity of employers therefore seemingly proves sufficient to overcome 
internal divisions to create policies that benefit the national economy more generally. 
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Yet the expectation that contexts with strong business organization can adjust well to 
changed conditions may not be warranted. High rates and duration of unemployment in 
Belgium and Germany in the 1990s and early 2000s raise alarms about the apparently weak 
capacity of these coordinated market economies to activate jobless individuals, particularly 
given the relatively low employment rates in these countries. The experiences of France and 
Italy, though not clear-cut cases of coordinated market economies, demonstrated similar 
trends, raising questions about the capacity of countries to combine social and economic 
goals more generally. Although the organizational strength of business may indeed lead to 
higher spending on active labor market policies, the various implementation problems these 
policies exhibit as well as the inability of countries that indeed spend highly on these policies 
to reduce unemployment raises doubts about a relationship between business organizations 
and the successful labor market integration of marginalized workers.  
 
In this vein, literature accounting for the failure of ‘consensual institutions’ (Lijphart 1999) to 
deliver optimal social outcomes have accumulated in recent years. A key challenge of all 
these works has been to examine more closely the causal mechanisms linking the existence of 
formal institutions to social and political outcomes. These studies generally either point to the 
underlying variation among formal institutions frequently masked in existing measures of 
coordination or point out that the effects of formal institutions are contingent on broader 
contextual factors. Martin and Swank (2008) examine the historical determinants of employer 
associations and illuminate the role of proportional, multiparty systems in promoting, and 
federalism in impeding, the development of social corporatist associations. Whereas these 
findings provide an explanation for the more broad differences we witness between 
coordinated and liberal welfare states, the inhibiting effect of federalism on the formation of 
social corporatist associations provides a potentially useful tool for exploring challenges for 
business associations in the federal states of Germany, Belgium, and Italy. As case in point, 
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Hemerijck points out the strong sectoral, ideological, and linguistic divisions in the Belgian 
social interest group structures (Hemerijck 2006). Developing theoretical categories for the 
variety of business organizational structures, Martin Höpner differentiates between 
‘organized’ and ‘disorganized’ coordinated capitalism (2007) and Hicks and Kenworthy 
distinguish between social corporatist processes and enterprise cooperation (1998). Together, 
these studies illuminate new aspects of business organizations that can help us gain insight 
into the variation in business support for policies addressing new social risks. Where the bulk 
of the literature relies on membership density in employer organizations as a key indicator of 
business organizational strength, these accounts suggest that features of the organizational 
structure are likely play an important role in shaping the policy goals of members and key 
leaders. 
 
An additional contextual factor that has been shown to sustain the relationship between 
formal coordination on the one hand and coordinated adjustment on the other is the role of 
the state. The role of the state has been identified as playing a key role in reinforcing 
employers’ coordinative capacity on the one hand and their support for solidaristic policies 
on the other (Martin & Thelen 2007). The role of the state on sustained coordination 
embodies three logics: as an employer, the state holds an intrinsic interest in promoting the 
employment prospects of their workers; the state can also play a role in fostering cooperation 
among the social partners; finally, the state can negotiate with private sector actors (33-34). 
To summarize, the different adjustment capacity of generous welfare states to changed 
economic conditions prompted closer study. One consequence of these efforts was to 
recognize differences between institutions that analyses had previous discussed as relatively 
similar, such as business organizations. A second consequence was to illuminate the role of 
factors previously side-lined in the literature, such as the state, and demonstrate the 
widespread effects of these factors for other economic actors. 
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From the above discussion, it is possible to generate some broad hypotheses about the 
potential variation in the effectiveness of active labor market policies in contexts of high 
business organization, where effectiveness is understood as the willingness of firms to hire 
and invest in workers through these policies. First, with regards to business organization, 
business associations with strong coordination capacity at the peak level should be more 
successful at establishing effective policies. Strong leadership of peak organizations should 
have general public concerns in mind as compared to particularistic concerns of a given 
sector. As such, this leadership will be relatively less concerned about competitive 
disadvantages that may arise from active labor market policies, such as displacement effects, 
and, at the same time, in a position to address negative externalities of active labor market 
policies such as displacement effects. Conversely, in contexts where firm representation is 
relatively strong than that of the peak organization, local firms may view the efforts of the 
peak organization to influence firms’ involvement in active labor market policies as an 
attempt to encroach on their territory and may be wary of supporting these policies as a 
result. 
 
Second, business organizations in contexts of a strong state will be more likely to support 
active labor market policies, because the state will be more capable of influencing firms’ 
behaviour. In such a context, firms will not be able to compete between federal units, and the 
centralized state is also the only gatekeeper to a host of public subsidies. Moreover, since the 
state employs large numbers of workers, it retains an interest in improving the productivity of 
low-wage workers in order to justify public expenditures (Spicker 1997). 
 
From this discussion, I generate hypotheses about the effects of the aforementioned 
institutions and actors on the frequency and intensity of private firms’ participation in active 
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labor market policies. First, I start from the finding of scholars within the varieties of 
capitalism approach that business organization supports the formation of coordinated 
solutions to common problems. However, drawing on the literature that identifies divisive 
elements within business organizations, I suggest that the structure of business organization is 
critical to building broad business support for active labor market policies. Passive social 
policies arguably resolved collective action problems within the firm between employers and 
employees that were central to the production process and therefore to the success of the firm. 
Active labor market policies, on the other hand, can hardly be assumed to play such a pivotal 
role in firms’ core functions. The main beneficiaries of active policies are marginalized 
workers. The disadvantages facing unemployed workers in the labor market are many: the 
occurrence and duration of an unemployment spell weakens an individual’s self-esteem 
(Seligman 1975), reduces their skill levels, and incurs a potential stigma among employers, 
which can be seen in the wage penalty suffered by workers who were unemployed prior to 
their current employment position. 
 
The potential benefits to private firms are less clear. Tight labor supply and generous 
subsidies, respectively, may provide firms with incentives to hire workers through active 
labor market policies. At the same time, these factors will only prove realistic incentives in 
cases where firms remain open to hiring from the pool of marginalized workers in the first 
place. Given that employers likely rely on many informal channels to find new workers 
(Montgomery 1991), inducing firm investment in active labor market policies relies on 
building awareness about active policies and their potential benefits to firms.  
 
Peak business organizations represent one avenue for building firm support for active labor 
market policies. On the one hand, these institutions hold an interest in alleviating skill 
157 
shortages. They also have the resources to create a campaign to motivate firms to invest in 
active policies in order to maintain a high supply of well-trained workers.  
 
The state also has the resources to launch a campaign motivating firms to invest in active 
labor market policies. And, in contrast to peak business organizations, the state holds an 
intrinsic interest in reducing unemployment. Also, due to its extent resources, the state can 
therefore place additional pressure on firms to hire unemployed individuals. In short, both 
peak business organizations and the state theoretically exhibit an interest and the resources to 
develop a campaign inducing firm support for active labor market policies.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.1. Hypotheses about Factors Influencing Investment of Private Firms in Active 
Labor Market Policies 
1. Business organizations with strong peak-level coordinative capacity will be related to 
support for active labor market policies aimed at improving the supply of skilled workers, 
whereas business organizations with relatively more dispersed control will be related to 
relatively greater difficulties coordinating human capital strategies 
2. The presence of a strong state will be related to the enactment of active labor market 
policies aimed at improving the integration of marginalized workers into the labor market  
3. The presence of both business organizations with high peak-level coordinative capacity 
and a strong state will be related to strong business support for active labor market policies 
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aimed at improving the integration of marginalized workers into the labor market 
 
The analysis below will distinguish three separate types of questions regarding the formation 
and implementation of active labor market policies. First, I will provide an overview of the 
design of active labor market policies in the last decade. Second, I will explain how active 
labor market policies interact with other type of labor market reforms to provide some insight 
into how active labor market policies are used as part of a broader package of reforms. Third, 
I will assess firms’ investment patterns in active labor market policies and explore the 
consequences for our understanding of firm support for the integration of marginalized 
workers.  
Analysis: Reintegration in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands – How Involved are 
Private Firms? 
Case Selection 
The three countries of Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands are selected according to 
Mill’s method of difference. Although all three are generally considered generous welfare 
states, they differ broadly on the characteristics discussed above including federalism, the 
structure of their business organizations, and the size of the state. The table below provides 
descriptive data regarding these characteristics. Germany is the only state that exhibits a 
strong federal structure. In terms of the business organizations, Denmark and the Netherlands 
present high levels of tripartite neo-corporatism both in absolute terms as well as compared to 
the degree of shop floor coordination. Germany exhibits the opposite trend, with higher shop 
floor coordination than tripartite neo-corporatism. Finally, the public sector in Denmark, as 
measured by the average share of public sector workers in the 1990s, is markedly higher than 
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in Germany or the Netherlands. In analyzing the role of private firms in active labor market 
policies, I will pay particular attention to the role of these particular features.  
 
The ways in which these factors influence active labor market policies and the more 
comprehensive overview of the paper is demonstrated in the schematic below. As discussed 
in the theoretical section, the size of the state, political competitions, and employer 
organizations, through the policy-making process, pass a host of active labor market policies. 
The success of active labor market policies in facilitating the labor market integration of 
marginalized workers depends on the broader structure of passive labor market policies and 
employer organization. The darker boxes indicate the foci of the study, or dependent 
variables, whereas the lighter boxes indicate the explanatory factors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 8.2. State and Interest Group Structures in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands 
  Federalisma Shop Floor b, c 
Tripartite 
Neocorporatism 
b, d 
Size of the 
Public Sectora, e 
Denmark  No 0.28 0.67 21.36 
Germany  Strong 0.42 0.23 8.07 
Netherlands  No 0.09 0.41 6.01 
Source: a=(Huber et al 2004a); b=(Hicks & Kenworthy 1998); c=Firm-level cooperation; d=Hicks 
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and Swank measure for tripartite neo-corporatism; e=average of civilian government employment 
of the working age population for the 1990s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Methodology  
The methodological approach involves structured interviews based on original Danish 
research by Cathie Jo Martin (Martin 2004b; Martin & Swank 2004; Martin 2004c). For each 
country, a random sample of 100 firms was selected from the list of the 500 largest firms in 
each country. 15 The list of the largest 500 firms was provided by the Børsen list in Denmark, 
the CDAX list in Germay, and the FEM Business list in the Netherlands. Structured 
                                                 
15 In Denmark, every fifth firm was selected. In Germany and the Netherlands, firms were divided into 
groups of five. For each group of five, the firms were assigned random numbers and the firm receiving the 
highest number in each group was selected.  
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interviews were held either in person or via telephone and lasted between 40 and 90 minutes. 
Data collection was completed by Cathie Jo Martin for Denmark in 2001 and by the author in 
2006 and 2007 for Germany and in 2007 and 2008 for the Netherlands. 
 
The structured interviews covered roughly two broad groups of questions. The first group of 
questions covered basic information about the firms’ finances, personnel, and organizational 
networks. The second theme involves the firms’ experiences with active labor market 
policies, including topics such as sources of information about active measures, the firms’ 
actual use of these measures, the experiences of participating firms, and the reasons why 
firms chose to use or not use these measures.  
 
The list of active labor market policies about which firms were questioned were chosen from 
the National Action Plan for Employment and Competitiveness from the year prior to the 
beginning of the interviews. For Denmark, this included leave schemes, job rotation, and 
programs for workers with permanent disability, including fleksjobs and skaanejobs. For 
Germany, this included tax redemptions on part-time work, in the form of Mini- and Midi-
Jobs, relocation subsidies, and subsidies for training regular workers, training additional 
apprenticeships, and hiring disabled workers. In the Netherlands, this included subsidies for 
hiring or maintaining disabled workers. There were also large appropriations made to the 
municipalities for the purpose of reintegration that could be spent at the discretion of the 
municipality. The Netherlands proved a unique case where private employment agencies 
played a central role in labor market reintegration, and private firms amongst themselves had 
developed extensive policies to improve the employability of their own workers.  
 
Active Labor Market Policy Development and the Policy Mix 
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The main question that this paper seeks to answer includes the factors that explain firm 
investment in marginalized workers through active labor market policies. This question, 
however, presupposes the availability of active policies as well as a supply of workers that 
employers can hire through these policies. Therefore, I review the development of active 
labor market policies as well as the rules governing individuals’ responsibility to be available 
as subjects of these policies. Both aspects are relevant, because the passage of active labor 
market policies alone does not ensure these policies even have the potential of being used. As 
long as workers are able to draw on passive support in cases of unemployment, the incentives 
to take part in an active labor market program are rather weak. In short, gauging firm 
investment in active labor market policies prompts questions about the availability of these 
policies: this section clarifies the policies available to private firms in each case. This 
discussion fits thematically into the debate on activation, or increasing individuals’ incentives 
to take up jobs and the various policy mixes that produce such incentives.  
 
In Denmark, the reforms initiated by the Social Democrats in 1994 mark a key turning point 
in the relationship between social policy and labor market activation. The approach adopted 
in Denmark can be described as a state-led reorganization of the unemployment regime. 
Active labor market policies were developed that, by definition, limited reliance on existing 
passive policies. The reforms stipulated the duty of individuals to take up employment within 
a relatively short period, which was further reduced throughout the 1990s. The 1994 reform 
targeted only unemployment insurance recipients, whereas the 1996 reform added social 
assistance recipients. Given the unlimited duration of unemployment benefits of the mid-
1980s, this change is quite remarkable. 
 
These activating reforms defined a new role for the state in ensuring the smooth 
implementation of active measures. The 1994 reform also included the creation of a new 
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administrative unit, the National Labor Market Council.16 The National Labor Market 
Council acts as an advisory institution to the Ministry of Labor and defines goals and output 
requirements for the Regional Labor Market Councils, which then establish plans to suit local 
needs (Jensen & Studies 1999). In fact, despite the continued capacity of the national 
organization to direct policy, the reforms further decentralized authority over labor market 
policy to the regions (Jensen & Studies 1999). These activating reforms beginning in 1994 
therefore placed strong legal requirements on unemployed individuals to enter employment 
and designed new administrative structures to guarantee the enforcement of these new 
regulations.  
 
On the firm level, these new regulations created a new role for private firms in the 
reintegration of marginalized workers into the labor market. The restructuring of the 
unemployment regime included many active labor market policies, and the much shorter 
duration of unemployment insurance implied a large role for the private sector in finding jobs 
for unemployed individuals. Of the 55 firms interviewed in Denmark in 2001, fifty-eight 
percent agreed that the active labor market policies in place at that time were ‘asking firms to 
get involved in a new way,’ whereas twenty-one percent had mixed opinions and twenty-one 
percent found the reforms a clear continuation of previous policies.  
 
Underlying the political decision to endow firms with a strong role in the reintegration of 
marginalized workers is the expectation that firms would be prepared to assume such a role. I 
argue here that this expectation about firms’ capacity to help reintegrate marginalized 
workers is in large part a consequence of the organization of firms and the relationship 
between firms and the state. Tables 8.3 and 8.4 demonstrate firms’ responses to the questions 
                                                 
16 The National Labor Market Council was merged with the National Social Council in 2003 to form the 
National Employment Council. The National Social Council originally aims to create a more inclusive 
labor market. 
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of whether the firm should have social responsibility for its own as well as socially excluded 
individuals. Table 8.3 shows that Danish firms feel overwhelmingly responsible for providing 
for the well-being of their workers above and beyond the requirements stipulated in law.  
Table 8.3. Danish Firms’ Responses to the Question: Should firm have social 
responsibility for own workers? 
Response Frequency Percent 
No 0 0 
Maybe 1 2 
Yes 53 98 
 
With reference to the responsibility of the firm towards socially excluded individuals, the 
record is more mixed. Still, forty-one percent of firms agreed that firms indeed have such a 
responsibility and thirty-three percent answered that the firm maybe should hold such a 
responsibility.  
 
 
 
Table 8.4. Danish Firms’ Responses to the Question: Should firm take social 
responsibility for socially-excluded people such as long-term unemployed? 
Response Frequency Percent 
No 14 26 
Maybe 18 33 
Yes 22 41 
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To account for these perceptions of firms, I argue that the structure of business organizations 
and their relation to the state explains the willingness of firms to make themselves 
accountable for social issues. Explaining the development of active labor market policies in 
the 1990s, Martin elaborates on the relationship between the state and business organizations: 
“The Danish government strengthened associations by creating corporatist channels in the 
realm of social policy that mirror those of labour-market policy. Although social policy has 
traditionally been left to government, the Social Ministry’s efforts expanded the jurisdiction 
of the social partners. At the same time, the state potentially weakened corporatist 
organizations by attempting to mobilize firms directly. Yet, while moving beyond the 
established channels to build networks with firms threatened the traditional hegemony of the 
employers’ associations, this move paradoxically may have motivated these groups to expand 
their activities in the social area. The organizations perceived the government’s move as an 
attack on their jurisdiction; consequently, this move may serve to enhance employers’ 
involvement with social policy in the long term. Thus, the continuing vitality of the Danish 
employers’ associations owes something to state activism.” (Martin 2004a, p. 148). 
Therefore, the state, rather than expanding its authority at the expense of that of firms, has 
actually created an agenda that creates a new role for private firms and their organizations. 
 
In Germany, attempts to shorten the length of unemployment faced a much stronger 
opposition than in Denmark, and this opposition manifested itself in the debates over issues 
of ‘reasonable work’ (zumutbare Arbeit) as well as divisions of responsibilities between the 
federal employment agency and the local employment offices. While unemployment swelled 
in the early 1980s and then increased again rapidly after unification in the 1990s, 
governmental reforms failed to address labor market regulation and social policy as a source 
of depressed labor demand. Rather, reforms primary directed attention to the Labor 
Promotion Law, Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, which focused predominantly on labor supply. 
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Even after the duration of unemployment insurance was greatly curbed in the Hartz IV 
reforms in 2003 and 2004, the unemployed did not face obligations to enter into active labor 
market policies. 
 
On one level, the inability of the government to rally broad support for structural reform is 
justifiable. In terms of wage restraint, the wage bargaining institutions were quite efficient at 
producing wage growth below inflation (Hassel 2006). At the same time, the inability of the 
German system to produce employment growth implied reforms that demanded more 
concessions from the social partners and workers than those called for by the existing 
regulatory structure.  
 
Yet the insurance-based system rested upon the idea that risks are more or less internalized 
by the existing regulations. In addition, the right to Tarifautonomie guarantees employers and 
employees the right to negotiate wages without state intervention. This concept, along with 
the idea of subsidiarity, or that the lower administrative level is more efficient at regulating 
public policy, weaken the capacity of the central state to generate support for issues of public 
concern that are unanticipated by the existing system. 
 
The weak support of firms for social issues above minimum requirements is evident from 
Tables 8.5 and 8.6. Compared to the Danish firms, who overwhelmingly supported the idea 
fully that they should have social responsibility for their workers, only twenty-five percent of 
firms fully agreed with this idea in Germany and only ten appeared somewhat in support. 
Turning to the results in Table 8.6, a full eighty-three percent of firms disagree with that idea 
that they should have social responsibility for socially excluded workers. There were some, 
seventeen percent, who were somewhat in support of this idea, but not a single firm agreed 
fully that they should bear responsibility for socially excluded workers. 
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Table 8.5. German Firms’ Responses to the Question: Should firm have social 
responsibility for own workers? 
Response Frequency Percent 
No 26 65 
Maybe 4 10 
Yes 10 25 
 
Table 8.6. German Firms’ Responses to the Question: Should firm take social 
responsibility for socially-excluded people such as long-term unemployed? 
Response Frequency Percent 
No 33 83 
Maybe 7 17 
Yes 0 0 
 
The weakness of firms’ self-proclaimed social responsibility for socially excluded workers is 
reflected by the nature of active labor market policies pursued in Germany. Although active 
labor market policies have a long history, firms and their organizations, in contrast to the 
Danish case, do not historically play a large role in the implementation process. Despite the 
passage of new active labor market policies in 2003, firms did not find that these reforms 
called for a larger role for private firms in the reintegration of marginalized workers. Eighty-
five percent of firms indeed responded that firms did not have a larger role as a result of these 
changes, and only fifteen percent agreed that there was perhaps a larger role for private firms. 
No firm fully agreed that these reforms created a new role for private firms. 
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The role of private firms was arguably larger in previous times, for instance in training 
programs for the unemployed before 2002. In this period, firms could receive large 
government subsidies for training unemployed workers. A lawyer at the German 
Confederation of Skilled Crafts, or Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks, explained, 
however, that the vast expenditure in training did not translate in efficient reintegration, 
because there were never mechanisms set in place to ensure sufficient market demand for 
skills delivered by training firms.17 As such, interested firms would take on trainees, but these 
trainees would frequently fail to find employment after the completion of their training 
period. After the placement scandal, or Vermittlungsskandal, in 2002, when the federal 
placement agency was revealed as having largely forged their placement statistics, the 
government embarked on a host of policy reforms which included a seventy percent 
reduction in the training budget for unemployed workers. In sum, although private firms 
previously played a larger role in the reintegration of marginalized workers, their 
participation did not on average improve the employment chances of marginalized workers 
much at all. Also, since the reduction in the training budget in 2002, the government has not 
developed innovative ways to involve private firms in the reintegration of marginalized 
workers. Outside of training policy, the active labor market policies available to private firms 
in Germany in 2006 did not represent a strong departure from previous policies. Various 
subsidy programs offered firms financial relief to hire disabled workers, apprentices, and 
replacement workers for workers on leave (job rotation). 
 
As in Denmark and Germany, Dutch reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s also responded to 
the growing budgetary crisis brought on by the shrinking active to passive ratio. The 
Wassenaar Agreement of 1982, which succeeded at guaranteeing wage restraint, was 
followed by the New Course Agreement in 1993, which broke new ground in terms of 
                                                 
17 Interview, November 2006.  
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gaining employers’ support for shorter working hours in exchange for union support for more 
flexible employment protection for workers on a permanent contract.  
 
Although governments continued to developed generous active labor market policies 
dependent on firm investment throughout the 1990s, the activation strategies currently in 
place in the Netherlands reflect the growing tendency towards flexibility initiated in the 
earlier period. Where private employment agencies flourished after reforms in 1996, these 
and similar firms had nearly completely assumed the main role of reintegrating unemployed 
individuals by 2001. In fact, in late 2001, the public employment service was officially 
dismantled and divided into separate parts (Sol & Westerveld 2005), which included the 
Centres for Work and Income, Centra voor Werk en Inkomen, and the Employee Insurance 
Agency, the Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen. Private employment agencies 
developed departments or entire subsidiary firms to handle the reintegration services, such as 
USG Restart within USG People and Manpower Reintegratie Services within Manpower to 
name a few. Private reintegration companies also competed for government bids to 
reintegrate unemployed individuals.  
 
Although these changes were accompanied by an almost complete fading out of existing 
active labor market policies to private firms, this does not imply that private firms no longer 
play a role in responding to social issues. For comparison with the Danish and German 
interviews, Tables 8.7 and 8.8 demonstrate the responses of Dutch firms to the question of 
whether they should have social responsibility for their own as well as socially excluded 
workers. The results for Dutch firms’ view of their social responsibility towards their own 
workers are somewhere in between those from Denmark and Germany. Although roughly 
half of the firms do not believe that they have a role in providing their workers social benefits 
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above the required legal minimum, thirty percent agree somewhat and twenty percent fully 
agree that they are responsible in this way.  
Table 8.7. Dutch Firms’ Responses to the Question: Should firm have social 
responsibility for own workers? 
Response Frequency Percent 
No 16 47 
Maybe 11 32 
Yes 7 21 
 
Turning to the results for socially excluded individuals, the results change. Again reflecting a 
distribution that places Dutch firms somewhere in between the highly ‘socially responsible’ 
Danish firms and the ‘socially non-responsible’ German firms, Dutch firms on average did 
not believe that they should take social responsibility for socially excluded individuals, 
roughly fifteen percent somewhat agreed and the same percent agreed fully. 
Table 8.8. Dutch Firms’ Responses to the Question: Should firm take social 
responsibility for socially-excluded people such as long-term unemployed? 
Response Frequency Percent 
No 24 70.5 
Maybe 4 11.5 
Yes 6 18 
 
Therefore, despite the predominantly small role for regular private firms in the reintegration 
of marginalized workers through active labor market policies, regular private firms do appear 
relatively willing to take social responsibility, at least for their own workers. In 2007, the 
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employers’ organization, in pursuit of more flexible employment protection, were ready to 
accept an agreement that would oblige every firm with over fifty employees to participate in 
the reintegration of unemployed individuals. Although the deal fell through, some employers 
interviewed in this study had already begun considering the implications of such a deal 
during the early negotiations of the 2007 bargaining round. Also, in 2005, the Ministry of 
Education and the Ministry for Social and Economic Affairs joined efforts in the new 
campaign called ‘Leren en Werken,’ in which learning and working are combined to facilitate 
labor market integration among marginalized workers. Private firms play an advisory role in 
the activities of this campaign.  
 
Firms’ Investment and Opinions 
 
Having reviewed the general development of active labor market policies in each case, I turn 
now to the usage of active labor market policies in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
For the cases of Denmark and Germany, where private firms remain the predominant actor 
responsible for reintegrating marginalized workers into the labor market, I generate an 
interval scale measuring the degree of participation of firms in active labor market policies. 
The scores 1 and 2 both indicate non-participation, although 1 means non-participation and 
ideological opposition and 2 means non-participation without ideological opposition. The 
score 3 means that the firm participation, but only on a marginal level, hiring only one person 
through the use of a wage subsidy. The scores 4 and 5 indicate more substantial participation, 
although the score 4 indicates that the firm hired a couple (i.e. more than one) of individuals 
with an active labor market policies whereas the score 5 was retained for the cases where the 
firm used active labor market policies to hire many workers. In Denmark, the score of 5 
meant that firms had signed a formal agreement to participate in active labor market policies, 
whereas, in Germany, this meant that the firm used active policies as a human resource 
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strategy and hired large numbers of individuals with these policies. For the German case, firm 
participation was coded twice to account for the fact that the main active labor market 
policies in Germany are frequently not used to hired previously unemployed individuals.  
 
The participation rates of Danish firms are listed below in Table 8.9. Roughly seventy percent 
of interviewed firms participated and thirty-five percent of firms signed formal agreements to 
participate.  
 
Turning to the German results for the first coding of firm participation rates, where all active 
labor market policies were included independent of whether they were used to hire previously 
unemployed individuals or not, the total percentage of firms participating in active labor 
market policies does not look too different from Denmark. Sixty-two percent of German 
firms, compared to Denmark’s sixty-nine, hired at least one worker with the use of a wage 
subsidy. The intensity of German firms’ participation, however, is much lower than in 
Denmark. Most firms only hired one individual with the use of an active labor market policy, 
and only four percent (two firms) used active labor market policies as a core human resource 
strategy. 
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Table 8.9. Firm Participation Patterns in ALMP in Denmark 
Response Percent Frequency
5 - High participation 34 19
4 - Marginal participation 33 18
3 - Weak participation 2 1
2 - Non-participation 22 12
1 - Ideological non-participation 9 5
Total 100 55
 
Table 8.10. Firm Participation Patterns in ALMP in Germany (All Policies) 
Response Percent Frequency
5 - High participation 4 2
4 - Marginal participation 12 6
3 - Weak participation 46 24
2 - Non-participation 33 17
1 - Ideological non-participation 6 3
Total 100 52
 
Considering now the recoded participation rates of German firms, where participation in 
active labor market policies is only counted as such when firms hired previously unemployed 
individuals, the participation rates decrease dramatically.  
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Table 8.11. Firm Participation Patterns in ALMP in Germany (Only 
Previously Unemployed) 
Response Percent Frequency
5 - High participation 2 1 
4 - Marginal participation 8 4 
3 - Weak participation 31 16 
2 - Non-participation 54 28 
1 - Ideological non-participation 6 3 
Total 100 52 
 
Turning to the Netherlands, gauging firms’ participation in active labor market policies 
presents some difficulties because of the structure of reintegration services in the 
Netherlands. Of the firms interviewed, four were private employment agencies that provided 
their own reintegration services. The number of individuals reintegrated with the use of these 
services numbered in the thousands. The final firm with reintegration services included 
Philips Electronics, which reintegrates roughly 150 marginalized workers per year. Rather 
than abide by the reduced working hours agreement that made up part of the Wassenaar 
agreement, Philips Electronics agreed to take on a number of long-term unemployed each 
year and train these workers.  
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Table 8.12. Firm Participation Patterns in ALMP in the Netherlands 
Response (Multiple Responses Possible) Percent Frequency
Private Firms with Reintegration Services 13 5 
Firms Hiring Disabled Workers with the Aid of a 
Wage Subsidy 28 11 
Firms with ‘Employability Centers’ 5 2 
Firms Not Participating in Any of the Above 
Activities 65 26 
 
Next, I examine more carefully the factors that explain firms’ participation in active labor 
market policies in Denmark and Germany. The Netherlands is not included in this section for 
two reasons. First, the small number of participating firms makes it difficult to gain consistent 
estimates for the reasons why firms participated. Second, the set of active labor market 
policies that Dutch firms could use was not constant across firms, which makes an analysis of 
the determinants of firm participation impossible. For instance, if I would regress the variable 
for the intensity of firms’ participation in active labor market policies on a host of 
explanatory variables, the interpretation of an explanatory variable would read, a one unit 
increase in that explanatory variable leads to a change in firm participation in active labor 
market policies equal to the size of the coefficient. Categorical differences between firms 
coded as high participation, however, and other firms makes such an interpretation 
meaningless.  
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Table 8.13. Reasons for Participating or Not in ALMP 
 Denmark Germany 
Subsidies Motivated Participation 38 18 
Labor Shortages Motivated Participation 31 34 
Social Responsibility Motivated Participation 51 16 
   
Need for Higher Skills Prevented Participation 36 65 
Negative Views of the Unemployed Prevented 
Participation 20 22 
Bureaucratic Difficulties Prevented Participation  45 
 
Besides the differing intensity of firm involvement in active labor market policies discussed 
above, Table8.13 above provides some information on the reasons why firms participated in 
active labor market policies in Denmark and Germany. More Danish firms listed the subsidy 
as a motivation for participating in active labor market policies than German firms. The 
interviews substantiate the marginal effect that the subsidy made in the German case. While 
the employers found the subsidy an added bonus, the majority stated that the decision to 
apply for financial support arose after the finalization of a hiring decision. The financial 
benefit that came with using an active labor market policy did not guide employers’ hiring 
decisions. 
 
At the same time, the respective difference in the supply of labor between Denmark and 
Germany does not appear to account for the greater attractiveness of financial support for 
Danish firms. In both Denmark and Germany roughly the same percentage of firms listed 
labor shortages as a reason for participation in active labor market policies. This provides at 
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least some evidence that the relatively tighter labor market in Denmark does not explain 
participation levels. 
 
Finally, whereas almost half Danish firms listed corporate social responsibility as a reason for 
participation, a small minority of German firms did so. These results suggest a difference in 
corporate culture, where Danish firms appear more engaged in social problems than their 
Germany counterparts. This difference may influence participation on a number of levels, by 
inducing a higher level of involvement of firms in the policy-making process or changing the 
human resources strategy of firms to include greater attention to active measures.  
 
Turning to the reasons why firms limited or decided against participation illuminates further 
differences between the Danish and German cases. German firms were double as likely to 
limit participation because of demand for greater skill needs. One possible explanation can be 
thrown out, namely that the unemployed hold a worse reputation in Germany’s slack labor 
market: Danish and German firms exhibit a similar propensity to avoid participation because 
of a negative view of the unemployed. Therefore, the common trend among German firms to 
avoid participation because they cannot find the appropriate skill set provides some evidence 
for main hypothesis that marginalized workers in Germany do not find access or recognition 
for skills that employers seek. 
 
The next step of the analysis tests the various characteristics of Danish and German firms that 
influence firms’ level of participation. The results of the analysis are below in Table 8.14. 
The measurement of the variables was as follows. Membership in an employers association 
was a dummy variable where membership was coded as 1. Variables for the skill profile of a 
firm were coded as percent of total workers. Wages was coded as the amount spent on staff 
costs divided by the number of employees. The wages variable was divided by 10,000 to 
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facilitate interpretation. Profit was measured as total profits divided by total revenue. The 
variables for public sector sales and exports were each measured as a percent of total sales. 
The variable for union presence was coded as 0 for doesn’t know, 1 for no, and 2 for yes. The 
data for employer organization membership, skill profile, public sector sales, exports, and 
union presence were attained from the interviews, whereas the data for sales, profits, and 
wages was derived from firms’ annual reports.   
 
The variables for membership in an employer organization, percentage of white collar 
workers, and percentage of low-skilled blue collar workers are of central interest. In both 
cases, membership in an employer organization increase firms’ level of participation in active 
labor market policies: in Denmark membership leads to a 1.475 or 1.651 unit increase in 
participation level, depending on the model. In Germany membership leads to a 0.478 unit 
increase in participation level. These results support the central claim in the Varieties of 
Capitalism literature and the work of Martin and Swank that business organization increases 
support for social policies. Ties to an employer organization make a decisive difference in 
firms’ personnel decisions.  
 
However, considering the skill profile of participating firms, these ties may not necessarily 
imply a willingness of firms to invest highly in marginalized workers hired through active 
labor market policies. In Denmark, a 50 percent decrease in the percentage of white collar 
workers led to a 0.75 unit increase in the participation level. Re-running the model using the 
variable for high skilled blue collar workers, the results provide some support for the 
hypothesis that Danish firms invest in the skills of participants since workers are likely filling 
skilled positions within the firm. 
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In Germany, a 50 percent increase in the percentage of low-skilled blue collar workers leads 
to a 0.6 unit increase in the participation level. These results imply that Danish firms 
participate in active labor market policies in order to gain access to skilled personnel, 
whereas German firms use these policies to gain access to cheap labor. When considering 
only active labor market policies targeted at previously unemployed individuals, the 
coefficient for membership in an employer organization becomes small and insignificant.  
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 Table 8.14. Regression Analyses of German and Danish Firms  
 Denmark Germany 
 White C. HS Blue   All  Unemp  
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
  
[Standard 
Error] 
[Standard 
Error] 
[Standard 
Error]   
[Standard 
Error]   
         
Employer Association 1.475 ** 1.651 *** 0.475 * .123  
 [0.556]  [0.575]  [0.271]  [0.245]  
        
Low Skilled Blue Collar 
Workers    1.225 * 1.096 * 
    [0.006]  [0.522]  
        
High Skilled Blue Collar 
Workers  0.011      
  [0.007]      
       
White Collar Workers -0.015 **   
 [0.006]       
       
Wages -0.582 *** -0.693 *** 2.323  -1.118  
 [0.174]  [0.173]  [.775]  [0.698]  
       
Size -0.069 * -0.072 * 0.057  0.003  
 [0.032]  0.034  [0.063]  [0.013]  
       
Profits -2.98  -1.315  0.008  0.006  
 [3.575]  [3.796]  [1.401]  [0.006]  
       
Public Sector -0.019 * -0.021 * -0.002  -0.006  
 [0.011]  0.012  [0.011]  [0.010]  
       
Exports -0.004  -0.003  0.003  0.002  
 [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.004]  [0.004]  
        
Unions -0.615  -0.416  0.026  0.132  
 [0.472]  [0.478]  [0.216]  [0.195]  
        
Constant 5.238 *** 3.841  1.616 ** 2.392 ** 
 [1.320]  1.275  [0.698]  [0.628]  
       
Adjusted Rsquared 0.394  0.112  0.113  0.114  
N 55   55   52   52   
*     Significant beyond .05 level, two tailed test   
**   Significant beyond .01 level, two tailed test   
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Observed in tandem, these results provide evidence that employer organizations in both 
countries play a central role in motivating firms to participate in active labor market policies. 
However, the role of employer organizations in these two contexts is quite different. 
Employer organizations in Denmark influence not only the hiring practices of Danish firms, 
but their training behaviour as well. In Germany, however, the capacity of employer 
organizations to influence firms’ behaviour is more limited. Firms’ human capital strategies 
are not a matter of public concern. As a result, firms do not consider active labor market 
policies as a potential aspect of a human capital strategy. In addition, active labor market 
policies do not appear to influence firms’ hiring strategies, since the bulk of firms that 
participated had already decided to hire the job applicant before applying for the subsidy. 
Finally, evidence for the weakness of employer organizations in influencing firms’ hiring and 
training policies is also observed when rerunning the regression in Table 8.14 using the 
recoded participation variable from Table 8.11. The coefficient for membership in an 
employer organization becomes small and insignificant.  
Conclusion 
This paper addressed the role of private firms in addressing labor market marginalization. 
Although generous welfare states generally share political institutions that support the 
passage of social policies, including active labor market policies, the degree to which these 
policies in fact improve the labor market chances of marginalized workers varies.  
 
The theory section reviewed the literature on business and the welfare state, paying particular 
attention to the factors that may reduce the likelihood of business support for active labor 
market policies. This literature was used to develop hypotheses about the varying role of 
firms in the integration of marginalized workers in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands.  
182 
 
The evidence provided here has shown that political reform in Denmark, Germany, and the 
Netherlands resulted in vastly different types of policies. In Denmark, private firms, under 
strong influence from the state, participated highly in the training of unemployed workers, 
and evidence suggests that participating firms indeed invested highly in the skill of these 
workers. In Germany, political actors develop active labor market policies, but private firms 
only used these policies to gain access to cheap labor. Moreover, although the organizational 
strength of business played a role in motivating firms’ participation in active labor market 
policies generally, this relationship weakened when only considering active labor market 
policies targeted at unemployed individuals. In the Netherlands, the state has largely 
privatized reintegration services. Regular firms play little role in the labor market 
reintegration of marginalized workers. At the same time, firms do remain willing and able to 
engage in innovative projects to facilitate the reintegration of marginalized workers in the 
labor market. Firms, however, are not formally required to aid in this process, and therefore 
maintain a stronger bargaining position than in Denmark. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The central argument of this study has been that education policies are the subject of political 
contestation and structure opportunities not only for workers in the labor market but also for 
policy makers developing public policies aimed at placing marginalized workers in secure 
employment. The consequences of education policy for workers and policy-makers are 
related, because education policies that influence the degree of labor market marginalization 
also influence the tools available to reduce marginalization. To clarify, education systems that 
limit opportunities to acquire new skills as well as the transparency of earned skills are likely 
to increase the relative proportion of marginalized workers within the labor force, who will 
face difficulties in improving their marginalized status due to the lack of education policies to 
acquire skills and the low level of transparency of their earned skills. Also, public policy 
makers within this context interested in creating policy proposals to address labor market 
marginalization will face weak infrastructural resources such as a lack of training facilities 
and bad information about not only the skills of marginalized workers but also the types of 
skills necessary to improve these workers’ employment opportunities.  
Theoretical Framework 
This study of the relationship between education policy and labor market integration began 
with a conceptualization of education systems for the following reasons. First, the risk of skill 
obsolescence has increased, where skill obsolescence is understood as the deficiency of skills 
necessary to fulfill the tasks associated with one’s employment position or comparable 
employment positions. Skill-biased technological change, trade, and financial market 
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liberalization were discussed as the three main causes of skill obsolescence and influence 
skill needs in the following ways: by increasing demand for higher levels of skills; by 
increasing demand for new types of skills including analytical and social skills; finally, by 
speeding up the rate at which skill demands change. Where the former two causes imply 
necessary reforms of the content of education policy, the latter suggests the need to redefine 
the relationship between education and working life, where learning is not restricted to the 
period of initial education but continues throughout the career. Finally, since education policy 
potentially influences an individual’s skills at many different points throughout the life 
course, it is necessary to take a comprehensive approach to the study of education policy and 
its influence on employment stability. 
 
The shortage of the conceptual tools for describing the capacity of the education system to 
respond to these new skill needs makes up the second motivation for creating a new 
conceptualization of education systems. Existing conceptualizations of education systems do 
exist (Campinos-Dubernet & Grando 1992; de Moura Castro & Alfthan 1992; Green 1991). 
However, these studies do not speak directly to the question at hand. Rather, they base their 
typologies on who has control over education policy and how education is delivered rather 
than on the relationship between education policy and labor market outcomes. The varieties 
of capitalism approach (Hall & Soskice 2001b) relates education policy to labor market 
outcomes as well as the broader structure of economic institutions, but the discussion of 
education policy relates primarily to vocational training and the phase of initial training more 
generally.  
 
For these reasons, the study set out with the first goal of constructing a new conceptual 
framework for understanding the relationship between education policy and labor market 
integration. Focusing on an individual’s skill set as the unit of analysis, I was interested in 
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expressing how education policy facilitates the transition of a partially obsolete skill set to a 
non-obsolete skill set. I established two theoretical dimensions that express how education 
policy can reduce the risk of skill obsolescence. The first dimension, called the skill 
acquisition dimension, aimed to capture the ways in which education policy increases the 
capacity and opportunities to acquire skills. The capacity to learn is perhaps the most 
fundamental skill, because it influences the ability to obtain additional skills and thereby 
adapt when confronted with new tasks. Policies that expand opportunities to enter education 
constitute the second aspect of the skill acquisition dimension.  
 
Opportunities to enter education were conceived of in three ways: as the degree of streaming 
in compulsory education that restricts educational choice; as the generosity of financial aid 
for students; and as the availability of on-the-job training and reintegration measures. When 
streaming occurs within compulsory education, students who demonstrate lower abilities take 
a reduced set of general education courses, which has the consequence of limiting their 
occupational choices later in life. Beyond this first point, however, the debate is divided. On 
the one hand, there are those that criticize streaming, arguing that dividing students by ability 
corresponds to relatively weaker resources and career goals for these students. On the other 
hand, there are those that defend streaming, contending that students’ needs are met more 
efficiently if divided according to ability or that lower ability groups usually enter vocational 
education in such cases, which leads to the acquisition of practical skills and a high likelihood 
of participating in continuing vocational training during the working career.  
 
Financial aid was the second policy that expands education opportunities and does so by 
reducing prohibitive costs of living and tuition. Finally, the availability of on-the-job training 
and reintegration measures share the common characteristic that they provide opportunities 
for workers to gain skills who have already begun their working lives. Opportunities for on-
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the-job training were expected to increase based on the degree of coordination over firm 
training policy with nation-wide agreements increasing opportunities the most followed by 
industry agreements and then firm-based agreements. Reintegration measures provide 
opportunities for marginalized workers to gain skills and included policy measures such as 
job counselling, retraining, and subsidized employment.  
 
Where the skill acquisition dimension captured the impact of education policy on individuals’ 
capacity to learn and the availability of learning opportunities, the central role of the 
certification system on labor mobility motivated the construction of a second dimension. I 
called this dimension the skill transparency dimension, and it consisted of three parts. The 
first part assessed countries’ skill forecasting policies. The tradition of skill forecasting and 
the relationship between skill forecasting and education policy were both analyzed in order to 
understand how countries anticipate and react to changed skill demands. The relevance of 
such activity for skill transparency lies in providing information about future skill needs, 
which can be used to inform to update course content, consolidate different qualifications, 
and develop new qualifications.  
 
The second part of the skill transparency dimension refers to policies that promote the clear 
certification of skills. The centralization of the qualification system is the first aspect of skill 
certification that I considered. Centralization should increase transparency by reducing 
regional or otherwise inconsistent methods of certifying skills. Centralization therefore 
increases skill transparency among qualifications, which despite similar content, are certified 
in different ways. Beyond the centralization of the qualification system, two other policy 
areas are relevant to the clear certification of skills. The accreditation of prior learning is the 
second aspect of the certification that I included, and it refers to the certification of skills 
learned informally. The policies that fulfill such a function provide an alternative to costly 
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and time-intensive formal education for those who already hold the relevant skills. Finally, 
the decision of firms to train in off-site locations rather than within their own organization 
should lead to more transparent skill certification, either because external training institutions 
are more likely than in-house providers to certify training activities or because external 
institutions are known to a broader community. 
 
The final part of the skill transparency dimension was made up of policies that recognized 
complementarities between different degree programs, or qualifications. By illuminating 
similarities in content between qualifications, these policies make clear the coursework 
necessary to become certified in qualifications requiring relatively similar skills. To be clear, 
if a worker, who has already earned a qualification or completed some coursework towards 
this qualification, decides to pursue another similar qualification instead, it is possible to 
identify the shared coursework between the original and preferred qualification.  
 
Once information about the overlap between different skill sets becomes available, increasing 
the facility with which individuals can earn new qualifications similar to their own depends 
on adjusting the certification system to recognize individual components of qualifications. 
Policies that divide coursework for a given qualification thematically into so-called modules 
will increase the ease with which individuals can become certified in different qualifications. 
The reason is simple. If an individual only receives certification for the qualification as a 
whole, he or she will have to complete all of the required coursework for a given 
qualification in order to receive certification. In this way, the recognition of shared skill sets 
between different qualifications may illuminate similar types of qualifications, but, unless 
parts of qualifications are certified individuals, it will remain relatively cumbersome to 
become certified in qualifications similar to ones own. 
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In sum, the construction of the skill acquisition and skill transparency dimensions developed 
a conceptual framework with which to understand how education policy reduces the risk of 
skill obsolescence. In countries that score highly on both the skill acquisition and skill 
transparency dimensions, individuals faced with a high risk of skill obsolescence will be 
relatively well-suited to cope with this risk. They will know the range of employment 
positions for which they are suitably certified and will be able to receive certification for 
skills they earned informally. They will also have good information about coursework 
necessary to earn new qualifications in order to be eligible for a broader range of employment 
positions and will be able to complete the coursework relatively quickly because of 
qualifications are broken down into modules, or thematic units, by which they are also 
certified. They will have received good cognitive skills from a strong basic education and 
will, as a result, find it relatively easier to obtain new skills through accessible on-the-job 
training if still employed and abundant reintegration programs if unemployed. On the other 
hand, if education systems demonstrate a lack of investment in education, weak opportunities 
to enter education, and a dearth of policies that support skill transparency, individuals at a 
high risk of skill obsolescence will find it difficult to earn new skills or apply existing skills 
to new training and employment prospects.  
 
In order to validate the two indices of skill acquisition and skill transparency, I correlated the 
indices with measures of their hypothesized observable implications. The results 
demonstrated significant correlations between the each index and measures of skill levels, 
training activity, unemployment rates of lower skilled workers, and the employment gap 
between different skill groups. The significant results for skill levels lent credence to the 
claim that policy that expands opportunities to acquire skills and ensures skill transparency is 
related to stronger basic skills as well as skills necessary for getting by in the knowledge 
economy. 
189 
 
The theoretical discussion also included an elaboration of the consequences of the two 
dimensions of education policy for the reintegration of marginalized workers. Since 
marginalized workers face the highest risk of skill obsolescence, education policies that 
provide opportunities to reduce skill obsolescence will be of relatively greater use to these 
workers. Moreover, the availability of institutions providing marketable skills and good 
information about new skill needs will aid the construction of efficient reintegration policies. 
Correlations between the two indices provided validation for these hypotheses. Both indices 
correlated highly with total spending on active labor market policies. When taking the 
relative efficiency of different integration policies into account, the indices were shown to 
correlate strongly with spending on training policies which have been shown to work well 
and only weakly with direct job creation policies which do not work well at improving 
participants’ employment prospects. This evidence supports the particular hypothesis about 
the relationship between the education system and the tools available to policy-makers 
interested in crafting reintegration policy.  
Tracing Causal Origins 
The last part of Chapter 2 provided a preliminary examination of the origins of policies 
constituting the skill acquisition and skill transparency dimensions. Chapter 3 built on these 
initial findings and conducted an analysis of the origins of the two dimensions using fuzzy set 
and regression analysis. The results corroborated various existing theoretical arguments about 
the origins of generous social policy. Providing support for the power resources theory, the 
results underscored the strong positive relationship between left party incumbency and trade 
union density on the one hand and education policies that expand opportunities to acquire 
skills and promote skill transparency on the other. The strong negative relationship between 
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veto points and the two indices of education policy also support work by Immergut (1990) 
and others, which links the number of points at which political actors can block legislation to 
reduced levels of policy creation. 
 
The remaining results paint a more obscure picture of the causal forces leading to education 
policies that expand opportunities to acquire skills and support skill transparency. Countries 
dominated by right parties appear opposed to policies that expand educational opportunities. 
This finding concurs with the theoretical expectation of the power resources approach insofar 
as such policies are understood as redistributive policies that benefit low income groups at the 
expense of net costs for high income groups. The results for the effect of right party 
incumbency on the skill transparency dimension, however, begin to undermine the singular 
understanding of education policy as a purely redistributive policy, because the relationship 
between right party incumbency and the abundance of policies that support skill transparency 
is frequently positive. There are indeed theoretical reasons that explain this positive 
relationship. The employer constituency of right wing parties potentially holds an interest in 
increasing the supply of skilled labor. Although policies that expand opportunities to gain 
skills also fulfill this goal, they impose trade-offs in the form of higher taxes that policies 
supporting skill transparency do not.  
 
In addition to the strictly interest based assessment of right party preferences over education 
policy, it is necessary to consider the role of incumbency in shaping the structure of economic 
institutions in countries where right parties manage to dominate the cabinet share over time. 
It remains a challenge to differentiate between the interests of a given party family and the 
consequences of recurrent incumbency on that party family’s policy interests, because the 
former is in part an outcome of the former. Recurrent incumbency changes the center of 
gravity of the policy agenda by reorganizing political debate around the interests of the 
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incumbent party (Huber & Stephens 2001, p. 28-32); it also influences the interests of 
bureaucratic actors responsible for formulating policy where incumbent parties influence the 
appointment of bureaucratic actors (Huber & Stephens 2001, p. 28-32). The interpretation of 
the results for right party incumbency therefore touches on a dominant debate with the 
comparative political economy literature concerning the complementarities between 
economic organization and social policy and the role of political incumbency in shaping the 
nature of these complementarities. The results for right party incumbency speak to this 
debate, because they provide an example of a policy field that holds positive consequences 
for both business groups and marginalized workers. Countries with a strong record of right 
party incumbency are, on average, more likely to expand policies that support the transparent 
certification of skills. These policies help workers by providing both recognition for skill 
learned informally and access to a broad range of educational and employment opportunities. 
They also advantage employers by increasing the supply of a skilled workforce. 
 
The illumination of a hypothetical cross-class coalition in countries with strong right wing 
incumbency over the issue of skill transparency provokes questions about why similar 
coalitions do not occur in other cases. Despite theoretical reasons for why workers and 
employers stand to gain from policies that promote skill transparency, the failure to establish 
these policies across all countries suggests that consent of workers and employers is 
contingent. Indeed, the negative relationship between Christian democratic incumbency and 
the expansion of policies that promote skill transparency demonstrates the inability of certain 
countries to pass these policies.  
 
At the same time, it may be more appropriate to conclude that only employers’ consent is 
indeed contingent, since the two most relevant institutions representing workers correlated 
positively to both indices. This conclusion nevertheless confronts the dilemma discussed 
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above, namely the need to distinguish between the ceteris paribus micro-level assumptions 
about the interests of workers and the consequences of long-term political incumbency and 
organizational roots on the interests of these actors. 
 
To continue, the results for the consequences of both right party and Christian democratic 
incumbency on skill transparency placed in question the understanding of social policy as 
purely redistributive, understood as dividing a limited resource. Instead, it may be the case 
that expanding skill transparency benefits all actors or that a reduction of skill transparency 
may make everyone worse off. In other words, there may be mutual gains, or positive sum 
outcomes, over certain policies. The possibility of mutual gains or losses alters the 
understanding of political contestation over policies related to skill transparency. Since the 
potential for mutual gains begs the question of how actors’ coordinated their preferences, it 
may be useful to explain how these relate to the relative gains and losses between groups. 
The question also arises as to the contextual factors that explain the capacity to develop 
policies that realize mutual gains as well as the importance of the distribution of relative 
gains for coordination over such policies (see Baldwin 1990, p. 23). Additional questions 
include: In which cases are policies predominantly redistributive in nature? In which cases do 
mutual gains or losses exist? Where mutual gains exist, what factors influence actors’ 
capacity to realize these gains? 
 
On a related topic, the results for right and Christian democratic parties also raised doubts 
that the passage of skill transparency policies can be explained solely by a conflict dimension 
based on income. Right parties typically gain support from wealthier citizens and business 
groups, yet long term incumbency of these parties has been shown to increase levels of 
support for policies that promote skill transparency. An initial interpretation might be that 
these policies receive support from both workers and employers. However, under the 
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assumption that workers and employers support policies that increase skill transparency, 
Christian democratic parties would appear to be the most likely to expand such policies, 
because they are the proto-type of the cross-class party. Yet countries in which Christian 
democratic parties were frequently in government appear unable or unwilling to pass policies 
that promote skill transparency. In this way, the preferences of workers and employers over 
policies that expand skill transparency are likely contingent on broader contextual factors. 
 
The varieties of capitalism approach provided analytical tools with which to understand the 
proclivity of right party incumbency to lead to policies supporting skill transparency and the 
opposite tendency for countries with Christian democratic incumbency. The varieties of 
capitalism approach explains the structure of education policies with reference to the role of 
general versus specific skills in the production process. In countries where production 
processes rely largely on specific skills, contracting problems frustrate high investment in 
these skills: employers, having invested highly in workers’ training, fear losing these workers 
to competing firms and workers fear, if becoming unemployed, the inability to find work 
requiring similar skills.  
 
The provision of labor market regulations and social policies resolve these contracting 
problems. Highly regulated training standards provide quality assurance, and social pressure 
from industry organizations and other firms ensure that firms train a high number of 
apprentices. These factors alleviate firms’ disincentives to invest in specific skills. In the case 
of workers, generous social protection provides income support during the period of potential 
unemployment, which provides workers with sufficient time to find a new employment 
position that suits their specific skills. For workers, therefore, the provision of generous social 
policy alleviates the disincentives to invest in specific skills. Countries relying on specific 
skills are labelled coordinated market economies and generally include the countries of 
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continental and northern Europe. These countries exhibit strong left and Christian democratic 
incumbency.  
 
For countries where production relies predominantly on general skills, contracting problems 
in the skill investments do not exist. As a result, employers do not support generous social 
policy to the extent of their counterparts in coordinated market economies. While some 
workers may continue to prefer generous social policy, the support of high income workers 
for such policies is likely to wane since the risk associated with holding specific skills does 
not exist and these workers can support themselves through periods of unemployment. 
Therefore, economies that rely predominantly on general skills exhibit relatively less 
generous social policy, because these policies are not central to employers’ production 
strategies and the support from high income workers is weaker. Countries that rely 
predominantly on general skills are labelled liberal market economies and included the 
Anglo-Saxon countries. These countries exhibit strong right party incumbency.  
 
Using this framework, one could explain the relative propensity of countries with strong right 
party incumbency to expand policies that promote skill transparency on the one hand and the 
relative lack of such policies in countries with strong Christian democratic incumbency on 
the other. Countries with a strong tradition of right party governments are typically liberal 
market economies. Production in these countries is based on general skills, and, as such, 
employers do not invest in workers’ training, because they cannot guarantee a return on this 
investment. Compared to their counterparts in coordinated market economies, employers 
prefer low wage costs and weak employment protection, because they are not defending sunk 
investments in specific skills and preferences to minimize wage costs and increase flexibility 
will dominate. The consequence, however, is that employers must come to grips with higher 
quit rates, since workers will anticipate relatively weaker allegiance from the employer and 
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will change employers more regularly to avoid accumulating firm-specific knowledge that 
goes unrewarded on the external market. Employers, however, still want to ensure a large 
pool of skilled labor in order to keep wage costs down. As such, employers in liberal market 
economies should hold a strong preference in favor of the expansion of policies that promote 
skill transparency. These policies will provide workers more opportunities to gain new 
qualifications more efficiently, which will likely lead to higher numbers of skilled workers 
particularly in growth sectors. Although some employers may potentially fear that these 
policies will encourage their workers to pursue alternative careers, employers in liberal 
market economies already face the expectation of high quit rates and these dissenting 
employers are likely to be in the minority. 
 
Employers and workers in coordinated market economies face a different set of incentives. 
Employers rely heavily on specific skills and invest large amounts in training workers with 
these skills. As a result, they hold a relatively stronger preference in long-term tenure than 
employers in liberal market economies, because they expect trained workers to return their 
training investment through productive employment. Workers, for their part, also invest 
highly in specific skills, and, as a result, are concerned about finding employment positions 
requiring similar skills (and involving similar wages) in the case of becoming unemployed.  
 
Therefore, employers in coordinated market economies should exhibit strong preferences to 
oppose skill transparency. Employers in these countries have already created solutions to 
generate the pool of skilled labor that they need and will not want to encourage their workers 
to pursue careers outside of their firm or industry. The position of workers in these cases is 
less clear. On the one hand, workers should be ambivalent to policies that promote skill 
transparency. As long as these workers receive insurance that reduces the risk of investment 
in specific skills, policies that further expand opportunities to become qualified in different 
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skill can only benefit these workers. At the same time, given the central role of specific skills 
in their employment position, they are unlikely to be strong advocates of policies to promote 
skill transparency simply because they are unlikely to use these policies. Finally, if skill 
specificity is related to select benefits for workers holding these skills, stably employed 
workers may oppose policies to expand skill transparency in order to safeguard these 
benefits.  
 
There remains one key problem with this explanation. Although it fits well to the case of the 
liberal market economies, it cannot explain the high support for skill transparency within 
countries with strong left party incumbency. These countries are also coordinated market 
economies, reliant on specific skills. Yet these countries largely managed to developed 
policies that support the transparent certification of skills. The central theoretical question 
provoked by this finding has to do with the consequences of skill transparency on the 
provision of specific skills.  
 
As discussed above, employers in specific skill economies generally invest highly in workers 
skills at the beginning of the employment relationship with the expectation that the long 
tenure of productive employment by these workers will help them realize a return on this 
investment. If policies increase the transparency of skills, firms’ incentives to train workers 
are weakened, because the capacity of workers to pursue alternative careers is higher. 
Maintaining high rates of firm-based training in contexts with high skill transparency 
therefore depends on subsidization of firms’ training costs. 
 
As for workers, they receive more employment opportunities in contexts with high skill 
transparency, but nevertheless face potential disadvantages. In particular, the expansion of 
policies that make it easier to gain new qualifications puts a premium on general skills in 
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contrast to specific skills. As a result, a relatively compressed wage structure may help to 
maintain high investment in specific skills. The coordinated market economies with strong 
left party incumbency indeed exemplify these characteristics that theoretically make it 
possible to combine high levels of investment in specific skills with policy reforms that 
increase skill transparency.  
Comparative Historical Case Studies 
The comparative historical case studies of education policy development in Denmark, 
Germany, and the Netherlands sought to enrich the understanding of the causal origins of 
policies that expand educational opportunities and ensure skill transparency. I grouped the 
policies that corresponded to the quantitative variables included in the skill acquisition and 
skill transparency indices into five thematic groups. These groups included the 
comprehensive school movement, state planning, firm-based training, active labour market 
policies, and qualification systems.  
 
Examining the roots of political contestation over these policy areas underscored the 
implications of political competition for education policy outcomes. Social democratic parties 
typically represented the main proponent of education reforms that expanded opportunities 
for skill acquisition and skill transparency. Social democratic parties in all three countries 
attempted to enact comprehensive schooling reforms, although the success of their attempts 
depended ultimately on their political incumbency and the strength of conservative forces in 
blocking these reforms. Social democratic parties were also the key force in the expansion of 
active labour market policies in each country 
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Beyond political competition, a second key factor in explaining differences in education 
policy reform in these three cases includes the coordinative capacity of social actors and the 
state. In Denmark and the Netherlands, the social partners and the state managed to 
implement considerable reforms in the structure of the vocational training system and the 
qualifications system. In Germany, the system has remained quite stable over time, despite 
growing signs that reforms are indeed necessary. 
Firm Interviews 
After validating the rankings of Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands on the skill 
acquisition and skill transparency dimensions and examining their causal origins, the analysis 
focused on the implication of the education policy rankings for the integration of 
marginalized workers by private firms. Structured firm interviews conducted with large 
companies in each country gauged the intensity of firms’ use of active labour market policies 
as well as the various reasons why firms did or did not participate in these programs. 
 
The findings supported the hypothesis that firms participate highly in countries with 
education systems that promote opportunities to acquire skills and ensure skill transparency. 
At the same time, firms’ role in the integration of marginalized workers was not the same 
across countries. In Denmark, the state plays a central role in creating active labor market 
policies and is able garner firms’ commitment to the implementation of these policies. The 
idea that firms are indeed responsible for addressing labor market marginalization resonates 
within the Danish context. 
 
In the Dutch case, firms generally appeared open to the idea of aiding the amelioration of 
social problems although ultimately normal firms are less engaged in the process than in 
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Denmark. Part of the reason seems to be that firms retain more autonomy in the Netherlands, 
which reduces the capacity of the state to control firms’ behavior. Moreover, although the 
state expanded active labor market policies in the nineties, the recent period has seen a large 
scale privatization of reintegration services. Beyond professional reintegration firms, private 
employment agencies also engage in state-funded reintegration projects, usually run by a 
separate wing of their organization and reintegrating thousands of workers per year.  
 
In Germany, the state spends highly on active labor market policies, but these policies do 
little to improve the employment prospects of the unemployed. Firms that do participate in 
active labor market policies tend to employ a high percentage of low skilled workers, 
suggesting that these firms do not invest highly in the skills of these workers.     
Concluding Remarks 
In many ways, the empirical analysis has raised more questions than it has answered. The 
conceptualization of education systems as involving redistributive elements introduces a new 
dimension that in turn encourages a fuller elaboration of how the determinants of the skill 
acquisition and skill transparency dimensions align with our existing knowledge of the 
determinants of redistributive policy. Moreover, given the theoretical justification of the 
necessity of high rankings on these two dimensions for addressing new economic needs, it 
remains an empirical question how education policy interacts with existing social welfare 
policies to shape individuals’ and firms’ decisions to invest in education and facilitate labor 
mobility.  
 
Beyond the social consequences of redistributive social policies, the research on production 
regimes, which highlights the impact of social policies on production strategies, draws 
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attention to the economic consequences of placement on the skill acquisition and skill 
transparency dimensions. The theoretical framework discussed and the empirical analysis 
provided evidence for the argument that the expansion of opportunities to acquire skills and 
the transparency of earned skills increases the average level of skills in the population as well 
as the distance between the group with the highest and lowest skills. In doing so, workers on 
average hold more marketable skills and employers find it relatively easier to find skilled 
personnel. The analysis, however, admittedly assumes a macro perspective that does not pay 
attention to the particular needs of a given social group or industry, which would prove a 
fruitful area for future research. The dominant focus on the macro perspective also brushed 
over power differences within workers and employer groups that certainly deserve more 
attention.  
 
Finally, by placing attention on the concept of skill transparency, the analysis has raised the 
issue of incomplete information in the knowledge that various economic actors have about 
workers’ skills as well as their preconceptions about the relationship between individual 
educational histories and the tasks required to fulfil various job profiles. Many factors are 
likely to shape the clear certification of skills and the recognition of complementarities 
between different skill sets, such as the degree of skill specificity and the strength of 
Christian democratic parties, and additional work is necessary to delineate the causal weight 
of these factors as well as their social and economic consequences. 
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APPENDIX A 
The construction of the skill acquisition and skill transparency dimensions was competed by using 
nine variables for the skill acquisition dimension and six variables for the skill transparency 
dimension. The variables are listed in Tables A1A and A1B, respectively. 
 
Table A1A: Components of Skill Acquisition Dimension 
Dimensions Definition 
Basic Investment  
Spending on Education Public expenditure per pupil as a % of GDP per capita 
for pre-primary, primary, secondary, and tertiary 
education 
  
Inherent Limitations  
No Institutional Separation Prior to 
End of Compulsory Education 
Dummy * Percent of Each Student 
Cohort in Apprenticeship Education 
The emphasis on apprenticeship training controlling for 
the potential damaging consequences of dividing 
students by ability too early in their educational career 
  
Cost Barriers  
Financial Aid Financial Aid as Percentage of Education Expenditure  
Costs of Tertiary Education Degree of Financial Relief in Tertiary Education 
  
Continuing Education  
Active Labor Market Policies Spending on ALMP as percent GDP divided by 
unemployment rate 
Regulation Encompassing Nature of Continuing Education 
Regulation 
SKILL AQUISITION The degree to which education policy supports the 
capacity and creates opportunities to enter into new 
forms of education 
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Table A1B: Dimensions of Skill Transparency 
Dimensions Definition 
Skill Forecasting  
Legacy of Forecasting Legacy and strength of skill forecasting activity 
  
Qualification Definition  
Centralization of Qualification 
Network 
Degree to which the qualifications system is centralized 
Framework for Recognizing Non-
Formal and  Informal Learning 
Degree to which there is a clear national system of 
recognizing non-formal or informal learning 
Firms’ use of External Institutions Degree to which firms use external institutions 
  
Qualification Complementarities  
Framework for Linking Different 
Occupations 
Degree to which a country has a clear framework for 
linking qualifications from different educational and 
occupational sectors 
Unitized Qualifications Qualifications are unitized and units from different 
occupations can be combined 
SKILL TRANSPARENCY The potential of educational institutions to reveal 
individuals’ qualifications and their appropriateness to 
occupations in the labor force. 
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APPENDIX B 
Basic Investment  
 
spendpre  Spending on Education as % GDP for Pre-Primary education.  
 
spendprim   Spending on Education as % GDP Per Pupil for Primary Education 
Source: UNESCO. Missing data for Canada from Education at a Glance 2004,  
 
spendsec  Index of Spending on Education as % GDP Per Pupil for Secondary Education 
Source: UNESCO. Missing data for Canada from Education at a Glance 2004,  
 
spendter  Index of Spending on Education as % GDP Per Pupil for Tertiary Education 
Source: UNESCO. Missing data for Germany from Eurostat.  
 
Inherent Limitations  
 
ability*apprentices  Division by Ability before Completion of Compulsory Education 
  Countries receive 0 if this is true and 1 is this is not true. 
 Source: www.inca.org, http://www.eurydice.org/portal/page/portal/Eurydice 
   This dummy variable is then multiplied by the percent of the school cohort 
   who enters apprenticeship training. Source: OECD, 1999, and OECD, 2007,  
   see www.oecd.org/edu/eag2007.  
 
Cost Barriers  
 
teraid Financial Aid as a Percentage of Government Expenditure on Tertiary 
Education. Source: Education at a Glance 2007, Table B5.2.  
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finaid Financial Aid as Percentage of Education Expenditure 
Source: Eurostat. Missing data for Australia, Canada and New Zealand from 
Education at a Glance, OECD, 1998.  
 
almp Spending on active labour market policies as a percent of GDP. Source: OECD.
  
 
conted Degree of Institutionalization of Continuing Training 
 The values for this variable were derived from the many sources. The coding 
scheme is the following: 0: training decisions predominantly made on firm 
level; 1: training decisions predominantly made through collective agreements; 
2: training is regulated through legislation or controlled through an obligatory 
levy on firms.  
 
 A report from Eiro-online supplied the data for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, 
Switzerland, UK, and US. (Caprile & Llorens 1998) 
 
The following shows where the data came from for other countries:  
 Australia: (Cully 2002) 
Bulgaria: (Neykov 2004) 
Canada: (Betcherman et al 1998) 
Czech Republic: (Hála & Kroupa 2005) 
Estonia: (Karu M & K. 2007) 
Greece: (Papadogamvros 1998) 
Hungary: (Whitman 2003) 
Italy: (D & V. 2002) 
Japan: (Gasskov 1994) 
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Latvia: (Karnite 2004) 
Lithuania:(Blaziene & Gruzevskis 2005) 
Norway:(Nergaard 1999) 
Poland:(Sroka 2005) 
Portugal: (de Paz et al 2007) 
Romania: (Preda 2004) 
Slovenia: (Kanjuo Mrčela & Kajič 2005) 
Spain: (Albarracín 2005) 
 
Forecasting  
 
forecast Legacy of Forecasting 
 The length and intensity of skill forecasting. 
 
 Australia: Manpower planning discussed in national employment report (Isaac 
1960); Many firm-based HR studies completed throughout 1980s (Kane & 
Stanton 1991) 
Austria: since the 1960s (Lassnigg 2002) 
Belgium: through ROA as with the Netherlands (ILO 2007) 
Bulgaria: Weak (2007) 
Canada: since 1969 (Ahamad & Blaug 1973; Boswell et al 2004) 
Czech Republic: No current forecasting activity (Havlíèková 1999) 
Denmark: Well developed forecasting methods (Lindskog 2004) 
Estonia: Established forecasts began in lates 1990s – first year of data is 1997 
(Zukersteinova & Strietska-Ilina 2007) 
Finland: Since the end of the 1960s the National Board of Education 
implemented a manpower forecast (Zukersteinova & Strietska-Ilina, p.73) 
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France: late 1940s (Ahamad & Blaug 1973; Zukersteinova & Strietska-Ilina 
2007, p.15) 
Germany: mid-1960s (Havlíèková 1999, p.18); by IAB since 1969 (Boswell et 
al 2004, p. 25). 
Greece: early 1980s (Zukersteinova & Strietska-Ilina 2007, p.97) 
Hungary: Undeveloped (Schmidt et al 2003) 
Ireland: institutionalized since 1993 (Zukersteinova & Strietska-Ilina 2007, p. 
18); some early attempts in 60s but didn’t really get underway until mid-1970s 
when the government established AnCO, the National Training and 
Employment Authority. 
Italy: First forecasts were in 2003 (Zukersteinova & Strietska-Ilina 2007) 
Japan: Well established methods (Neugart & SchÖMann 2002a) 
Latvia: No experience yet (Jakobsons 2006) 
Lithuania: Since 1991 (Gruzevskis & Sventickaite 2006) 
Netherlands: prior to 1970 (Zukersteinova & Strietska-Ilina 2007, p.17) 
New Zealand: There were models in the 1980s (Papps 2001) 
Norway: Established practices (Lindskog 2004) 
Poland: Though there appears to be good data, a team of experts was just set up 
in 1998 to develop a forecasting system for Poland (Havlíèková 1999, p. 155) 
Portugal: early 1980s (Sellin 2000, p. 129) 
Romania: Skill forecasting in a “nascent phase” – at last post-1992 
(Zukersteinova & Strietska-Ilina 2007) 
Slovenia: There is a survey on education and training needs from the national 
employment service, but this does not lead to good predictions of training needs 
(Havlíèková 1999) 
Spain: Weak development (Neugart & SchÖMann 2002a) 
Sweden: 1930s (Ahamad & Blaug 1973) 
Switzerland: Weak development (Gilomen 2002) 
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United Kingdom: At least by the early 1970s (Wilson 1994) 
United States: early 1950s (Zukersteinova & Strietska-Ilina 2007, p.15); at least 
1954 (Boswell et al 2004, p. 32) 
 
Clarity of Qualifications  
 
central Centralization 
See Blog, I. (2007). “Education and Training Policy Qualifications Systems: 
Bridges to Lifelong Learning Complete Edition-ISBN 9264013679.” Countries 
where the qualifications system is unified throughout its regions and control lies 
with one main agency or 
with government: 3. This is definitely true for my country; 2. This is only 
partially true for my country; 1. There is only limited 
experience of this in my country; and 0. This is not present in my country. 
 
accred Accreditation of Prior Learning 
See Blog, I. (2007). “Education and Training Policy Qualifications Systems: 
Bridges to Lifelong Learning Complete Edition-ISBN 9264013679.” Countries 
where there is a clear national programme or system for recognising non-formal 
or informal learning: 3. This is definitely true for my country; 2. This is only 
partially true for my country; 1. There is only limited experience of this in my 
country; and 0. This is not present in my country. 
 
exttrain Firm Use of External Institutions 
 All data comes from CVTS except for the following countries. For 
Australia (Dawe 2003).  
 
Qualification Complementarities  
208 
 
link  Linking Complementarities  
Source: Blog, I.(2007). “Education and Training Policy Qualifications Systems: 
Bridges to Lifelong Learning Complete Edition-ISBN 9264013679.” Countries 
with an explicit framework linking qualifications from different educational and 
occupational sectors: 3. This is definitely true for my country; 2. This is only 
partially true for my country; 1. There is only limited experience of this in my 
country; and 0. This is not present in my country. 
 
unit Unitized Qualification
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Validity Check of Table 2.3: Correlations with Skill Acquisition Index 
 
Low Adult Literacy: The source of the measure is the Adult Literacy Survey. 
 
Information Age Literacy: The source of the measure is the Adult Literacy Survey. 
 
Percent Early School Leavers (early): The source of this measure is Eurostat (Extracted 30 May 2008). 
It includes the percent of the population aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education 
and not in further education or training. The measure is an average of data from 2003 to 2007.  
 
Gross Tertiary Enrolment (enroll): The source of this measure is the United Nations Educational, 
Scienctific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). It includes the total gross enrolment of 
students in the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 5 and 6.  
 
Participation in Continuing Education (cvt): The source for this variable includes Eurstat, UNESCO, 
and two publications reporting specifically for Japan and Slovenia (Kurosawa 2001; 
Medvešek-Miloševič 2007). 
 
Percent in Recent Training Activity (recent): The source of this measure is Eurostat (Extracted 30 May 
2008). It includes the percent of the population aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary 
education and not in further education or training. The measure is an average of annual data 
from 2003 to 2007. 
 
Unemployment - Primary School (unprim): The source of this measure is Eurostat (Extracted 24 April 
2008). It includes the percent of the population aged 15-64 who are unemploymed and hold at 
most a degree equivalent to ISCED levels 0 to 2 (Pre-primary, primary and lower secondary 
education). The measure is an average of quarterly data from 2000 to 2007. 
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Unemployment - Secondary School (unsec): The source of this measure is Eurostat (Extracted 24 
April 2008). It includes the percent of the population aged 15-64 who are unemploymed and 
hold at most a degree equivalent to ISCED levels 3 to 4 (Upper secondary and post-secondary 
non-tertiary education). The measure is an average of quarterly data from 2001 to 2007. 
 
Employment Gap - Tertiary – Secondary (diffem): This measure is the difference between the 
employment level of those with tertiary degree minus the employment level of those with a 
secondary school finishing degree. The source of this measure is Eurostat (Extracted 22 May 
2008). Both employment data measures include the percent of the population aged 25-64 who 
are employed. The measure for tertiary education includes those with a degree of equivalence 
ISCED 5 or 6, the measures for secondary degree includes those with a degree of equivalensce 
ISCED 3 to 4. The measure is an average of annual data from 2003 to 2007. 
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Table B2. Data Included in Table 3. 
country lowlit inage early enrol cvt recent unprim unsec diffem 
Australia     67.20 24.00     
Austria    9.50 49.20 33.00 11.80 8.30 3.80 10.10 
Belgium  0.06 0.72 12.50 57.90 26.50 7.70 12.40 7.70 10.40 
Bulgaria    19.70 41.60 15.00 1.30 25.20 12.50 10.30 
Canada  0.10 0.62  67.50 28.00     
Czech 
Republic  
0.07 0.69 
6.00 35.00 37.50 5.60 23.40 6.90 10.30 
Denmark  0.04 0.72 10.10 64.00 40.00 27.10 7.10 4.20 6.00 
Estonia    13.40 57.10 24.00 6.50 19.10 10.20 8.80 
Finland  0.03 0.80 8.50 82.80 42.00 22.80 14.60 9.10 9.60 
France    12.70 52.80 46.00 7.30 12.80 7.80 7.40 
Germany  0.08 0.63 13.10 33.80 30.00 7.30 17.10 9.60 12.40 
Greece    14.90 66.40 14.00 2.10 9.00 12.50 13.50 
Hungary  0.19 0.45 12.00 46.10 15.00 4.00 13.50 6.10 11.50 
Ireland  0.17 0.53 12.30 50.90 10.00 6.90 7.30 3.80 10.00 
Italy  0.16 0.52 21.60 54.40 14.00 5.80 9.60 7.80 7.40 
Japan     48.90 40.00     
Latvia    16.10 61.90 11.00 7.60 17.00 10.00 10.60 
Lithuania    9.90 60.00 15.00 5.20 16.50 11.90 12.70 
Netherlands  0.06 0.74 13.30 53.80 29.00 16.20 5.40 3.10 7.40 
New Zealand  0.16 0.55  70.10 36.00     
Norway  0.06 0.75 5.40 70.70 37.00 17.80 7.40 3.30 8.40 
Poland  0.29 0.36 5.60 53.50 16.00 4.80 25.30 18.00 20.60 
Portugal    38.80 49.10 28.00 4.00 6.70 6.70 7.00 
Romania    21.20 32.20 17.00 1.30 7.90 8.50 14.90 
Slovenia  0.21 0.43 4.50 62.70 35.60 14.90 9.60 6.50 12.70 
Spain    30.90 59.90 33.00 8.10 12.20 10.40 8.20 
Sweden  0.04 0.79 10.30 70.50 46.00 32.30 10.70 5.70 5.70 
Switzerland  0.08 0.67 9.20 39.80 15.00 25.70 6.40 3.30 9.30 
United 
Kingdom  
0.20 0.50 
14.70 56.70 38.50 27.60 8.40  6.70 
United States  0.26 0.41   77.10 35.00     4.80   
 
Table 2.4. Validity Check: Correlations with Skill Transparency Index - All variables in Table 4 are 
also in Table 3. Please refer to above descriptions. 
 
Table 2.5. Active Labor Market Policies and Indices of Education Mobility 
 
Spending on Active Labor Market Policies (total): This measure is the spending on all active labor 
market policies as a percent of GDP divided by the rate of unemployment. The source of this 
measure is data on active labor market policies downloaded from the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Extracted 1 June 2008) and 
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unemployment data from the OECD (Extracted 1 June 2008). The data is an average of annual 
data between 2001 and 2005. 
 
Subsets of ALMP: Training (train): This measure is the spending on the subgroup of active labor 
market policies entitled training policies as a percent of GDP divided by the rate of 
unemployment. The source of this measure is data on active labor market policies downloaded 
from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Extracted 1 
June 2008) and unemployment data from the OECD (Extracted 1 June 2008). The data is an 
average of annual data between 2001 and 2005. 
 
Subsets of ALMP: Recruitment (recruit): This measure is the spending on the subgroup of active labor 
market policies entitled recruitment policies as a percent of GDP divided by the rate of 
unemployment. The source of this measure is data on active labor market policies downloaded 
from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Extracted 1 
June 2008) and unemployment data from the OECD (Extracted 1 June 2008). The data is an 
average of annual data between 2001 and 2005. 
 
Subsets of ALMP: Disabled (support): This measure is the spending on the subgroup of active labor 
market policies entitled supported employment and rehabilitation policies as a percent of GDP 
divided by the rate of unemployment. The source of this measure is data on active labor 
market policies downloaded from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) (Extracted 1 June 2008) and unemployment data from the OECD 
(Extracted 1 June 2008). The data is an average of annual data between 2001 and 2005. 
 
Subsets of ALMP: Direct Job Creation (direct): This measure is the spending on the subgroup of 
active labor market policies entitled direct job creation policies as a percent of GDP divided 
by the rate of unemployment. The source of this measure is data on active labor market 
policies downloaded from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
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(OECD) (Extracted 1 June 2008) and unemployment data from the OECD (Extracted 1 June 
2008). The data is an average of annual data between 2001 and 2005. 
 
Table B3. Data Included in Table 2.5. 
country total train recruit support direct
Australia 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Austria 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01
Belgium 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.06
Bulgaria      
Canada 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Czech Republic 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Denmark 0.31 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.00
Estonia      
Finland 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01
France 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03
Germany 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02
Greece 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Hungary 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Ireland 0.15 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.06
Italy 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
Japan 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Latvia      
Lithuania      
Netherlands 0.33 0.05 0.01 0.16 0.06
New Zealand 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00
Norway 0.15 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.02
Poland 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Portugal 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01
Romania      
Slovenia      
Spain 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Sweden 0.21 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.00
Switzerland  0.07 0.02 0.07 0.00
United Kingdom 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
 
 
Table 6. Political Factors and Indices of Skill Acquisition and Skill Transparency 
 
Cumulative Left Cabinet Share (left): This measure is the cumulative proportion of seats that left 
parties held in government since 1946. The data sources is Evelyne Huber, Charles Ragin, 
John D. Stephens, David Brady, and Jason Beckfield, Comparative Welfare States Data Set, 
Northwestern University, University of North Carolina, Duke University and Indiana 
University, 2004. 
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Cumulative Christian Democratic Cabinet Share (Christian): This measure is the cumulative 
proportion of seats that Christian and catholic parties held in government since 1946. The data 
sources is Evelyne Huber, Charles Ragin, John D. Stephens, David Brady, and Jason 
Beckfield, Comparative Welfare States Data Set, Northwestern University, University of 
North Carolina, Duke University and Indiana University, 2004. 
 
Employer Organization (employer): The measure is a compilation of three other measures of 
employment organization: Traxler et al index of employer association integration in national 
policy process; Z-score index of existence of national employers association and powers of 
that association; and Soskice scale of coordination of employers associations in collective 
bargaining. The source of the data is the dataset used for Martin and Swank (2004). 
Table B4. Data Included in Table 2.6. 
country left christian employer
Australia 19.94 0 -0.16
Austria 33.38 20.75 0.63
Belgium 18.98 28.32 0.25
Bulgaria   
Canada 0 0 -1.78
Czech Republic  
Denmark 32.18 0.42 0.63
Estonia   
Finland 22.93 0 0.82
France 16.17 3.97 0.22
Germany 14.56 28.99 0.75
Greece   
Hungary   
Ireland 5.98 0 -0.37
Italy 8.56 39.7 -0.29
Japan 1.37 0 -0.03
Latvia   
Lithuania   
Netherlands 13.66 30.08 0.07
New Zealand 17.33 0 -0.76
Norway 40.54 3.44 1.03
Poland   
Portugal   
Romania   
Slovenia   
Spain   
Sweden 44.86 0.45 0.52
Switzerland 14.4 15.11 0.35
United Kingdom 19.83 0 -0.72
United States 0 0 -1.78
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